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This study assesses how accountability is practiced and justified in collaboration of cross-sector 
organisations and community.  It addresses three main questions: firstly, what are the roles of 
actors in collaborative working setting of repeated flooding, where government organisations and 
non-government organisations, civil society groups, and individuals all work together in dealing 
with this recurring issue; secondly, what is working relationship between different actors in four 
phases of disaster management; and thirdly,  how does accountability arrangement affect actions 
in every disaster phase. 
These three questions are addressed through case study approach conducted between 2015-2019. 
The research involves qualitative analysis of collected data from field work and semi-structured 
interviews with actors who involve in disaster management. This data is complemented by 
document analysis. 
There is a contrast in the response to disaster management between the state and some communities 
and local NGOs. The communities and local NGOs respond to natural disaster according to their 
ancestral beliefs and knowledge about their relationship with nature. In contrast, local government 
institutions often execute transactional projects which are measured by results of short-term 
activities. Local communities use their knowledge from generation to generation in preserving and 
treating nature as part of their life but this does not inform government activities in the 
development of the natural environment (e.g, farming and tourism sectors).   
This study finds that accountability concept is recognised differently by the state (local government 
of Garut officers) and people, including NGOs and donors. The state defines accountability as a 
hierarchical mechanism which is manifested in the form of reports to higher authority within state 
system. However, accountability in disaster management has different aspects including the 
natural environment as an actor. Nature has a significant influence in understandings of the concept 
of accountability in disaster responses. There are two types of accountability within this context. 
Accountability between actors which is influenced by nature and between actors with nature. The 
first accountability type is a negotiable accountability and the second accountability type is non-
negotiable type of accountability. 
Understandings of accountability in developing countries needs to engage with the idea of the 
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“[T]he most deadly killer in any humanitarian emergency is not dehydration, measles, 
malnutrition or the weather, it is bad management . . .” (John Telford, former senior emergency 
preparedness and response officer, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as cited by 
Hulm (1994))   
Located in one of the most southernmost locations of West Java (Indonesia), Garut is highly 
vulnerable to many kinds of natural disasters (Kurniawan, Yunus, Robi Amri, & Pramudiarta, 
2011). Garut has a population of 2,585,000 and an area of 3.065,19 km2 (Statistics of Garut 
Regency, 2017). It is located in the geographical area of volcanic activity known as the "Ring of 
Fire" where the majority of the world’s active volcanoes are found.  Garut is surrounded by six 
mountains, of which two are active volcanoes. Its position makes Garut vulnerable to natural 
disasters such as volcanic eruptions and floods. Garut has previously experienced different types 
of natural hazards including; volcanic eruptions, tsunami, earthquake, landslides, drought, bushfire 
and flooding. However, flooding is the most frequent disaster to occur in this area. The majority 
of people who live in the city, especially near the river Cimanuk, experience regular flooding every 
rainy season. This is caused by poor planning and infrastructure development, as well as high 
levels of precipitation.  
Local disaster response can often be chaotic, a good example of this is when a flash flood swept 
through Garut on 20th - 21st September 2016. The flash flood killed 34 people with a further 19 
missing and still unaccounted for (BNPB, 2016). At least a thousand houses as well as numerous 
schools, bridges, a public hospital, and office buildings were all destroyed. This kind of flooding 
was not a unique situation for Garut, a city which faces similar issues every year. Local disaster 
response issues are numerous and varied and include: slow response times, poor coordination, poor 
communication, poor collaboration, logistical ineptitude, as well as a general lack of capability 
and skills. One big question is why authorities do not learn from previous disaster experiences 
(especially flooding). The authorities always seem to ‘muddle’ when tackling disasters. 
The National Board of Disaster Management (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana/ BNPB) 
is the primary national organisation mandated to help with dealing with natural disasters in 
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Indonesia. At the more local level there are local boards of disaster management (Badan 
Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah/BPBD). However, these organisations often fail to execute 
their disaster management duties. For example, Garut BPBD was overwhelmed by the flooding of 
September 2016. Its function as a coordinator, a command, and a manager for disaster management 
can be clearly surmised as having failed as there was so many victims caused by this flooding.  
The management response of this flash flood can be simply classed as chaotic. While considerable 
help came from different organisations, volunteers, and communities, this help can be 
characterised here as working to help victims without any direction and instruction. Some victims 
were evacuated to safer places but more victims were left abandoned on the roofs of their houses 
as no help came to their area. Many victims and properties affected by the flash flood condemned 
the incapability of local government in tackling this natural disaster. The local government was 
deemed to have failed to learn from multiple previous experiences of flooding in the city.  
On the 21st September 2016, the head of the local government in Garut (Bupati), Rudy Gunawan,  
instructed the military to take over by issuing a decree that the BPBD was regarded as incapable 
of coping with this disaster. The military created a task force team for tackling the flooding. This 
was more successful but did not solve all the problems or deal with all the needs of victims. Victims 
in certain area such as Cimacan and Lapang Paris received many donations for their needs whereas 
in some other areas such as Rengganis and Sanding, people were not so fortunate. It was caused 
by a lack of information about affected areas. Some NGOs and volunteers joined the team, but 
others preferred to work on their own. This made the whole situation more complex in terms of 
coordination and communication amongst disaster relief agencies and participants. The BPBD is 
expected to be an organisation that can play a central role in disaster management. The failure of 
response during the 2016 Garut flash flood is here deemed to have been caused by a failure of 
preparedness, with further failings in the mitigation phase of the disaster management.  
The local government of Garut’s disaster management failed in the mitigation phase because 
development and spatial plans ignored the individual geographical characteristics of the area and 
local wisdom to preserve nature. This failure led to incapability in preparation to face flooding. 
There was very little local education and training about awareness to flooding, insufficient 
development of early warning systems, and insufficient preparation of evacuation and logistics for 
flooding events. The fact that many people died and lost their properties is here cited as a prime 
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example of bad disaster management. This bad disaster response management continued into the 
recovery phase. People who lived near the river refused to be moved to alternative living locations. 
Afforestation and river embankment programmes also did not solve the problem.  
Beside the BPBD, there are several government institutions which are expected to contribute to 
mitigate and respond to flooding such as the military, Local Development Plan, Natural Resource 
Conservation Board, etc. But, these government institutions seemingly cannot cope with repeated 
flooding in Garut. This then reduces the levels of trust society has in government institutions, 
which are now blamed when flooding occurs. As a result, many NGOs, donors and volunteers 
prefer to work by themselves without involving government institutions. In 2016 many people 
neglected orders from government officers to move their belongings and families to alternative 
locations (provided by local government). Although many actors were involved, the flooding was 
deemed by local people as ‘far from having been prevented or its effect on communities having 
been minimised’. A large budget of 14 billion rupiah (USD 983.843,00) was allocated by 
government for response and recovery in 2016. However local government and communities failed 
to work collaboratively since they had different perspectives about the flooding.  
 
Some communities and local NGOs try and live according to their ancestral knowledge and beliefs 
about their relationship with nature. For example, they stick to zoning of forest which was created 
by their ancestors to guide them in cultivating land. This decision-making can often be in conflict 
with planners and disaster relief organisations.   Local government institutions often use 
transactional project-based collaborations whose responsibility is measured by the results of short-
term project. In contrast to this, local communities use their knowledge from generation to 
generation of preserving and treating nature as part of their life, but this has not balanced 
government activities in development of area which have deteriorated nature (e.g. the farming and 
tourism sectors).     
Government institutions, NGOs, and enterprises in Indonesia often work based on the demands of 
higher authorities. It seems that in Indonesia many people in this field regard their duties as 
successful if their higher authority (or an entity who gave them their jobs) is happy with their 
reports. The valuation of many roles and jobs is seemingly based on institutional output and not 
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the mitigation and response to natural disasters. Accountability measurement is seemingly based 
on hierarchical procedure or vertical accountability.     
Every organisation that works collaboratively comes with their own objectives and goals apart 
from humanitarian purposes. Government institutions intend to prove to their citizen that they fulfil 
their duty to serve society as the taxpayers. Hierarchically, they want to demonstrate their 
capability to accomplish their responsibilities. On the other hand, NGOs want to demonstrate to 
their donors or funders the impact of the financial help they have received. To some extent, these 
conditions create ‘conflicts of interest’ because this type of collaboration consists of institutions 
with discretion of activities between them which is non-contractual. 
My research shows that responding to repeated flooding facilitates cross-sector collaboration 
among different organisations, enterprises and individuals. However, working collaboratively in 
every phase of a disaster response could not solve all the problems of flooding. It is obvious that 
the local government of Garut, with its different agencies that contribute to disaster management, 
(particularly flooding), has failed to learn the lessons from previous flooding in order to prevent 
future flooding. They work based on a system which is adapted from a mish-mash of imported 
administration systems from the western world without sufficient less adoption of the local context 
of environmental characteristic. This issue is mirrored within to non-government organisations, 
enterprises and individuals that are involved in flood responses.  
One significant challenge is ‘accountability setting’. Accountability is understood as a social 
interaction among agencies, whether formal or informal. In Indonesia this often neglects to take 
sufficient account of environmental factors (nature and its society); or what Riggs calls the 
‘prismatic society’  which is an environment and its social system they work together could 
significantly determine outcomes of their collaboration (Riggs, 1960b). In order to create better 
performance, which in turn could prevent the loss of life and property, there is a significant need 











1.1  Introduction  
The main objective of this thesis is to assess accountability in disaster management collaborative 
working contexts where dynamic relationships exist among actors in cross-sector organisations. 
This study assesses how accountability is practiced and justified in cross-sector organisations.  
This chapter starts by introducing the issues. The first section of this chapter shows the background 
to my research, which includes the workings of Indonesian public administration in the context of 
this research, and the potential of collaborative working by the (hoped for) evolution of public 
administration in Indonesia. The second section of this chapter explains my reasons for conducting 
this study. This is followed by: i) the aims and objectives of this study; ii) the wider significance 
of this study; and iii) it’s contribution to this field. The final section of this chapter outlines the 
structure of the overall thesis.     
 
1.2 Research Problem 
Garut is one of a local government in Indonesia in regency level. Its area has 306.519 Ha (3.065,19 
km²) with the population is 2.718.330. Figure 1 shows location of Garut within West Java province. 
It is located in the south of West Java province. Garut is claimed as the second most vulnerable 
city for natural disaster in Indonesia (Kurniawan et al, 2014). As a consequence, local government 
of Garut created a local government regulation No. 7 Year 2011 about establishment and 
organisational structure of Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah/ BPBD (Local Board Disaster 
Management) in Garut. There are other regulations which are not specifically designed for 
responding disasters directly, but they might relate to disaster management since disaster 
management consists of mitigation, preparedness, response and rehabilitation. The regulations and 






Source: The Local Government of Garut archive  
Repeated flooding to the city occurs every year during the rainy season in Garut. The areas covered 
by flooding differ in size and intensity thus causing differing impacts on the socio-economic lives 
of citizens (see table 1). The different actors who are involved in responses to these disasters also 
suffer impacts. If the flooding affects a small area with minimum damage only a few numbers of 
actors are involved. This research focuses on the flooding response during the devastating flooding 
that occurred on 20th-21st September 2016 in Garut. This killed 34 citizens, 20 are still missing, 
6,361 citizens fled from their houses, 1,784 houses were destroyed as well as four educational 
buildings, fifteen religion facilities, and two hospitals. The responses include four phases of 
Figure 1 : Map of Garut 
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disaster management, where each phase influences subsequent phases. Flooding occurs in some of 
this area every year, but this study focuses on the 2016 case and its disruption. 
The flash flood traversed six kecamatan (sub-districts) in Garut (Garut Kota, Bayongbong, 
Karangpawitan, Tarogong Kidul, Taragong Kaler, and Banyuresmi). It continued to neighbour 
kabupaten (district) Sumedang before crossing Cirebon district and discharging into the Java Sea. 
It is suggested here that this example is an excellent case to use to try to understand the 
accountability concept of collaborative work among Indonesian participants during the sudden 
onset of a disaster response phase.  
Table 1: Flooding and its consequences in the last 10 years in Garut 
Source: National Board of Disaster Management Indonesia (BNPB, 2018) Retrieved from 
http://dibi.bnpb.go.id/ 
 
The impetus to conduct this research started when issues of collaboration among government 
institutions and with non-government organisations received significant attention from Indonesian 
authorities subsequent to the collapse of the dictator model of centralistic government (i.e. the 
Soeharto era) marked by the Reformasi movement in the late 1990’s. A decentralisation model of 
public administration emerged where every local government would manage its region based on 
its own characteristic and needs. Local government was envisaged to involve cross-sector 
collaboration involving private enterprises and/or non-governmental institutions. With respect to 
















2018 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2017 5 2 0 2,438 24 3 248 524 1 2 3 
2016 14 54 9 9,387 806 433 1,094 1,271 2 17 50 
2015 5 0 0 1,200 11 0 0 397 0 0 0 
2014 11 1 0 5,906 63 1 109 1,136 0 2 0 
2013 4 0 0 3,887 0 0 0 197 0 0 0 
2012 4 0 0 7,499 3 3 7 547 0 0 0 
2011 2 13 7 1,405 638 1,264 1,336 0 2 40 8 
2010 12 1 8 0 105 0 213 421 0 4 0 
2009 3 0 0 320 2 0 0 66 0 1 1 
4 
 
disaster management, the strong concern from the central government of Indonesia for 
collaboration is exemplified by the issuance of Law No 24 (2007) about Disaster Countermeasure  
(Government of Indonesia, 2007c) and presidential decree No 8 (2008) about Badan National 
Penanggulangan Bencana/ National Board Disaster Management.  
In this study empirical investigation is carried out to study actors’ accountability in the 
collaborative working of disaster management in Garut where repeated flood occurs every year. 
Actors are from government institutions, civil society organisations, enterprises and individuals. 
This research looks at: i) why collaborative working failed to reach better performance which then 
lead to worse situations; and ii) how actors create accountability in this context. This research 
focuses on the actors involved in tackling flood response in the four recognised phases of disaster 
management (mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery).  
An area of particular focus of this study regards how actors perform their accountability to other 
actors within collaborations as well as relationships with externals (such as other organisations, 
citizens, individual, media, donors, victims/ beneficiaries, etc.). In particular, this thesis scrutinises 
the extent to which collaborative working in disaster response might be informed and improved 
through accountability process of involved actors which in turn can create better performance for 
beneficiaries and citizens as a whole. Much of this new research focuses on the actors who are in 
charge of collaborations. They are leaders of the organisations or representing organisations, 
policy makers, community leaders, parliament member, and media. Their understanding of 
collaboration process is important to analyse how accountability is experienced and passed.   
It is asserted here that this research is of particular interest since it explores accountability in a 
system of disaster management in a comprehensive holistic manner. It is the belief of the author 
of this study that accountability does not only work within a single event of interaction. One related 
event might affect the following event in a process of cycle such in disaster management. 
Moreover, a collaborator in disaster response may have very different motives although they have 
the same goals for victims or citizens as a whole. Financial traffic in disaster responses come from 
different resources such as public fund, international and local donation, corporate social 




1.3 Personal Rationale 
There are two main reasons why I wanted to conduct a research study on collaborative working 
accountability in natural disaster response in Garut. Firstly, I have lived in this area for my entire 
life prior to commencing this Ph.D. The flooding affects so many of my fellow citizens and our 
local public infrastructure every year. I am very committed to safety and specifically the better life 
of my fellow citizens who live in a city which experiences annual flooding. Moreover, the flooding 
hit Garut again with a great impact to community and infrastructures during my study in University 
of Liverpool in 2016. Some of my neighbours died my family members lost their properties which 
were swept by the flooding. This strengthen my motivation to study this case with my expectation 
could contribute for better disaster management by understanding accountability model. 
Secondly, this is appealing to me since I am a member of a local NGO, FK3I (Forum Komunikasi 
Kader Konservasi Communication Forum of Indonesia/ Indonesia Conservation Cadre)  whose 
concern is to protect nature in Garut. Since joining the FK3I, I have worked with different 
organisations from government and non-governmental sectors to address the issue of 
environmental deterioration.   
I hold the viewpoint that if repeated flooding can be prevented, or at least can be mitigated by 
proper management in each disaster management phase with roles from government and involved 
actors including local communities, it can create good governance in facing other natural disaster 
issues. In turn, local government would be trusted and respected by its citizens and the levels of 
appreciation given to local government institutions from NGOs, donors, and private enterprises 
would be stronger. I postulate here that the impacts and effects of collaboration would improve 
significantly if better governance can be pursued and achieved. 
 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
After discussing the current situation of accountability in collaborative working in an Indonesian 
disaster management context and after reviewing some key literature, this study will then focus on 
analysing and assessing the collaborative working accountability in the tackling of repeated 
flooding which happens in Garut District, West Java, Indonesia.  
This study is focused on how the practices of accountability in the collaborative working setting 
of repeated flooding, where government organisations and non-government organisations, civil 
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society groups, and individuals all work together in dealing with this recurring issue. Disaster 
management issues not only involve government agencies, other agencies, non-government 
organisations and citizens are also involved. Flooding is different from unpredicted sudden onset 
disasters such as earthquake which occurs without prior notifications and on unpredictable 
timelines. Flooding is a predictable disaster that can happen because of nature, such as weather 
(heavy rain), or human involvement, such as deforestation and poor planning. Responding to 
flooding is multi-faceted; flood responses can occur pre-disaster, during disaster, and post-disaster. 
Indonesian responses may involve two or more agencies or organisations in every phase. 
Collaboration between agencies or organisations can be executed with or without prior agreement. 
For example, a government institution can invite enterprises to build river embankments, 
reforestation, housing for victims, and other infrastructure development. This normally occurs 
during mitigation and recovery phases of disaster. However, during response phase collaboration 
can also incidentally occur because of the turbulence and chaotic nature of the disaster that attracts 
many organisations to be involved in helping people.   
Accountability is viewed here as a tool to create a good order in every aspect of life (as per 
Romzek, 2014). However, repeated flooding to the city questions the existence of sufficient 
accountability of involved actors. There is a budget allocated regularly to cope with disaster issues; 
however seemingly the large number of organisations, donors and volunteers involved can’t solve 
Garut’s flooding problems.    
To address this topic a number of key research questions are posed. These are: 
1. What are the roles of actors in this disaster management? 
2. What are the working relationships between the different actors? 
3. How does accountability arrangement affect actions in every disaster phase?  
A main aim of this research is to provide a valid theoretical and conceptual framework to analyse 
and assess accountability within a collaborative mechanism when the context setting is a repetitive 
natural disaster in a developing country. This research approaches this subject from the viewpoint 
of the cultural and social setting of the developing country, which, it is argued in this study, may 
have a very different perspective of accountability.  This thesis seeks to understand actors’ 
accountability to different kind of forums within collaborative systems and/or to external forum. 
This research explores how accountability is practiced and experienced by actors in a collaboration 
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setting. This research examines whether accountability deficits exist in collaborative working 
within disaster responses.  
Another aim of this research is to extend our knowledge of the mechanics of social groups within 
Indonesia; a country which has experienced very distinct recent shifting political and 
administrative systems of government. This recent evolution has helped contribute to massive 
changes in social interactions within a society which has shifted from a very predominantly 
agrarian society to one which is being markedly transformed due to: i) the integration with global 
industries; ii) the marked acceleration of widespread technological development throughout the 
country; and iii) the dissemination of new technologies, which in Indonesia can be seen to all have 
come hand-in-hand. Within this report I provide a new framework of collaborative working 
accountability that can strengthen the performance of disaster management, which in turn has 
implications, if implemented, for future better governance. 
 
1.5 Significant of Study 
Findings from this study could potentially be of significant use for the community of Garut. Local 
government institution actors could develop greater trust from peer institutions, communities and 
non-government actors. It is hoped that this study provides clear evidence of how actors involved 
in natural disasters (especially repeated flooding) face differing accountability mechanisms; 
evidence of how actors perceive and practice their accountability in every phase of disaster 
response; evidence of how actors react to consequences which they face caused by their 
performance during disaster responses; and evidence of how actors respond to accountability 
arrangement in disaster management.  
In the field of accountability, this research may contribute to the development of an improved 
framework of accountability in cross sector collaboration in disaster management cyclic responses. 
It is argued in this study that one phase of disaster response contributes to the next phase. There is 
also considerable influence due to the unpredictability of nature. Previous scholars such as Romzek 
and Dubnick (1987), Bovens (2007) and Schillemans (2013) have claimed that accountability is a 
relational context between actors, and to whom this accountability is rendered; however this 




1.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is structured into nine chapters with Chapter 1 the introduction. Chapter 2 is the main 
chapter. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical literature used to frame this research. This thesis classes 
itself as interdisciplinary research as it intersects public administration study and sociological 
study. Chapter 2 focuses on research aimed at analysing and assessing accountability in the 
collaborative working of disaster management; within Chapter 2 some key literature in 
accountability, collaborative working and disaster management are reviewed. Chapter 2 starts by 
reviewing the broader concepts of accountability and evolution of accountability in three different 
public administration process with the purpose of illuminating, through the analysis of case studies, 
our understanding of accountability experienced by actors. This analysis is followed by a review 
of the current theory of collaboration concept. In addition to these fundamental theories, the 
context of disaster management is provided. The main reason for this literature review is to 
highlight relevant concepts from, and the limitations of, previous research. By understanding 
current theories and literatures about accountability, this literature review then leads to the design 
of an innovative new theoretical framework that forms the guidance concept of this research. 
Chapter 3 introduces the research methodology applied in this research.  This research applied 
qualitative case study techniques.  The reason to apply a case study research strategy is based on 
the phenomenon of accountability in natural disaster responses contexts, particularly within 
collaborative working, which requires a clear definition based on specific context. A case study is 
selected since it has the ability to understand context-setting which leads to theory development 
and thus will expand the current limits of existing theory (as per Flyvberg, 2011). In this study 
existing theory is used as a skeleton; a structure which requires empirical richness to help achieve 
the best understanding from a range of different contexts.  
Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7, are analysis of data from the different phases of disaster management; 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery respectively. These chapters assess and analyse 
actors’ accountability; actors’ who work collaboratively in each phase by using a sociological 
accountability framework which has been integrated with a prismatic society concept. Chapter 4 
focuses on mitigation phase which consists of planning mechanisms and processes for designing 
and implementing development in local government of Garut that could have mitigation impacts. 
Chapter 5 analyses the preparedness phase and explores contributions of the previous mitigation 
9 
 
phase (chapter 4) to a process of preparation conducted by government institutions and 
communities facing flooding. Chapter 6 investigates activities during the response phase. This is 
followed by chapter 8 which focuses on the recovery phase.  
In all the data analysis chapters the dynamic process of accountability mechanisms is identified 
which inform the nature of accountability. This study aims to provide analysis of the roles of each 
involved actors, their performance and their contributions to each disaster management phase. 
Accountability types are identified which are based on the nature of the golden concept questions 
to accountability; to whom, who, what, and why from Bovens (2007). Analytical discussion of each 
chapter is presented in the final section of each of these four chapters. Results are evaluated using 
learning perspectives that identify the types of accountability practiced by every actor in all these 
phases.   
The final chapter is Chapter 8, which highlights the main discussion points from each chapter and 
then draws conclusions about this research. The conclusions of this study aim to directly address 
this studies key research questions. Existing theory about accountability and its context to 
collaboration is revisited and some potential future studies within this field are offered. This is 
followed by a brief discussion of the contribution of this research to the field of accountability 








“I love talking about accountability and responsiveness because these are the values in which I 
believe. Why? Because accountability is based on fairness, integrity, doing what is right, and 
regard for others” (Barbara Romzek, 2014, p. 27) 
Accountability promises a good order in every aspect of life. It has been described as a ‘golden’ 
concept (Bovens, 2007), a ‘magic’ concept (Pollitt & Hupe, 2011), a ‘feel good’ concept (Bovens, 
Schillemans, & Hart, 2008)  which is “ever-expanding” (Mulgan, 2000) and measures 
professionalism  (Friedrich, 1940); it has also been recognised as a manifest of democracy 
(Flyvbjerg, 1998). However, accountability can connote in a negative sense. It can be used as “a 
rhetorical weapon” (Barbara Romzek, 2014) in political arenas and public administration. Anyone 
might use it as a tool to attack a certain person or group whom is regarded as below expectations.  
Within this chapter, the theoretical backgrounds which are relevant to this study are identified and 
evaluated. This explores current concepts of accountability in cross-sector collaboration, 
particularly in disaster contexts. Analysis starts with a discussion of the current understanding of 
disaster management and the context of accountability within disaster management. Collaboration 
concept and disaster management are worth it to be explored since they are contexts of 
accountability which will be analysed and assessed in this study. This then is followed by a section 
of disaster management focussed on Indonesia. Section 2.3 discusses accountability concepts 
within public administration and accountability issues arising from these concepts. Section 2.3.1 
discusses the principal theory of accountability. It is followed by section 2.3.2 which explores the 
different types of accountability that exist. At the Section 2.3.3, accountability valuation is 
discussed. Regarding how this theory is developed and practised within public administrations is 
discussed in Section 2.3.4. The Section 2.3.5 identifies accountability in public administration then 
it is followed by Section 2.3.6 which discusses accountability within three different models of 
public administration; accountability in traditional public administration, in New Public 
Management Era, and in New Public Service. The fourth section, Section 2.4, focuses on 
accountability in collaborative contexts. This section specifically explores current studies about 
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accountability in collaborative settings. Section 2.5 explores characteristic of society in developing 
country by adopting prismatic society theory. This is followed by Section 2.6 which discusses 
contextual information of public administration in Indonesia. The final section, Section 2.7, is a 
theoretical framework of collaborative working accountability. This framework will be used as a 
foundation to recognise accountability issues of actors in collaborative settings which is then used 
to analyse data of this research; particularly the accountability which relates to a public-sector 
organisation when they work within a collaborative context with other organisations, communities 
and individuals. The nature of this research focuses specifically on the collaborative accountability 
of those actors involved in phases of disaster management.  
2.2. Disaster Management 
Defining disaster is more difficult than recognising what disaster is (Quarantelli, 1985). Disaster 
can mean many things to many people (Perry, 2007). Quarantelli (1985) listed seven ideal-type 
terms of disaster; Disaster as physical agents, disaster as physical impacts, disaster as assessment 
of physical impacts, disaster as social disruption from physical impact, disaster as social 
constructions of reality, disaster as political definitions, and disaster as imbalance in the demand-
capability ratio in a crisis. 
Implicitly, disaster is defined as any event that create negative consequences such as an event in 
the natural environment, technological failures/ incidents, and war (Perry, 2007). Negative 
consequences can be highly disruptive to people. Disruptions, which often occur suddenly, can be 
caused by nature or by human activity, and can damage lives, livelihoods, property and 
environments; this event often takes place beyond the capacity of the community with all its 
resources. The cause of disruption can be from the agent that causes disruption or from aspects of 
social structures such as values, norms, and protection (Perry, 2007).  
Modern disaster management is based on four distinct components: mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery (Coppola, 2007). These four components are phases in disaster 
management. Figure 2 shows the four phases are a cyclical process. One phase of disaster 
management contributes to the nature of subsequent phases. Take mitigation phase as an example; 
activities during this phase (e.g. creating tsunami or volcanic eruption evacuation zones) might be 





Figure 2 : Disaster management phases (adopted from Coppola [2007]) 
 
2.2.1. Mitigation 
Mitigation is a cornerstone of disaster management (FEMA, 2010). Mitigation can be summarised 
as ‘activities to prevent an emergency, to reduce or to eliminate consequences of a hazard’. Ha 
(2017) described mitigation as ‘disaster risks reduction’. Mitigation aims to make hazards less 
likely to occur or to reduce the negative effect of hazard (Ha, 2017). There are several ways to 
mitigate hazards including: public education, hazard assessments and infrastructure 
improvements. The mitigation process depends on capabilities and available resources since every 
hazard needs different treatments. In order to treat the hazard risks, there are several goals as the 
outcomes of mitigation. They are risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk likelihood reduction, risk 
consequences reduction, and risk transfer, sharing, or spreading (Coppola 2011; Simonovic, 2011; 
FEMA, 2010). 
Mitigation is used to face natural or man-made hazards. Humans (normally) learn from knowledge 
and/or their experiences to mitigate hazards. For instance, Japan has experienced repeated 
earthquake and tsunami that has led to its people and government being aware of, and preparing 
for, potential future hazards by developing infrastructure which can reduce vulnerability and the 
chances of losing their lives or possessions. Nowadays government actions in disaster mitigation 
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are expected to help citizens in facing or avoiding hazards. This can be implemented in the form 
of infrastructure development and urban planning (Hamada, 2014), policy and strategy (Davis and 
Davidson, 2018), and creating the required framework to mitigate coming disasters (Ha, 2017). 
2.2.2. Preparedness 
Preparedness in disaster means that to know what to do when a disaster occurs. The main purpose 
of disaster preparedness is preparing to handle an emergency. This includes a plan to save life, to 
help responses and rescue operations. Good preparedness requires a lot of time to achieve a 
satisfactory level as responses to disasters cannot be accurately predicted (Coppola 2011; 
Simonovic, 2011; FEMA, 2010). Coppola (2011) divided preparedness into government 
preparedness and public preparedness. Government preparedness includes internal governmental 
preparation such as creating planning, conducting exercises and training among government 
officers, providing equipment, and developing statutory authority. Public preparedness is focused 
on public education about natural or man-made hazards, awareness, and public behavioural change 
(Coppola, 2015c). Burling and Hyle (1997) simplified preparedness into three categories: 
information dissemination, education and practice. Due to the unpredictability of disasters, and 
their size and effects, these three categories cannot be prepared appropriately in advance (Burling 
& Hyle, 1997). Perhaps in some cases common sense and quick actions are a better way of 
responding to disasters than detailed plans?        
2.2.3. Response 
Disaster response is an activity that starts when a hazard event occurs until it is declared over 
(Coppola, 2015f). Disaster response occurs when a hazard creates an emergency situation. Coppola 
(2015) divided emergency into three stages: pre-hazard, hazard effects ongoing, and hazard effects 
have ceased.  
The pre-hazard phase occurs when a potential hazard event approaches. However, this might not 
be recognized since some hazards have identifiable characteristic and some others do not. For 
instant, volcanic eruption, flooding, tsunami, and hurricanes can be pre-identified but earthquakes 
cannot yet be accurately predicted. Recognition of hazards may come from natural signs or specific 
technology. Each hazard has specific indicators. Some hazards have signs which allow humans to 
prepare or avoid them with lead time in hours, days, weeks or months.   
Ongoing hazard effects can happen in seconds or last longer than a month. Flooding can exist for 
a day or a week before it ceases but earthquake and lightning may strike very swiftly. During the 
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disaster response phase, government and citizens respond to victims and property needs. This can 
be in the action of evacuation, mobilization of emergency team to locations, and addressing 
affected communities. Analysis of multiple disasters has shown that hazard effects can be 
exacerbated by decision makers being in situations of incomplete or inconsistence information 
(Valcik & Tracy, 2017).  
When hazards effects have ceased, responders start conducting search and rescue, distribution of 
logistics, sheltering victims, measuring damage, caring for injuries, managing fatalities and so on. 
The emergency may still exist, and while responders attempt to manage or tackle the emergency 
the situation may worsen. Sometimes social media can enhance capabilities in response and 
community service (Xie & Yang, 2018). This can only happen where information technology 
infrastructure is available. 
The response phase should be integrated with previous phases; mitigation and preparedness. The 
successfulness of the response phase depends on how much the mitigation and preparedness phases 
can increase resilience (Coppola, 2015f). Communities, government, and individuals all have the 
capacity to reduce the effects and impacts of hazards to them. 
2.2.4. Recovery 
Recovery is the post-disaster phase. Other terms used are (often these can be interchangeable): 
rehabilitation, reconstruction, and post-disaster development. The Recovery phase incorporates 
activities aimed to bring affected communities or victims back to their normal situations that they 
experienced pre-disaster. Despite mitigation and preparedness phases, disasters often lead to 
destruction of physical buildings that then require rebuilding or renovation during the recovery 
phase. However, the Recovery phase not only focuses on physical infrastructure and housing but 
also on the long-term future of the community (e.g. economic growth) (Simonovic, 2011; FEMA, 
2010). It is hoped that to some extent, the psychological damage to affected citizens might be given 
the chance to recover from their traumatic experiences.   
The Recovery phase has been identified to be the most diverse action of all disaster management 
functions (Coppola, 2015b). The nature of the Recovery phase depends on the size of the disaster 
and its effects on people’s lives, economics and social conditions. The Recovery phase attracts 
attention from countries and communities who want to help those people affected. The Recovery 
phase is expected to reduce the effects of disasters and to create physical buildings, and social 
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development, which it is hoped, will mitigate and prepare for future disasters. Technological 
devices for planning may be used in the Recovery phase (Ganji & Miles, 2018) or even a 
community based recovery model (Casagrande, Mcilvaine-newsad, & Jones, 2015; Marin, Bodin, 
Gelcich, & Crona, 2015; Williamson & Bond, 2014). Many more actors from individuals and 
organisations are involved in the recovery phase compared to the other three phases of disaster 
management; but they are often very loosely affiliated since activities are diverse (Coppola, 2015b; 
Passarella, 1993). Governments usually renovate or rebuild public infrastructure, housing, and 
other disruptions to social and economic matters. Related departments within government are often 
involved in the reconstruction of different networks (Koliba, et al., 2011).       
These four phases of disaster management consist of activities that involve two or more 
organisations, agencies, and individuals. In this study they are called ‘actors in disaster 
management’. Some of them work only in one phase such as a Search and Rescue team works 
during the Response phase to evacuate and to search victims. However, some of them work in two 
phases or in all phases. Their interaction with other organisations or individuals could be based on 
motive of similar goals (e.g.to save and help people). However, it is clearly stated here that it is 
the responsibility of government to protect its citizens; this involves multiple government agencies.  
Disaster management is designed to prevent or reduce the effects of catastrophic events to citizens. 
With its cyclic process, activities start from mitigation (e.g. identifying and implementing 
preventive actions to minimise the effects of hazards), it continues into preparing, planning, and 
action when disaster occurs. When a disaster strikes, the Response phase starts and it continues to 
recovery post-disaster such as clearance of debris, trauma healing, and logistics for victims. 
Following this, reconstruction starts to rebuild infrastructure and buildings. Reconstruction 
planners have to consider mitigation awareness since it should prevent future disaster. For example 
the rebuilding of housing should consider the characteristics of the disaster so that it can withstand 
future issues. However in practice this is often not done appropriately. Such a case is highlighted 
in this study where flooding repeatedly occurs every year in Garut and it sometimes costs citizen 
their lives and properties. This raises questions about government agencies and non-government 
organisations roles and activities in every phase of disaster management. These questions include 
how their coordination works, and the most important factor, how is accountability applied or 
created in this cycle of repeated disaster. The concept of accountability requires to be clearly 




2.3.1. Accountability Concept 
It is very difficult to dispute the importance of accountability in public administration. 
Accountability is regarded as a manifestation of democracy (Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999) 
and very important for democracy (Jacobs & Schillemans, 2016). However the  concept of 
accountability in public administration is highly complex (Mulgan, 2000; Radin & Romzek, 1996). 
The concept of accountability  is contestable (Rowe, 1999) as it can mean different thing for 
different people (Blagescu et al., 2005; Bovens, 2007; Romzek et al., 2014; Romzek & Dubnick, 
1987a; Schillemans & Busuioc, 2014), is context dependent (Bovens, 2006; Williams & Taylor, 
2013a), and is an ever expanding shape-shifting concept (Mulgan, 2000); previously some 
researchers who forensically examined accountability found that accountability can be overloaded 
(Bovens, et al., 2008), a trap (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002) and a complex paradox (Dubnick, 2005). 
 Researchers in the field of accountability offer a vast of broad conceptual schemata ranging from 
positive impact such as good governance (Brinkerhoff, 2006) to negative views such as deficits 
(Mulgan, 2014) and shadows (Schillemans, 2008), pathologies (Koppell, 2005) dilemmas (Kilby, 
2006) and promises (Dubnick & Frederickson, 2010).  
One way of assessing accountability using a very narrow framing suggests that accountability is a 
social interaction (or a sociological relationship) between two sides, an actor and a forum (Bovens, 
2006). One actor is obliged to render an account to the forums; on the other side forums can 
demand account from actors. The consequences of this interaction is that actors may gain rewards 
(e.g. awards, bonuses, trust, election victories, and donations) but can also face sanctions or 
punishment if their performance is below the standards of forums’ expectations. This narrow 
concept of accountability is best suited to understand interactions between actors and forums 
Romzek and Dubnick (1987) stated that there are four different types of accountability system . 
The four types of accountability system are based on the nature of forum such as bureaucratic 
accountability - which is shaped by bureaucratic hierarchy (upward and downward), legal 
accountability - which relates to legal obedience, political accountability  - which means meeting 
political demands, and professional accountability - that should meet professional normative 
values. In addition to these types, Bovens (2007) added social accountability - which is aimed to 
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facilitate accountability to interest groups and other stakeholders such as media. Koliba et al (2011) 
simplified this model into three accountability frames; democratic, market, and administrative 
(Koliba,  et al., 2011).  The framework from Koliba et al (2011) is more comprehensive since this 
includes accountability systems which cross boundaries such as ‘market frame’. A ‘Market frame’ 
might work as an accountability model for a state owned company. Another framework for 
understanding accountability is based on social relationships (Bovens, 2007). There are three 
variables for this framework; relationship between actor and forum, analytical of involvement, and 
assessment of accountability relations. This framework from Bovens (2007) is the most 
comprehensive concept as it comprehensively tries to understand from basic of relationship to 
evaluation of result from activities.     
Bovens (2007) proposed three questions to analyse and assess accountability (conceptual, 
analytical, evaluative). Bovens (2007) starts with asking the meaning of accountability based on a 
relationship between an actor and a forum in a conceptual question (Figure 3). This question is 
crucial to understanding accountability since not every relationship can be categorised purely in 
terms of accountability (e.g. responsiveness and participation) (Mulgan, 2003). Responsiveness is 
an important aspect for accountability but securing responsiveness is not the only means of 
accountability (Thomas, 1988).  For example, a government responsive to the need for economic 
development of a city develops a factory within a city. This could harm citizens and environment 
health without considering space allocation in the city.  The second question is analytical, concerns 
the analysis of what accountability types that are involved in this relationship. This is explained 
fully in the next section. The last question is an evaluation of accountability, how should we assess 
accountability? using three perspectives; democratic, constitutional and learning perspectives. 
These perspectives assess accountability based on the results from relational processes between 
actors and forums (see Section 2.3.3).    
This assessment (evaluation of accountability) will work in any kind of accountability 
arrangements or mechanisms. Accountability arrangements can be vertical-horizontal (Ryan & 
Walsh, 2004) and formal-informal mechanisms (Romzek & LeRoux, 2012). Accountability 
mechanisms can be internal or external to the organisations and formal or informal. Vertical-
horizontal arrangements are based on the position of the actors and forums. When the actors report 
their duties to superiors, it creates a vertical accountability mechanism. However, if reports or 
18 
 
information sharing are informed to partners or peers, this is a horizontal accountability 
mechanism. Within a vertical mechanism, there is an upward-downward hierarchical order. Both 
formal and informal accountability is structured on relationships between actors and forums. 
Formal and informal mechanisms exist in both vertical and horizontal relationships. Within the 
fundamental concept of accountability, this is the answer of ‘how’ accountability manifests 
(Mulgan, 2003).    
Generally relationships within an accountability mechanism consists of four elements (Davies, 
2013). The first element is standard setting. Setting standards acts to set certain measurement as 
the basis for judgment. The second element is information collection. Performance information is 
collected by forum after duties have been executed by the actor. The third element is the judgement 
of performance against the standards that have been agreed. The fourth element is applying 
consequences. If the performance meets the forum expectations, the actor will get incentives. 
However, if the performance is below the standard, the actor should face sanctions.  These four 
elements might fit with formal accountability mechanisms but not with informal accountability 
mechanisms; which are thus more complicated since no standards of performance are pre-agreed 
between actors and forums.  
2.3.2. The Type of Accountability 
It has previously been proposed (e.g. Romzek 2014) that the specific nature of accountability can 
be identified using four principal questions concerning the “answerability for performance” 
between actor and forum. The questions are: (Adapted from - Bovens, 2007; Mulgan, 2000; 
Romzek & Dubnick, 1987b) 
i) To whom is the account given? 
ii) Who should render the account? 
iii) About what? 
iv) Why that account is rendered?  
Figure 3 shows a process of interaction in accountability between actor and forum. An actor, as an 
account holder, has a responsibility to inform its conduct to the account receiver (forum) for its 
performance. The actor may face multiple receivers of its conduct internally or externally and 
formally or informally. There might also be a process of processing and debating the information 
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Notwithstanding, the essential definition of accountability is giving an account and being held to 
account but the four questions above can specify accountability types. Defining accountability is 
based on which question is proposed. Figure 3 shows specific accountability types which are based 
on each of these questions. Question (i) is related to the receiver of accountability - to whom it is 
provided. Answering this question is not as simple as identifying certain groups/ bodies or 
individuals as account holders or account receivers. Some account holders may have many facets 
with different obligations (e.g. vertical, horizontal, and diagonal). Account receivers may also face 
many different actors with different aspect of conduct such as financial, procedural, or product.  
Question (i) can result in several accountability loci. They are political accountability (Lederman 
et al., 2005; Pollitt, 2000), legal accountability (RACHED, 2016), administrative accountability 
(Finer, 1941; Hodges, 2012; Ikeanyibe, 2017), professional accountability (Radin & Romzek, 
1996), social accountability (Grandvoinnet, Raha, Kumagai, & Joshi, 2015), moral accountability 
(Franklin, 2018) and holistic accountability (Williams & Taylor, 2013b). Each of these loci has its 
own forums. For example, political accountability may consist of forums such as elected 





1. Informing conduct 
3. judging 4. consequences 
Figure 2.2: A process of interaction in accountability i re 2.2: A process of interaction in ac ountability 3: A process of interaction i accountability 
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Question (ii) asks: Who should render the account? Question (i) asks about the recipient of 
accountability but Question (ii) is the other way round in that the forum ask about the actors. It has 
similar complexity within public administration since there is potential for numerous actors. For 
example, a regulation will pass over a number of stages involving different processes and people. 
It starts with suggestions, ideas, demands, or pressure from certain groups within a legalisation 
process. Asking the who question cannot simply point to a single actor to be blamed or punished 
for misconduct. Corporate accountability (Baines, Lightfoot, Benedettini, & Kay, 2008) is a clear 
example of the nature of the who question; corporate accountability does not point to specific 
members who must be responsible for conduct, instead tasking the entire corporation with 
responsibility.     
Question (iii) concerns for what. Question (iii) regards the subject matter of conduct about which 
the actor must provide information to the forum. The subject of this classification can be in the 
form of financial, procedural, programme, or product. In practice these are not discrete 
classifications. Question (i) asks about the account receiver or forum. At the same time, it also 
relates to conduct. Take a doctor as an example; the legality of the doctor’s conduct will be within 
the domain of professional accountability. If the doctor conducts a malpractice, the doctor can face 
several consequences. As a professional, the doctor can be punished by their professional board. 
On the other hand, they may face a consequence from the law courts which may lead to sanctions 
(e.g. imprisonment), which will be in addition to a loss of reputation. Day & Klein (1987) 













Figure 4 : Types of accountability based on answerability for performance 
 
Question (iv), the why question, aims to classify accountability type. Question (iv) demands 
reasons for actor to render the account, irrespective of whether the actor is voluntarily or being 
forced to render its account; often accountability is obligatory. The reasons to oblige rendering an 
account are based on relationships between the account holder and the account receiver. This 
relationship is decided by the flow of conduct. Romzek (2014) prefers to use a “how” question for 
this rather than “why” question. Both questions (why and how) are aimed at understanding the 
direction of accountability. Romzek (2014) added formal and informal accountability to these 
accountability relationships. In this study I prefer to use a why question because it provides a clear 
reason/s for an obligated actor to render their account. For example, a request that asks the reason 
for a government agency to report its expenditure in a previous period may be answered that the 
agency is obliged to explain its performance to a higher authority (e.g. a parliament). On the other 
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Figure 4 depicts various dimensions of accountability that are based on the four questions posited 
earlier to understand the nature of relationships between actors and forums. For instance, someone 
can categorise city mayoral accountability to a local house of representative either as political 
accountability (since the house of representative is a political forum) or as vertical accountability 
(because parliaments are generally populated by elected officials who are voted in by citizens). 
The mayor can be subject to hierarchical accountability to their higher position in the government 
administration system because of their position as a government officer. The mayor may be 
subjected to financial accountability as they may have been given authority to manage the city 
budget (this is the case in Indonesia). What’s more, the mayor is accountable to voters as a form 
of downward accountability. Again, these different types of accountability are dependent on 
context setting. 
Analysis of accountability types might provide answers to the four proposed questions of to whom, 
for who, for what, and why. However there is a further need to understand how these accountability 
types should be assessed; subjects to be assessed can be financial, procedural, or product 
performance. As a concept of social relationship, this assessment aims to identify outcomes and 
outputs from accountability arrangement.       
2.3.3. Assessing accountability 
Assessing accountability within this narrower concept can be executed by using a specific tool to 
evaluate public administration organisations. According to Bovens (2007) and Romzek (2014) the 
tools of accountability are democracy perspectives, constitutional perspectives, and learning 
perspectives. Democracy perspectives mean that accountability is a tool to monitor and control the 
conduct of actors or organisations. A constitutional perspective focuses on how regulations, laws, 
and policies are implemented to prevent the abuse of power and corruption from actors; control 
bodies are auditors, parliament/s and independent judicial power (public institutions). Learning 
perspectives aims to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of actors or organisations. For 
example, an actor may learn from previous action for a better future performance. 
Assessing accountability of actors by account receivers (forums) can in practice be an issue for a 
forum. There may be a dilemma for the forum if they have to evaluate someone they know. They 
may be uncomfortable to give performance reviews, especially poor performance reviews. This 
situation can even happen in well-designed accountability arrangements since it involves human 
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behaviour and its possible prejudice on decision-making. This leads to the conclusion reached by   
Romzek (2014) that, in practice, accountability is sometimes uneven.   
In real life, even in well-designed systems with good documentation, a failure of accountability 
can occur. Hence there appears to be no perfect system for accountability. A new standard system 
of accountability might be created, but it can also lead to new issues of accountability. Moreover, 
a well-designed system may only have been practiced in a certain situation or country. It might not 
be suitable if it is implemented in different situations with different social setting and environment, 
or in a different country with different ecological systems. 
Bovens (2006) offers three perspectives (democracy perspective, constitutional perspective, and 
learning perspective) to assess the effect of accountability arrangement for different practices. 
These perspectives are aimed at measuring outcomes of various types of accountability aimed at 
improving performance. Assessments of each accountability arrangement aim to evaluate and 
judge the effects of accountability.   
Figure 5 shows a process of assessing accountability. Type of accountability is identified by four 
questions; “To whom”, “Who”, “For What”, “Why” (See Section 2.3.2). This type of 
accountability is then assessed by three evaluative perspectives (democracy, constitutional, 
learning). This assessment leads to outcomes. The outcomes are consequences whether an actor 
receives reward or punishment. If outcomes are not as expected, this is a case that accountability 





When using this perspective, the most important role of accountability is its importance for 
democratic arrangements. Accountability should be a tool that is able to monitor and control the 
conduct of actors and forums (Bovens, 2006). Monitoring, evaluation and control mean that all 
involved parties (actors and forums) in conducts are entitled to take part in decision-making. 
Generally the concept of democracy implies that every human has equal respect and consideration, 
such as in the exchange and interchange of ideas (Milligan, 1943). In the world of public 
accountability, it is related to principal-agent relationships (Strøm, Bergman, & Müller, 2003). The 
electorates, as the primary principal in the world of democracy, have power over government 
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agencies since they delegate their power to them through election. As agents, government officers 
should work on behalf of people, although in practice this is far too often not the case. Officials 
must, in theory, be accountable to the citizens who give them their mandate. This control from 
principal is expected to provide good governance which is an indicator of being accountable 
(Brinkerhoff, 2006). On the other hand, democracy can mean equality in society where people can 
make readjustment through interactions in decision making (Milligan, 1943). Assessment of 
accountability should result in equality power among involved actors in a system.  
Constitutional perspective 
The success of accountability can be assessed from power context.  Government is required to run 
activities without abusing their power and corruption. The accountability effect within government 
administrative processes can prevent corruption by providing checks and balances (Bovens, 2006). 
Practically, government activities are guided by laws, regulations, and policies. These rules are 
methods for countervailing power (such as courts, ombudsmen, or parliaments) to check and 
balance government activities in order to prevent misconduct such as corruption and other abuses 
of power. The balance of power between executives and other agents with power or control is a 
result of good governance (Fisher, 2004)  
Learning Perspective 
The results of accountability practices are rewards and punishment to actors. It means that actors 
are subject to consequences, whether results are negative or positive. Previous studies in 
accountability found that accountability has a negative connotation where forums tend to assess 
the failure of current government with objectives to provide punishment (Bovens, 2007; Romzek, 
2014). It creates pressures for government to avoid that consequences by creating rationalisation 
of conduct (Flyvbjerg, 1998); however, others regard that accountability as a tool to induce 
government to learn (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000). This view sees accountability from a positive 
perspective. Punishment or sanction of errors is aimed to motivate executives to learn and improve 
their performance by searching for alternative solutions or better ways to make their conduct 
acceptable to their stakeholders. Evaluations and reviews of government performance are expected 
to identify what worked and what failed. The concepts of openness and inward looking has existed 
within the tradition of public administration and political sciences for a long time (Barnes, 1965; 
Deutsch, 1966). The existence of reward and punishment in accountability are incentives to 
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encourage intelligence and learning in the process of policy making through adjustment 
(Lindbloom & Braybrooke, 1965). Within the context of learning perspective, accountability 
offers government executives feedback from their performances and the opportunity to reflect on 
the successes and failures of the past to hopefully provide better performance in the future. Failures 
occur where a lack of accountability affects the behaviour of an actor; this is called an 
accountability deficit.    
Accountability Failures 
The introduction of New Public Management (NPM) in public administration has given 
opportunity for government organisations to manage their organisations in an autonomous way 
(Pollitt et al., 2004; Thatcher & Sweet, 2002). The NPM is a model of public administration 
arrangement which implements public choice theory (this will be discussed further in Section 
2.3.6) Local governments can create agencies and departments in order to provide effective public 
services to citizens or by shifting responsibilities to the private sector. However, this phenomena 
has resulted in a lack of accountability or an “accountability deficit” (Flinders, 2017; Mulgan, 
2014; Schillemans & Busuioc, 2014). Conversely, the creation of complex administrative conduct, 
laws, regulations, and policies from central government or local government may hinder the 
effectiveness of organisations. Government agencies face many different types of scrutiny and 
assessment from different institutions that can be time consuming for them to report or explain 
about their conducts. This is an “accountability overload” situation for government agencies 
(Bovens, et al., 2008; Linaweaver, 2009). 
On one hand, accountability deficits occur not within the domain of public sector organisations; it 
happens in non-government organisation too. For example, the work of Crack (2013), Dhanani & 
Connolly (2015), and Andrew (2014) shows that it occurs to International Non-government 
Organisations (Andrews, 2014; Crack, 2013; Dhanani & Connolly, 2015).   
Accountability deficits exist when an account receiver fails to demand an account holder delivers 
its responsibility of conduct. This can also happen in the situation when a forum neglects the 
accountability of its account holder (Schillemans & Busuioc, 2014). A lack of accountability 
occurs in the absence of law, regulation and accountability mechanisms; this can be both when 
accountability is vertical and horizontal (Schillemans, 2008). However, this does not happen in 
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Indonesia because, despite the existence of law, regulation, and accountability mechanism, there 
could still exist accountability deficits.  
On the other hand, accountability overload occurs when an actor can face different demands of 
accountability from different forums; such as from a higher hierarchical position, auditor, 
parliament, and media. Public administrators may spend a large amount of their time responding 
(and explaining) to these demands. Sometimes this might provide a positive effect on their 
performance, but some might use this as a political motive to underrate their performance. 
Public administrators are subject to scrutiny from auditors that can publicly report findings. Audit 
officer duties are to identify ineffectiveness and inefficiency. As a demand of public transparency, 
audit offices often provide reports to journalists and parliaments. Journalistic framing could 
damage bureaucrat’s reputations although often what it is being said by media is not the complete 
performance of administrative activities. Theoretically, accountability aims to stimulate better 
performance by conducting evaluations of administrators, but these might become a burden for 
delivering their duties to citizens in practices.  
2.3.4. Rhetoric and Practice of Accountability 
Accountability is an attractive word often used by politicians or public management officials 
seeking to score political points (Barbara Romzek, 2014). They often focus on the failures made 
by their political rivals. This makes accountability a weapon with which to attack political rivals 
in pursuit of their personal or group interest. In doing so, they make their own perspective and 
narratives and also rationalise situations in ways which match their purpose. Media can be uses to 
inflate a story. For example, people can hear, read or watch in media many politicians of opposition 
parties and members of the public using these media platforms to attack other actors by ostensibly 
by ‘seeking accountability’. Accountability, when used as a weapon therefore takes on a negative 
connotation  
Within rhetorical arenas, accountability often focuses on the failure of actors. Good examples exist 
of this accountability rhetoric; one famous case in Indonesia occurred in 2009 when the chairman 
of the feared Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission went to prison (KOMPAS, 2009) 
accused of murder.  Many people argued that this was a scenario created to expel him from his 
position since he had pursued and arrested many big corruptors.  
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There has been much discussion about the theory of accountability and benefits for democracy; 
for example, research conducted by Herron & Boyko (2015), Koop (2014) and Trihartono (2014) 
to name a few. They state that accountability can create successfulness for democratisation. 
Accountability has become a cornerstone of political systems and public administration in many 
developed countries. The rhetoric of accountability is aimed to create good governance within 
organisations. The theory and rhetoric of accountability requires media and people to practice it.  
Accountability, if imposed effectively, can help create good governance; but failures in practice 
can occur. Irregularity in practice might come from good people but lack of good design and proper 
implementation. It might come also as a result of incompetence, poor management, or sufficient 
political will to impose sanctions. A failure of accountability because of poor performance or 
misconduct might not be realised by the actors, or they might realise it but not suffer any 
consequences. Besides, inadequacies might happen because of accountability excesses where the 
actors face multi accountability mechanisms, an accountability overload (see section 2.3.3). There 
should be an analytical process to assess these inadequacies in practices of accountability.     
2.3.5.  Accountability in Public Administration 
Accountability models in public administration literature use principal-agent models (Dubnick & 
Frederickson, 2010; Randa & Tangke, 2015; Schillemans & Busuioc, 2014) particularly in 
bureaucratic and political contexts. A principal-agent concept is a manifestation of agency theory 
which exists within different academic fields such as accounting, finance, economics, political 
science, sociology, organisational behaviour, and marketing (Eisenhardt, 1989; Panda & Leepsa, 
2017). The concept is that a separation exists between owner and manager. In a business context, 
shareholders are principals who delegate their authority to managers (agents). The agents have 
responsibility to run a business on behalf of shareholders or owners (principals). But account 
holders can be different from principals. For example, auditors are paid by a company to execute 
their duties. However the company could not be their principals because their report is a valuation 
of company performance. This may have negative consequences for company managers because, 
in this case, they are not principals for auditors. Company managers (agencies) may face 
consequences for the conduct, whether reward or punishment for misconduct, from owners 
(shareholders) based on audit reports from auditors they have paid.  Auditors have another 
accountability demand from professional organisations, from which they may also face 
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consequences if they attempt to manipulate reports for their own personal interests. The 
professional organisation is not their principal too. Therefore, the appropriate terminology used 
for this context is actor and forum (Bovens, 2007). The model of accountability has myriad 
relationships within bureaucracies.  
In bureaucracy chains, citizen (principals) as voters delegate their power to representatives in 
parliaments (agents). The next stage is that representatives become their principals who then 
delegate authority to government as their agents. This principal-agent approach is claimed as a 
suitable approach to analyse accountability gaps within democratic systems (Schillemans & 
Busuioc, 2014). In fact, government and public organisations should not only be accountable to 
parliaments as their agent but they should be accountable also to citizens (voters), political parties, 
media, and horizontally to other organisations which may have no direct agent-principal 
relationship.  That becomes the reason in accountability contexts that the relationship is actor and 
forum (Bovens, 2006; Schillemans & Busuioc, 2014). Actors can be agents and forums can be 
principals. For instance, government should render its accountability to electorate representatives 
as principal-agents, however government is also accountable to political parties as an actor-forum 
accountability relationship.  
2.3.6. Accountability in Three Models of Public Administration 
The debate of accountability in modern public administration can be classified into three contested 
concepts: i) traditional accountability which can be understood from a debate between Friedrich 
and Finer in 1940 related to balancing capacity and control (Lynn, 2001); ii) market and contractual 
accountability (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998; Christopher Pollitt, 2000) which relates to New Public 
Service Era (NPM); and, iii) accountability of citizenship and democratic value as a concept of 
post-NPM (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; Hodges, 2012; Rowe, 1999). This debate shows that 
accountability is a disputed concept and when implementing accountability in practices of public 
administration it can become highly complex. This complexity is crucial to understand each claim 
about accountability so as to be able to explore deeper what accountability means in the real world 
of government and public-sector organisations.  
The theory of accountability from a public administration standpoint is different from political 
science theories that focus on accountability in relationships with democratic elections, due to the 
context of answerability to authority (Romzek, 2014); authority is ‘to whom the account is 
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rendered’. Answerability to the authority is only a part of other standard questions of the 
fundamental characteristics of accountability. The other questions are asking the actors who are 
accountable, the context of accountability for, and the way the actors answer to accountability 
demands (Bovens, 2007; Mulgan, 2000) This can be within a formal (Radin & Romzek, 1996) or 
informal mechanism (Chen, 2012).   
The following section will discourse accountability within three public administration concepts. It 
is aimed to enrich our understanding of accountability of those three concepts. By examining these 
different perspectives of accountability, it is hoped that the reader will be able to comprehensively   
perceive the concept of accountability  
Accountability in Traditional Public Administration 
Accountability in traditional public administration might be best illustrated through the famous 
debate between Finer and Friedrich in the 1930s and 1940s (Jackson, 2009). Finer and Friedrich 
were debating about accountability in the context of a Weberian concept of bureaucracy versus a 
federal model of the bureaucracy (e.g. the USA). The central issues of debate were the different 
manifestations of accountability and responsibility. Friedrich (1935) said that responsible persons 
give an account but Finer (1936) insisted that responsibility involved obedience to external 
controlling authorities.  Friedrich claimed that the job of supervision by elected representative and 
chief executives to public administrators did not succeed in controlling detailed jobs since the jobs 
were highly technical and might be understood by expert specialists (Friedrich et.al, 1935). Finer 
disagreed since Finer argued that Friedrich was talking about ‘a sense of duty’ that he viewed as 
‘a fact of responsibility’ (Finer, 1936). The sense of duty is abstract since it is about one’s 
consciences, profession, or public interest. Finer stated that the manifestation of responsibility is 
obedience; obedience to a specific direction which is directed by politician or chief executives.  
The Finer-Friedrich debate comes from different political perspectives. Finer sees the relationship 
between minister and administrator as a one-way street. A minister or chief executive was elected 
by people, so he therefore works on behalf of his constituents. A minister creates the policies and 
defines how policies are implemented with explicit directions to a bureaucracy which is structured 
with strict rules, strict procedures and detailed supervision (Yeboah-Assiamah, Asamoah, & 
Adams, 2018). Administrators are expected to execute their duties as best they can, and they must 
obey the direction provided. The minister must supervise the administrators; which is the reason 
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that they were elected. Administrators will face punishment if they fail to complete the jobs 
effectively.  
Friedrich (1940) however believed that politics and administrations are a reciprocal relationship. 
Politicians create policies but may not be experts; administrators are expected to be expert in their 
specific fields and thus able to give high quality feedback. Friedrich posited that ministers cannot 
be expert in everything or all fields, so they cannot give the best advice in a specific field. To 
Friedrich, a minister or elected representative cannot work effectively to create responsible 
administrators by providing close supervision. He saw that forcing administrators to obey is in fact 
a negative way to prevent corruption. The better way is by education and motivation to act 
responsibly by increasing professionalism. Finer argued that within Friedrich’s view public 
administration and inward responsibility is anti-democracy (Finer, 1941). Finer claimed that if 
administrators manage themselves without control from ministers, it might result in a dictatorial 
system. The essence of democracy is the primacy of people over administrators (Finer, 1941)  
In a democratic system a government (and public services) exercise their power through 
legislatives elected by citizens, meaning that the state must give account to citizens directly and 
indirectly through parliament. Theoretically, the power belongs to the citizenry, however in 
practice many democracies have been infiltrated by corporate models so that legislatives act 
primarily in the interests of businesses and not the citizenry; however as this is beyond the remit 
of this study, in this study we will pretend this is not the case. Citizen power is proven in the 
election arena where they decide to give reward or punishment to the current government by re-
elect or drop them from authority and power. However in practice the accountability mechanisms 
in bureaucracy are not that simple. Government agencies face internal expectation from 
hierarchical bureaucracy, they are tasked with preparing how to be accountable externally to both 
the elected politicians and the complexity of society (Mulgan, 2000). The government and public 
service must deal with diverse expectations internally and externally (Blagescu et al., 
2005;Romzek & Dubnick, 1987a).  
An internal accountability mechanism in bureaucracy has clear lines from street level workers 
through a hierarchical process to the head of a government agency or organisation; this is upward 
accountability or, in the reverse order, downward accountability (Baker, 2014; Ebrahim, 2003). It 
often works within government agencies. Agents are accountable to those who delegate the tasks 
within a hierarchical order of organisation. It is argued that this mechanism has had positive 
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impacts (Davies, 2001) since it has well-defined the domain, rights and obligations, and rewards 
and punishment forms (Bovens, 2006). The principal demands the agent to be accountable for the 
duties. The agent has authority to execute the duties. The accomplished duties are assessed, and 
the agents will face consequences for the jobs done.  This is a process of control and is designed 
to avoid agency drift. Thus, in theory the mechanism looks perfect for creating better 
accountability which in turn will create good governance (Bovens, 2006). In reality, hierarchical 
system of accountability might be flawed by principal drift problems (Schillemans & Busuioc, 
2014) or conflict of interests inherent within internal organisations. Moreover, this traditional 
accountability model focuses on reporting and disclosure requirements to higher bureaucratic 
positions or creating upward accountability but this model lacks downward accountability to 
citizens (Ebrahim, 2003). Heads of departments, supervisors and managers pay little attention to 
creating accountability for their downline organisation staffs. They assume that their downline 
might not threaten their position since they have the greater power.   
External accountability mechanisms in principal-agency theory operate so that agents record and 
disclose their activities and behaviour to the external addressees. Theoretically, the citizens have 
a direct line of command (power) within the policy process to the agents who execute the public 
policy (Strøm, et al., 2003). Agents inform their activities to a higher bureaucratic line which ends 
at a departmental minister. The minister must render accountability to a parliament at a house of 
representatives. The elected representatives render their account to the citizenry as their principal. 
The citizenry assesses the performance and behaviour of parliament before choosing to re-elect 
their party or remove them from power. I reality however the fact is that elected officials have their 
own interests which impact decisions made when assessing governmental behaviour and 
performance. This is worsened by what are often ‘dirty political systems’ during elections, such as 
money politics and fraud. Therefore, citizens have only a weak power to judge agencies within 
this representative mechanism. Elected representatives might drift their duty to the citizenry 
(Schillemans & Busuioc, 2014). In a constitutional democracy, public-sector organisations should 
meet the expectations not only of principals but also of forums. However as there are at least five 
different type of forums (Bovens, 2007), this results in many different types of accountability since 
every forum has different criteria of accountability (Bovens, 2007). Government and public service 
agencies should render accounts to forums within political, legal, administrative, social and 
professional arenas. A clear example of this is the political accountability forum which is regarded 
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as an essential aspect of accountability within democracy (e.g. elected representatives, political 
parties, voters, and media). 
External accountability is more complex than internal accountability due to the ‘problem of many 
eyes’ (Bovens, 2007). Rendering an account to a certain forum may conflict with the expectations 
of other forums especially within intergovernmental contexts (Radin & Romzek, 1996). Some 
accountability types are legal binding, such as rendering accounts to parliaments and audit boards. 
However, accounts should also be rendered to other large forums such as political parties, media, 
and NGOs. Take oil subsidies for in Indonesia as an example; the intention may be to create better 
accountability to citizens as voters by lowering prices. On the other hand, political parties or 
opposition parliaments question the decision that is a financial burden for the country (Pikiran 
Rakyat 2013).  
Debates of accountability within public administration keep taking place in line with the 
development of theory in this area. With the world recession in the 1970s traditional public 
administration was viewed as out of date since it could not cope. This changed global economic 
and social conditions , New Public Management (NPM) was introduced to address the situation 
which had greater emphasis on performance and the transparency of administrations.  
Accountability in New Public Management 
New Public Management (NPM) is driven by public choice theory (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; 
Gruening, 2001; Hodges, 2012; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Rowe, 1999). Public choice theory is 
popular in political science which uses economic tools for tackling traditional problems of political 
science. The theory was developed by Buchanan & Tullock in 1962 as part of an attempt to 
describe how decisions involving voters, politicians, and bureaucracy are made (Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1962). The development of NPM theory continued in the late 1970s and 1980s under 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This development then spread in other countries such as the 
United State of America, New Zealand and Australia. This movement was triggered by economic 
recession tax revolutions (Gruening, 2001). NPM was claimed as a solution for better public 
services by introducing private sector ideas such as contracts and competitions (Davies, 2013) 
which it was argued would improve accountability. Better accountability in New Public 
Management is reasoned by two main points: clearer duties and public choice (Davies, 2013).   
Clear duties are the forms of assigned duties to government organisations concerning the services 
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they provide to the public, and the budget allocation for the duties. Government organisations have 
their own purposes in implementing fragmented systems (Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & 
Pettigrew, 1996; Stewart, 1992). This makes it easier to measure the performance of government 
organisations based on the output of the duties. Elected representatives would easily be able to 
judge the performance and give rewards or sanctions based on the completed duties. In turn, 
elected representatives are accountable to electorates since they have conducted their tasks. 
 
Public choice theory states that every individual behaves based on preference (Gruening, 2001).  
The individual acts to pursue his or her wishes based on his or her valuation of the service provided. 
Public choice means citizens have the right to choose certain services that are provided by 
governments. The mechanism is similar to private sector organisations where the citizen is 
regarded as a consumer (Davies, 2013). The mechanism is based on market principals. Citizens 
can choose the services provided. Take choice in education as an example; the citizen chooses the 
school based on their own preference. Market mechanisms give freedom to citizens to decide their 
preference based on the quality of services provided by governments and public organisations. The 
market mechanism cannot be claimed to be a perfect model for improving government 
accountability since individuals do not have total freedom to choose the services provided. Citizens 
have only partial or limited choices provided by government (Ranson & Stewart, 1994; Stewart, 
1992).  
However it can be viewed that NPM has failed to fulfil accountability to citizens and civil society 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004). Take education as an example, where 
parents can choose the school, but they cannot choose the curriculum. In addition, within internal 
markets, citizens regarded as a costumer cannot choose the products directly, but is instead 
represented by a purchaser on the behalf of the citizenry.   
Other mechanisms within this context are contractual mechanisms. Government organisations can 
create contracts or pseudo-contracts with other organisations. This is claimed to create more 
effective mechanisms of accountability (Davies, 2013). There will be standards of agreement 
within the contract (this is a starting point to measure accountability). A contract should include 
the agreed price or budget for the services to be delivered, the target of performance to be achieved, 
and the consequences of results. Based on the contract, different aspects of information regarding 
the execution of duties might be collected and analysed. Government will then judge results before 
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providing rewards or sanctions.  
Contractual mechanisms within public service delivery may create problems from accountability 
perspectives (Davies, 2013; Gilmour & Jensen, 1998). It appears that contractual mechanisms 
seem to create uncertainty within accountability. Often it is not clear who is responsible for the 
services, whether government as a client (purchaser) of the service, or contractors. This model is 
more worrying from an accountability perspective because it calls into question the very role of 
the government (Schillemans & Busuioc, 2014). When problems occur each organisation tends to 
blame each other (Davies, 2013; Stewart, 1992).  
In several areas of public service, governments execute compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). 
The contract is made between governments as a client and contractors as a service provider. The 
aim is to create efficiency and effectivity by using professional providers, who then try to find the 
best way to maximize profits without ignoring the contract. The accountability perspective here is 
that the provider would render accountability to the purchaser. However, citizens as the user of the 
service might be ignored. Accountability issue lies here since a service provider would focus on 
creating accountability to the direct purchaser. To some extent, if the provider is a private company 
this may result in an information transparency problem. Citizens or members of the public 
interested in this service may find it difficult to access the required information.  
New public Management has excluded authority and democratic accountability (Ferlie, et al., 
1996) due to the marketization of public bodies. Parts of the public sector organisation are 
transferred to private organizations for efficiency, effectivity and economic reasons (Hodges, 
2012). NPM has created issues in accountability and democratic deficits (Ferlie, et al., 1996; 
Stewart, 1992). The removal of local authority and democratic accountability can be seen in UK 
health service reform where Local authorities are elected by local citizens (to whom they are 
accountable), but when non-elected body such as NHS trusts took on certain roles the 
accountability became unclear. The NHS has no new form of accountability to the users of services 
(Ferlie, et al., 1996). In turn, this left some UK public services under the control of unelected 
boards who appear only to be accountable to the ministers that appointed them the funds. 
In the early 2000s the public administration theories of NPM were questioned in the context of 
democratic values and citizenship (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Rowe, 1999). It was viewed that 
public administrators had become entrepreneurs through the prevalence of increasing privatization. 
Governments no longer focused on serving the public and controlling bureaucracy, but instead 
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were steering privatized governmental organizations. Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) illustrated 
that government function in NPM as “steering the boat”. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) that ‘steering 
the boat’ means that those who steer the boat have greater power than those who row the boat. The 
debate continued, Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) replied by asking a question “who owns the boat? 
King et al., (1999) made the point (perhaps rather naively…) that the real power lies in the citizenry 
since the government belongs to its people; the main duties of public administrators are to serve 
and empower citizens. This means that they have to manage public administration and implement 
policies for the benefit of citizens. Citizens become the main objectives. Within this model of 
public service, the emphasis is placed on democracy and citizenship as the basis for public 
administration theory and practice. 
  
Accountability in New Public Service 
Some scholars who realised that accountability issues exist within public administrations offered 
new concepts that focus on citizens and democracy. Some call it Joined-Up Government 
(Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2014; Hodges, 2012; Hyde, 2008; Kavanagh & Richards, 
2001; Rowe, 1999; Wilkins, 2002), other Holistic Government  (Perri, 1997) and as New Public 
Service which was proposed by Denhardt and Denhardt in 2000. They identified some issues in 
New Public Management concepts such as the main function of public administrators.  
Although the name differs between scholars, the focus and concepts are similar. To simplify this 
section, I have chosen to use the term New Public Service from Denhardt & Denhardt (2000). The 
focus and the foundations of The New Public Service concept is based on the theories of 
democratic citizenship, models of community and civil society, and organizational humanism and 
discourse theory (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). Democratic citizenship means that citizens engage 
in governance. The state should see citizens as citizens not as voters, customers, or clients. The 
state should share authority and reduce control. The state should involve citizens in collaboration. 
This terminology is suited to the context of giving service to citizens as the main concern of public 
administrators.  
New Public Service has a different approach to accountability from its two former concepts (the 
Traditional Public Administration and the New Public Administration). The Traditional Public 
Administration accountability approach used a hierarchical model where administrators are 
responsible to ministers or to elected representatives who are voted by citizens; the New Public 
37 
 
Administration used a market-driven approach. Citizens are regarded as customers of government 
services. However, The New Public Service concept of accountability approach is multifaceted 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). Public administrators’ role is serving to society not “rowing” (like 
in a Traditional Public Administration model) or “steering” (like in a New Public Administration 
model).  
Elected representatives and executives should work together with citizens to reach the goals and 
objectives, then they work collaboratively with citizens to achieve them.  Government becomes a 
player (the most important player) in the process of reaching goals and objectives not just creating 
policies, regulations, and decree. Government is not a controller, but it should become the player 
who can facilitate, negotiate, or broker solutions to society’s’ problems. Through serving society, 
public administrators must include many aspects such as legal compliance, community values, 
political norms, professional standards, and citizens interests (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000) This 
holistic approach to accountability does not focus on specific accountability to a certain forum 
instead focusing on all the beneficiaries of services. Thus, it is not only internal hierarchical 
accountability mechanisms (within organization), but it also involves external organisations, and 
all beneficiaries of accountability. 
Accountability in these three models of public administration shows that its existence is important, 
but the concept is highly complex as accountability means different things to different people. This 
could be made even more complex in the public administration of Indonesia since the country 
adopts a western design for its public administration system which may not suit its environment. 
This could be even more complicated in disaster response situations which involve different 
government agencies, non-governmental organisations, and individuals working within cross-
sector collaboration. Intimately knowing and understanding the context is crucial to appreciating 
the collaboration concept, and thus being able to accurately analyse and appraise existing systems 
of accountability; this in turn will impact on the design of future accountability frameworks.  
2.4. Collaborative Working 
Collaboration occurs when two or more organizations combine their energies and perhaps funds 
to reach the same purposes (Bardach & Lesser, 1996). An organization that enters a programme 
which is hosted by another organization has to understand its role. An organisation which works 
collaboratively with other organisations will achieve benefits if the organization develops effective 
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working relationships within its collaboration (Lank, 2006). There may be many different reasons 
for an organization to work collaboratively. This depends on the goals and objectives of the 
collaboration.  According to Miles & Trot (2011), the main focus of collaborative working in 
publicly funded organisations is to aid service users. The model of collaborative working from 
Miles & Trot (2011) which focuses on service user’s perspective consists of three main concepts:  
 
i) to create a common purpose;  
ii) to insist on a whole system approach; and  
iii)       effective power sharing that utilizes the internal strength of an organisation.  
 
Creating a common purpose is about how organisations that work collaboratively have the same 
purpose to achieve the same thing (Miles & Trot, 2011). In the context of disaster management, 
organisations should have the same purpose to save and help the lives of people who are the 
victims. Insisting on a whole system approach means that every organization involved in the 
collaboration inspects the entire system and not just the role of their own organization. Power 
sharing is articulated as the effective distribution of leadership, including to those who work 
closely to service users. Effectively incorporating these three main concepts is crucial for 
organisations to work collaboratively. However, working collaboratively is not as simple as 
adopting these three main concepts. Every organization has its own objectives and goals which 
must be achieved. This might create turf battles and other competitive challenges (Barbara 
Romzek, et al., 2014). To some extent, accountability becomes crucial in this type of work. A 
strong backbone of accountability will help produce effective collaborative working (Dewar, 
2000) 
The collaborative working concept proposed by Miles and Trott (2011) seems to be relevant for 
collaborations that operate with formal mechanisms. Funded organizations or institutions 
(government agencies, NGOs, or private enterprises) will seek to undertake services which benefit 
themselves; the distribution of roles might be decided during a negotiation process. Different 
situations of collaboration context will produce different scenarios. Bryson et. al (2006) claimed 
that there are three initial conditions for organizations/ institutions to collaborate; environment, 
sector failure, direct antecendents. These conditions decide the type of process, structure and 




The first reason organizations or actors collaborate is simply general dynamics of the environment. 
This can push organizations to work with others since it might be too difficult if they work 
separately. Turbulent environmental conditions can force organizations to work with each other in 
order to cope with uncertainty and to increase the stability of organizations (Bryson, Crosby, & 
Stone, 2006); e.g the environmental condition of resource dependency where one organization 
requires others to fulfil its needs. In the business world a company may work collaboratively for 
reasons of economisation or effectivity. For example, a company decides to use another existing 
company for certain services (e.g. security services or gardening) rather than hiring new employees 
which may increase their expenses. Collaboration with another company can reduce costs in terms 
of employees’ training, holiday pay, etc. Competitive situations can trigger organizations to work 
with others to increase the mutual strength among them. Institutions can be forced to collaborate 
by turbulent environmental conditions. These high-demand conditions may override competitive 
forces.       
Although dynamic environmental factors can induce organizations to collaborate, collaboration 
from within one single sector can fail. This is another clear reason for organizations to work 
Environment 
- Turbulence 
- Competitive and Institutional Element 
Sector Failure Direct Antecedent 
- Conveners 
- General Agreement on the Problem 
- Existing relationship or network  
INITIAL CONDITIONS  




- forging agreement 
- building relationship 




- reciprocity  
STRUCTURE AND 
GOVERNANCE 
(formal and informal) 
-membership 
- structural configuration 
- governance structure  
ACCOUNTABILITIES 
(formal and informal) 
- input – process - output 
- result management system 
- relationship with political and professional 
constituencies 
Figure 6: Framework of cross-sector collaboration (adapted from Bryson et. al, 2006) 
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collaboratively in the form of cross-sector collaboration. In many Indonesian examples within the 
education, transportation and housing sectors the government relies on voluntary works first in 
accomplishing public services since Indonesia has very strong social solidarity. If philanthropic 
work fails, the government will engage to work and support the voluntary organizations. 
In addition to environmental dynamic and sector failures, the last reason for organizations to 
collaborate is direct antecedent conditions or linking mechanisms such as conveners, general 
agreements on how to tackle problems, and existing relationship or networks. Conveners mean 
brokering actors which make collaboration happen. This can be in the form of powerful individuals 
such as heads of local government, mayors, and community leaders, or it can be publicly 
recognized and respected organization such as Greenpeace, International Red Cross etc. One 
common linking mechanism is by initial agreement. Initial agreements can identify purposes of 
collaboration and acknowledge interdependence among them. Existing networks is another linking 
mechanism since if there is a previous positive record of organizational collaboration this should 
have built trustworthiness, legitimacy and confidence.  
These three initial conditions can create different kinds of collaborative processes, accountabilities, 
structures and governance.  Collaboration process can be triggered by initial conditions and 
structures. For instance, collaboration is made after an agreement of collaborative purposes is 
reached between organizations. This may consist of a formal or informal structure. Structure 
concerns the components of an organization and can be built vertically or horizontally. 
Collaborative structures will be influenced by, amongst other things, the initial conditions also 
negotiational processes. For example, collaboration membership might be designed to be formal 
or informal. The structure may change over time based on changes to conditions and processes.  
Accountabilities are the most complex issues within collaboration (Bryson, et al., 2006). 
Complexity is triggered by a lack of agreement or understanding about who is accountable to 
whom and for what (Bovens, 2006).  Moreover, every collaborator may define results and 
outcomes differently. Accountability is a product of process and structure. The initial conditions 
will result in different types of accountability. There is a need to understand the types of 




2.4.1. Accountability in Collaboration Settings 
The previous section discussed the collaboration framework of. Bryson et al (2006) who insisted 
that collaboration is built by three initial conditions that may create different models of 
collaboration based on each condition. Each of these initial conditions may result in different 
processes, governance and accountability. Accountability exists to make sure that everything 
works as expected (Page, 2004).  
Accountability within collaborative settings has attracted significant amounts of research. In the 
arena of public administration some researchers have attempted to analyse this concept in-depth. 
Different views and approached to the study of accountability exist; such as viewing accountability 
as a challenge arising from collaboration (Hodges, 2012); as dynamic and complex expectations 
from different stakeholders (Radin, Romzek, & Radin, 2016); and as collaborative capacities of 
agencies with expectation from forums (Page, 2004). However, limited research exists on 
accountability within collaborative settings in disaster management. There are some scholars who 
have attempted to study this area but mostly in one event post disaster such as; the challenger 
tragedy (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987c); hurricane (Koliba et al., 2011a) the Mount Merapi eruption 
(Bakkour, et al., 2015); and the devastation caused by the 2004 Aceh tsunami (Dixon & McGregor, 
2011). These studies have only a limited capacity to aid the understanding of collaborative 
accountability in repeated disaster such as flooding which occurs repeatedly every rainy season in 
the same locality.  
Most disaster response collaboration is driven by environmental turbulence. Incapability of 
government agencies in responding to disaster triggers non-government organisations and 
individuals to offer their help to aid vulnerable citizens for reasons of humanity. Some 
collaborations might have been built before disaster occurs but most of them without prior 
agreement. There might be clear measurable standard setting of collaboration for organisations/ 
institutions that have prior agreement. In turn, assessing accountability will be based on its 
agreement for consequences (reward or punishment) (Newberry, 2015). However, many 
organisations will offer help without any prior commitment.   
If a disaster affects a large area and a country cannot cope with it help will be offered by 
international institutions such as the Red Crescent. The failure of Government in tackling the 
effects of disaster creates the need to receive help from the non-government sector. Disaster risks 
contain an element of uncertainty (van der Keur, et al., 2016). Disruptions from disasters are 
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unpredictable and may be difficult to measure. Indonesia realizes is located at the confluence of 
three tectonic mega-plates, which makes the country prone to large earthquakes. However the 
specific size and location of the earthquakes are unpredictable and therefore so is the impact on 
the social and economic lives of Indonesians. The type of collaboration triggered by government 
failure to cope with disaster creates issues in vertical and horizontal accountability. Chaotic 
situations demand agility from involved organisations which sometimes ignores administrative 
process. Bureaucracy is often regarded as a process which makes responses slow. For instance 
during the 2004 Aceh Tsunami  logistics were stuck in customs for several days to pass clearance 
due to a requirement to provide evidence of recipients of donations which confused international 
donors (TEMPO, 2005).       
Accountability might be identified based on a ‘for what’ question when collaboration is driven by 
previous poor performance. Collaborators can measure the activities of other involved 
organisations. This horizontal accountability can be in informal setting and it can be classed as a 
weak accountability type as it is based on trust and reciprocity (Koliba, et al., 2011). To some 
extent, a more formal accountability mechanism can be created if “for what” is mandated to other 
organisations in the form of reports.  
Another collaboration setting is created by direct antecedent. In this type of collaboration very 
clear relationships exist where higher authorities command ‘lower’ agencies or staff to work with 
others. This normally occurs within governmental institutions although there are some cases where 
government and non-governmental institutions have made prior agreement between themselves. 
For example, government agency collaborates with private company through contractual 
agreement. The most relevant question to understand accountability in this setting is the ‘to whom’ 
question.  
Governing collaborative working creates challenges for accountability (Koliba, et al., 2011b). 
Cross-sector and cross-jurisdictional collaboration creates complexity in accountability. The 
challenge of accountability for public service collaboration results from ‘many hands’ (Bovens, 
2007;Romzek et al., 2014). This challenge might be greater in a developing country with what 
Riggs termed a prismatic society (Riggs, 2006); where an administrative system coexists alongside 
complex society influences . The prismatic society concept requires further academic exploration 
since this concept offers in-depth understanding of culturally different society, like Indonesia, 
where a government has attempted to adopt a western system which has the capacity to forcefully 
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collide with endemic cultural and ecological factors.   
2.5. Prismatic Society 
The previous sections discuss accountability and collaborative setting based on an understanding 
of current theories and concepts implemented in the ‘developed world’. Developing countries have 
started to adopt this concept into their public administrations such as government of Indonesia 
through its president created presidential decree No. 7 Year 1999. However, this concept might 
not necessarily work effectively in these countries. For instance, citizens in developing countries 
(such as in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Africa) still have a culture of caste. Collaboration in 
these types of countries is very complex since there are many factors which can affect the process 
of creating and sustaining collaborations. Moreover, researchers who are attempting to analyse and 
assess accountability in these countries need to comprehensively understand these types of society. 
The history of colonisation is claimed to affect a country’s characteristics and its people (Ahmad, 
1970; Ch & Ramulu, 2008; Riggs, 1980, 2006; Weidner, 1965), this includes public administration 
systems (Riggs, 1961). However, no clear measurement has been identified as to how strong this 
influence has been to a previously colonised country. In this study this is viewed as being 
particularly true within a country that has experienced many phases like Indonesia, which has 
experienced several different colonial masters and periods of colonisation. Patterns and models of 
accountability and collaboration might be different in a prismatic society. Further, western models 
of accountability may not work effectively in developing countries which have experienced 
colonisation. 
Riggs described post-colonial countries, or the third world, as prismatic societies (Riggs, 1960a). 
Riggs (1960) stated that the transformation of society from fused to prismatic has major 
consequences within the realms of economics, social, politics and culture. Society is very dynamic, 
with the social transformation not occurring at a constant speed.. Society can adapt to a change 
quickly or it can respond slowly to an influence. Influences might come from outside or inside the 
society. Riggs believed that the biggest influence comes from external, or exogenetic factors. 
Riggs theory of prismatic society was developed to model developing countries, particularly post-
colonial states (Adams, et al., 2011), and to provide a framework to understand the evidence of 
tension (Riggs, 1964).  Riggs attempted to conceptualise developing countries as situations where 
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the existence of societies with old and traditional characteristics blends with a modern model of 
society.  
Riggs’ prismatic society concept has been referenced by many scholars studying developing 
countries influencing their work (Peng, 2008).  The influence of Riggs’ concept is in understanding 
organisational behaviour and the administrative systems of developing countries. However, Peng 
(2008) criticised some aspects, such as the degree of differentiation of ‘fused-prismatic-diffracted’ 
model - where a spectrum exists with modern society being attributed as highly differentiated, a 
fused society as undifferentiated, and social systems within a prismatic society as ‘in between’.  
The degree of differentiation is different in every country.  
 
 
Figure 7 shows a model of “fused-prismatic-diffracted” is illustrated by the principle of light 
through a prism. Light passing through the prism is divided into three groups. The first group is 
the white light which enters the prism. This is termed fused - which represents traditional or 
agricultural society. Fused society is functionally diffused where a single structure executes all 
functions. The society depends highly on agriculture, and economic systems are based on barter.  
There is a lack of labour division within a fused society. This can be found in a kingdom country 
such as the previous imperial China and pre-revolutionary Siamese Thailand which Riggs termed 
as fused societies. These societies have only a single structure which executes many functions. 
King and officials appointed by kings carry out all functions in society such as administrative, 





Figure 7: Riggs' fused-prismatic-diffracted model 
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based on factors of race, ethnicity, and class of birth rather than achievement. The degree of 
development in these societies is very low since the way of life is still togetherness that control 
behaviour. 
In contrast, diffracted light produces a rainbow with different colours; in Riggs’ model this 
illustrates that each structure executes its own functions. This diffracted light represents modern 
or industrialisation societies. Economic systems in these societies is based on market mechanism 
(demand and supply).  These societies have high divisions of labour. Riggs uses the USA as a 
sample of diffracted society. This society is opposite to a fused society. In term of government, 
diffracted societies have responsive governments. Government protects human rights and are 
responsive to the needs of the citizenry. People have a general consensus about the basic aspects 
of social life which must be fulfilled by government. They can give pressure to government. The 
law is widely respected, and the enforcement of the laws proceeds without any significant 
difficulty.  
A diffracted society appears to be the perfect type of society. It is characterised by an ideal 
government which is responsive, attainment values exist in society, each structure performs its 
own function, the economic system is based on market mechanisms, and general consensus exists 
among people on all basic aspects of social life. However, this ideal model is too good to be true. 
This idealised type of society is difficult to find in the real world even in the most highly developed 
democratic countries. 
Between the fused and diffracted societies there is a prismatic society. Explicitly, Riggs realised 
that the scale from fused to diffracted is not predetermined by specific sequences of evolutionary 
stages that a society will go through. The prismatic society was Riggs’ attempt to explain public 
administration in post-colonial countries. It should be viewed as a transitional stage of society. In 
this society, there is a mix of characteristics of fused and diffracted societies. A certain degree of 
differentiation and specialisation of roles exists. However, coexistence of roles creates friction.  
Riggs tends to value a prismatic society as a negative society whose complexity is messy. 
However, in this study it is considered that human nature is similar everywhere (good and bad 
sides exist). Indonesia should not be viewed as a ‘Hobbesian1 jungle’ as many good people still 
work to build a better country, people still love working cooperatively and sharing, and some 
 
1. Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher in as a founder of modern political philosophy. Hobbes is famous for 
his book Leviathan (1651) which discusses social contract 
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Indonesians have a strong intention to help each other; particularly indigenous people who still 
live in communal societies.  In this study being in a prismatic society is viewed as not always 
negative. This is just a different type of society to a ‘developed world model’. However problems 
occur where the people (citizens and/or government) and their ecological system harm each other.  
An indigenous fused society should not be assumed to be a negative societal situation as societies 
have their own choice of lifestyle. They may be no less happy than diffracted society; or they may 
even be more content with life as they rarely face scarcity of their daily needs. An indigenous fused 
society can conserve natural resources far better than modern systems of technology that are 
implemented by the majority of centralised governments. This does not mean that modern 
technology is useless, but within a bureaucratic system political situation can manipulate the use 
of this technology to exploit natural resources for personal interest. In this study the strong view 
exists that we can learn from indigenous peoples’ ways of life. If human goals and objectives are 
to reach happiness, harmony, and welfare, these can be found in indigenous peoples’ ways of life 
as they live in greater harmony with nature mostly treating nature as part of their life cycle. 
It is viewed here that Riggs’ concept of “Fused-Prismatic-Diffracted” society is quite vague. All 
societies can be assumed as prismatic societies with different degree of ‘old’ administrative 
concepts (agrarian/fused society) and modern administration concepts (modern/diffracted society). 
There will always be complexity in every social system since humans are very social and creative.   
2.5.1. Indonesia as a Prismatic Society 
Although Riggs’ idea of prismatic society was developed post World War II, it still attracts some 
scholars either to adopt his concept in their work (such as Adam et al. 2011 and van den Bersselaar 
& Decker 2011) or to criticize it (e.g. Bent, 1967 and Peng 2008). Here it is viewed that 
comprehensive analysis of this concept is required in the public administration of current 
developing countries systems. It particularly seems that, the variables of historical background, 
post-colonial political structures, social ideology, the role of the military, a territory’s size, and the 
status of social power are all, in some cases, ignored in Riggs concept of “fused-prismatic-
diffracted model” (Peng, 2008). To address this criticism directly (and assess its validity) this study 
aims to analyse the public administrative practices of Indonesia, a developing country that has 
experienced many colonial phases. This study is focused on accountability in the administration 
of disaster management in Indonesia. 
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Firstly, Indonesia, in pre-colonial era, was only thousand islands in a territory which consisted of 
multiple sultanates and kingdoms. There was no one country as Indonesia today. At the beginning 
was dominated by Hindu and Buddhist Kingdoms but Islam started to come to territory in 7th 
century which was brought by trader from mid-east. Islam dominated kingdoms in this territory in 
the late of 14th century and early 15th century. Since its richness of natural resources, the territory 
attracted Chinese and European traders such as from Portugal, Netherland, and Britain. These 
European countries started their colonisation to the territory. It was Netherland which dominated 
trading in the territory with its Vereenigde Oost Indische Compagnie (VOC). The Dutch controlled 
trading by monopolistic system. Dutch called the territory as Nederlandsch Indie (Dutch East 
Indies). Some areas was occupied by British (today is Malaysia) but than it was declared as a 
separate country.  Indonesia is claimed that had been colonised by the Dutch for 3.5 decades and 
there was 4.5 years colonised by Japanese during World War II. Secondly, the transition era was 
started from 1945 when Indonesia proclaimed its independent from colonisation. During this era, 
Indonesia experienced different systems of state such as federal and republic system. There was a 
revolution movement in 1965 which overthrew the President Soekarno since Indonesia faced 
economic and political problems. Thirdly, the country was led by a dictator of second president 
when in a new order era. Within these two periods of presidencies, Indonesia was Javanese centric 
which the country was ruled by most of Javanese.  Lastly, under reformation era from 1998 to 
current country situation where democratic values have been introduced and implemented within 
Indonesian government system.  
These changes have created both positive and negative impacts on the public administration of the 
country. In the early stage of the Independent Indonesia the public administration system was 
dominated by Dutch influences, some of which still exist today; for example, the majority of 
Indonesian laws use a Dutch model (Sholihin, 2008).  In order to more fully comprehend and 
understand the real practice of public administration in this study a case of disaster management 
in a local government is presented and analysed. Disaster management is a unique example of 
public administration complexity. This complexity includes many aspects such as state, social 
system, environmental, political and economic.  
Riggs’ attempted to compare public administrations and identified some problems that occur in 
one country and then suggests this might occur in other countries as well. Riggs developed three 
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analytical tools to explain his theory: i) an ecological approach; ii) a structural-functional 
approach; and, iii) “sala” models. To some extent, these tools are used as a methodology to 
understand public administration in developing countries.  
2.5.2. Ecological approach 
An ecological approach to public administration means that the public administration has a clear 
relationship with its environment. This approach was developed because public administration 
clearly has to interact with environmental factors such as people, places, physical technology, 
social technology, wishes and ideas, catastrophe, and personality (Gaus, 1947).  This is a two-way 
process as environmental factors influence administration, and administration impacts on 
environmental factors. These environmental factors somewhat shape the social system of a country 
and administration, and therefore is part and parcel of the social system. Every environmental 
change can affect public administration (Gaus, 1947). Riggs identified five simple functional 
requisites of society: social, political, economic, symbolic and communication. 
Clear reasons exist to use an ecological perspective to understand a public administration system, 
as the same type of administration system might not best suit countries with clearly different 
environments. An administration system is like a species of plant that has evolved to grow in a 
certain environment. It might not grow in another place if the place has a different soil type, 





2.5.3. Structural-functional approach     
 A structural-functional approach in public administration study acknowledges that every society 
has different structures, with each structure completing different functions within society.   
Using a systematic approach in his analysis Riggs categorised the functions of society into five 
structures; social, economic, political, communication and symbolic (Figure 8); all functions work 
in society as a system. Riggs claimed that in order to understand public administration in a society, 
it is crucial to take a full-system perspective since public administration is part and parcel of the 
wider social system. The linkage between society and administrative system is that what exists in 
society would exist within the administrative system. They should not be entirely different. For 
example, if a caste system exists in society so there should be a caste system in administration. 
Riggs defines structures as patterns of behaviour.  Based on this, Riggs attempted to explain within 
his ‘fused-prismatic-diffracted’ model that the functions in society are carried out by a number of 
structures with specific implementation methods.  
In a political context, a prismatic society is either influenced by predominantly endogenetic forces 
or is under the influence of exogenetic forces, which means that the change can come from inside 
or outside of society. Development within third world countries is considerably influenced by 
exogenetic forces. The prismatic society will respond to external forces, especially from diffracted 














Figure 8: Riggs' five functional requisites of society 
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to maintain its independence. However, if the society fails or its endogenetic forces are weak, the 
society will be colonialised by a foreign elite that will change the structure of society. 
Prismatic society is characterised by heterogeneity, formalism, and overlapping. Heterogeneity 
means that in the society there simultaneously exists different kinds of system and viewpoints; for 
example  urban and rural, or modern hospitals with high technology executing allopathic 
approaches but there also exists homeopathic treatment. Politicians and government staffs are 
spoiled by having massive influence; the degree of formalism is very high in a prismatic society 
where the laws, rules and regulations are prescribed but the implementation of them consists of 
wide deviations. Discrepancies exist between formally prescribed norms and practised norms. 
There is a gap between stated principles and practices. Functional overlapping occurs when similar 
functions are executed by different institutions. Both differentiated structures of diffracted society 
and undifferentiated structures of fused society exist in a prismatic society, which potentially 
makes social change in society inconsistent, incomplete and irresponsive. New and modern 
institutional structures may be created but in practice traditional social structures keep dominating. 
A parliament, judicial system or government exists but behaviour is governed by certain caste, 
family, religion, ethnicity, gender, etc. 
2.5.4. Sala Model 
The characteristics of a prismatic society consist of various economic, political, social, 
technological, and administrative sub-systems. The administrative sub-system has been termed a 
‘sala’ model by Riggs. The ‘sala’ model is characterised by certain ‘bureau’ features which co-
exist with certain features of chamber. ‘Bureau’ is a characteristic of diffracted societies whereas 
chamber is a characteristic of fused society. However, the ‘bureau’ characteristics of a 
administrative efficiency and rationality do not exist in the ‘sala’ model. In a prismatic society 
appointed administrative positions, which discharge certain administration functions, are often 
distributed based on nepotism and favouritism, practices which are kept out of diffracted societies 
(fused societies are patrimonial where kinship is paramount).  
The administrative characteristics of both diffracted and fused societies can be found in prismatic 
society. The administration of prismatic society is characterised by the existence of patrimony, but 
this is not officially subscribed - rather it is simply wildly practiced. The people close to, or that 
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have connections to government, will get more benefits from government programmes whereas 
general people might be ignored. Government staffs can prioritise programmes to their own benefit 
in order to increase their wealth and power rather than wider social well-being.  Government staffs 
can easily rationalise situations to the public to claim and judge their decision since they have the 
power to do it. This is where power defines reality (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Universal laws cannot be 
applied in this society since there exists heterogeneity of community groups. Government staff 
tend to work more loyally to their own community than to the government. Many government 
policies or decisions lead to dissatisfaction and hostility among communities.   
In the ‘sala’ model clects exist. The definition of clect is ‘a group of people who use modern 
systems and methods of administration but retain traditional/ fused characteristics’, such as 
maintaining a close link to a specific group because there is an interest in that group. In the ‘sala’ 
model the recruitment of government staff is through educational qualification or examination 
processes, but the process of promotion and career depend on ascriptive ties. Staff are unresponsive 
to people who do not have any direct relationship with them. There is unbalance in a state in which 
bureaucracy dominates its existence. Corruption, nepotism and inefficiency occur widely in ‘sala’ 
public administration systems. 
2.6. Public Administration in Indonesia: Contextual Information  
Indonesia is a country which is constructed upon cultural diversity. There are 633 large ethnic 
groups, a total which reaches 1331 when sub-ethnics are included (Statistics Indonesia, 2018). 
Each culture has its own way social system, language, and way of life. They live in different 
territories with different environments. Some live in lowlands, hills, forests, jungle, coastal, urban 
and the Bajau (sometimes called sea-gypsies) live entirely upon the ocean. Their lifestyles are 
different from one place to another. The place where they live can identify the type of job they do. 
For example, most people who live near the beach fish for a living, and those who live around the 
hills and forests are generally farmers. Cultural characteristics are influenced by peoples 
interactions with their environments (Riggs, 1980), both physical and non-physical; such as 
climate, social life, religion, technology, etc.  
Defining environmental concepts is tricky as environments differ. For example, the environment 
of a school is quite different from the environment of a house. The concept of environment is 
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identifiable from the entities that built this environment. This is similar to the concept of a state 
environment. In order to fully understand the Indonesian environment, its unique range of 
environmental factors must be identified (as per Gaus 1947). Environment is a dynamic space 
where each system interacts with others and creates new atmospheres and situations. 
Environmental changes can affect public administration (Gaus, 1947). Society has recently 
become much more complicated. This is caused by many factors such as improved communication 
technologies that have changed the way people communicate, bank and shop (e.g. the Internet and 
mobile phones) Economic motives have become greater than conservation consideration for the 
natural resources; this is a trend that can be traced to the dawn of agriculture more than 10,000 
years ago (Zohary, Hopf, & Weiss, 2012) As a consequence, governments need to increase both 
its gross number of functions and also the ways in which they engage with individuals and societies 
as a whole. This becomes even more complex in Indonesia due to the vast and broad range of 
environments.  
Indonesia has central laws whose principles are laid out under Pancasila2 and Constitution 1945. 
Every local government must rule the territory under these constitutions. Local governments can 
create local regulations, but these cannot contradict the state constitutions. As every local 
government has different environmental characteristics, local governments may create 
departments required for their bureaucracy and services to citizens. Indonesian citizens, as a 
society, are very dynamic. The influences of information technology, foreign culture, and 
modernisation force citizens to adapt to rapidly changing current situations. Government systems 
everywhere in the world appear to always be one step behind the progress of change (laws evolve 
much more slowly than technology and culture), this is also true in Indonesia. To cope with societal 
changes governments attempts to execute legal changes. In Indonesia the process of legal change 
is carried out by discussion among government entities such as executives, legislatives, and 
judiciaries.  
 
2 Pancasila is the state ideology of Indonesia which consists of five basic principles. The Pancasila was announced 
by Indonesian first President (Soekarno). Mr. Soekarno gave these principles to  the Independence Preparatory 
Committee on 1st June, 1945. The Pancasila Principles are; 1) Belief in one supreme God, 2) Just and civilized 
Humanitarianism. 3) The unified Indonesia, 4) Democracy, led by the wisdom of the representatives of the People. 
5) Social justice for all Indonesians. 
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Legal changes are not always designed for the needs of Indonesians; some may be driven by 
political interests. For instance, the House of Representatives has revised a law No 17 Year 2014 
(Government of Indonesia, 2014b) about parliamentary immunity which became controversial 
(Kompas, 2018; Detik, 2018). Firstly, the process was not transparent as the process of creating 
the draft was not accessible by society. Secondly, Article 245 states that if parliamentarians are 
involved in breaking a law (e.g. corruption or any other crime), they could not be prosecuted before 
there is a consent from both the President of Indonesia and the Honorary council (Mahkamah 
Kehormatan Dewan).    
State transformation requires comprehensive understanding. The foundation of this study is that 
great academic value can be created by attempting to analyse how the transformation from a 
fused/traditional society, to a diffracted society, occurs. In this study this analysis uses the example 
of disaster management in Indonesia. Garut was chosen, a place which experiences repeated 
natural disasters that has been marked as one of the most vulnerable area in Indonesia (Kurniawan, 
et al., 2011).  
2.6.1. The history of public administration in Indonesia 
Public administration was introduced to many kingdoms in the territory of what is now Indonesia 
by Dutch colonialists in the 16th century (Resink, 2013). Dutch East Indies or Netherland-East 
Indies (Dutch: Netherlandsch-Indie) was the name given to this colonial territory (Indonesia as a 
country did not exist at that time). This administration was created for the commercial purposes of 
the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or VOC). The VOC, was 
involved in the spice trade. In the Netherlandsch-Indie the VOC violently monopolised this trade 
so other countries could not make transactions directly with local people.  
At the beginning of colonisation, the VOC occupied only several territories in Indonesia; over time 
their territory increased. Some territories were occupied for 300 to 400 years before Indonesian 
independence in 1945 (Resink, 2013).  The Dutch applied a centralised administration to 
strengthen its power. Different governmental levels such provinces and regencies were created, 
but the central government controlled everything. Dutch power over Indonesian territory ended in 
1942 when Japan invaded. No change in public administration occurred when Japan took over. 
Even after Independence in 1945, a centralistic system was maintained for decades. 
54 
 
This centralistic administrative model survived in Indonesia up to 1998. All policies, regulations, 
financial decisions and development depended on the central government. The power of central 
government was very strong; it was dominant characteristic in the country. Change was started in 
1999 during the Reformasi, or reformation era, when decentralisation and greatly increased local 
autonomy was introduced. This was the era when New Public Management structures were 
introduced to public administration in Indonesia. These concepts are still adopted today.  
2.6.2. Administrative System 
Indonesia is a republic led by an elected president. Indonesia adheres to a trias politica system. 
Trias politica is a state system where the power lies within three separate divided groups; 
executives, legislative, and judicative (Ott, 2014). Today Indonesia is claimed as a democratic 
country where the possession of power is with voters. People have independence to elect their 
leaders, with elections being held every five years for president, mayors or head of local 
government, governor, and parliaments. Citizens vote within a one-person one-vote system. In 
practice the president has the strongest power within the state; ministers are accountable to a 
president, who in turn is formally controlled by parliament. 
2.6.3. Post colonisation  
The Old Order Era 
The history of Indonesian colonization continued to influence subsequent public administration 
systems. The Dutch administration system, including the Dutch legal system, was then adopted by 
state leaders. Many physical and mental legacies of the Dutch are still in existence in the 
Indonesian state system. However, there has been some small evolution within administration 
systems as Indonesia tried to escape from its colonial characteristics; although this has not been 
easy. In the 1950s characteristics of the United States administration system were adopted by 
Indonesian co-founders since they believed that the US administration system was modern, 
practical and efficient (Ahdiyana, 2010). These administrative reforms took place under the first 
president of Indonesia, Mr. Soekarno. This reformation was triggered by changes in national 
strategy as well as global geo-politics (Thoha, 2014).  
Soekarno ruled the country with a monocratic bureaucratic system. This administration system 
was aimed to develop unity of the state based on ‘guided democracy’. His policy was to ‘retool’ 
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cabinets if he found the officers were not loyal to him. In his presidential decree of 5th July 1959, 
Soekarno reshuffled the local government system, which was focused on efficiency, and increased 
the capacity of central government to control local governments (Nurcholish, 2005). Soekarno 
then subsequently proclaimed himself as ‘president for life’ based on law No II/MPRS/1963 
(Budiharsono, 2003).  However, Soekarno was ousted from his presidency by the 1965 revolution; 
the state had become economically and politically unstable. During the turmoil a pogrom occurred 
against communists and the communist party. Perhaps millions of people were killed who were 
suspected as communist by the military and armed civilians (Adam, 2009). The Communist party’s 
existence was prohibited in Indonesia and Mr. Soeharto (an army general) took control as the 
second president of Indonesia. His presidency brought Indonesia to the New Order Era.  
The New Order Era 
The overthrow of Soekarno led to the birth of the New Order Era. The new regime was under the 
second president of Indonesia, Soeharto. Some small changes were made to the public 
administration system although the bureaucratic system was still monocratic. Soeharto ruled 
Indonesia for 32 years from 1966 to 1998. During this period even though Indonesia was stated to 
be a democratic country whose president was voted by parliaments, in practice the presidential 
power was absolute. The house of representatives was just a rubber stamp.  The members of 
parliament came from three parties; Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/United Development Party, 
Golongan Karya/ Functional Group, and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia/ Indonesian Democratic 
Party. Government staffs had to vote for the government party (Golongan Karya or GOLKAR).  
Soeharto created two rules that were crucial for the administrative system. Firstly, he created 
presidential decrees No 44 and 45 in 1974 which together (classed here as one rule) arranged the 
basic tasks and functions of government departments and non-departments (Government of 
Indonesia, 1974a). These decrees regulated department organisation standardisation and became 
the principles guiding the construction of vertical institutional establishment within local 
government.  
The second was Law no 5 Year 1974 about local government (Government of Indonesia, 1974b). 
This law was then revised multiple times during the reformation era to become Law No 22 Year 
1999, Law No 32 Year 2004, and Law no 23 Year 2014. The law regulated local government to 
56 
 
become two levels: provincial level and regional level. The provincial level is led by a governor, 
and the regional level is led by a mayor (cities) and a head of regency (regencies). Every local 
government has two statuses; i) autonomous; and ii) as part of central government. As a 
consequence, the head of local government has double functions in his position. It is as the head 
of autonomous local government and as a representative of central government. This law was made 
to create efficiency and to control local government. In practice, even though local government 
has autonomy, the power of central government is still strong. It has been previously identified 
that to strengthen both the political situation and the economy significant public administration 
reform is required (Ahdiyana, 2010).   
Soeharto’s era was ended by a powerful movement of university students in 1998, asking for better 
democracy and economic leadership of the country as there was political and economic crisis in 
the country. Soeharto was regarded as a dictator since many activists were prosecuted by the 
military without trial. A climax occurred when the Asian economic crisis happened and the Rupiah 
nose-dived devaluing to 18% of its previous value in less than one year (Tarmidi, 2017).  
The Reformation Era 
With the Reformasi at the end of the 1990’s, which followed the collapse of dictatorial president 
Soeharto’s regime, Indonesia experienced a big shift in government administration when the 
previously adopted centralized government became decentralized. It was created by a new Law in 
Local Autonomy (No 22 Year 1999). Indonesia’s public administration system has adopted 
Reinventing Government concepts from Osborne and Gaebler (1992). The paradigm of reinventing 
government is that government should be catalytic, community-owned, competitive mission 
driven, result oriented, customer-driven, supports entrepreneurship, anticipatory, decentralised, 
and market oriented (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). This paradigm is well-known also as a New 
Public Management paradigm.    
The new order government had been regarded as a government with no sense of accountability 
and a lack of transparency to citizens; this despite being voted by local citizens (Haris, 2005). It 
can be seen clearly that local government simply acted as a representative of central government. 
For instance, the head of local governments did not have any political responsibility to local 
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parliaments for their regional level policies. Within this system the local houses of representatives 
were just the media used to legitimise all central government decisions. 
The Reformation era offered changes in politics, democracy, and public administration. A 
president was voted directly by citizens not through a parliamentary vote (who at the time were 
regarded as people representatives). Political parties were not limited to just three parties; now 
every citizen could initiate to create a party and join in the election process to become citizen 
representatives. In public administration there was now real local autonomy and decentralisation. 
Every local government at the provincial level, city level and regency level has the power to 
manage the majority of local development and administration although some of the most important 
matters are still dealt with nationally. This is widely seen within Indonesia as a better solution for 
the development of effective regional and local government. Theoretically, each local government 
knows the problems and needs of its territory intimately. Practically however, this decentralisation 
created the opportunity for gross abuses of power from executive officers since they now had the 
power to manage their area without interfere from central government; this led to massive 
corruption in local governments (Setiyono, 2017). The current era of reformation in Indonesia can 
be characterised by both new dynamic advantages, but also significant drawbacks. 
2.6.4. Local Government of Indonesia from Constitutional Perspectives 
The principal Law of Local government in Indonesia is stated in Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution 
of the Republic of Indonesia (Government of Indonesia, 1945). This Article has inspired other 
laws and regulations which regulate local governments. These include; Law No 1 Year 1945, Law 
No 22 Year 1948, Law No 1 Year 1957, Law No 18 Year 1965, Law No 5 Year 1974, Law No 22 
Year 1999, Law No 32 Year 2004, Law No 23 Year 2014 and Law No 9 Year 2015. These laws 
were created and revised in order to follow the development of local government. The laws of 
local government regulate the relationship between central and local government in financial, 
general services, natural resources management, and other resources (Sunarno, 2006).  
Law No. 22 Year 1999 regulates to give as much as authority to local government except in the 
areas of finance and monetary, foreign affairs, justice, defense, religion, and several government 
policies for national strategical issues (Government of Indonesia, 1999). Citizens have a new hope 
with this law, to have a transparent, accountable and responsible government.  However, the law 
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experienced two-time replacements. In 2004 Law No 32 was introduced (Government of 
Indonesia, 2004) which after a decade was replaced again by Law No 23 Year 2014; as it was 
viewed as having become unfit to the development of good state administration, and the correct 
spirit of local autonomy (Government of Indonesia, 2014a).    
While the laws, regulations and policies have improved over time, however many characteristics 
of the country remain the same. There is no significant change to the general prosperity of people, 
there is still weak law enforcement, corruption occurs at every government level, multiple abuses 
of power exist, and so on.  While the latest laws of local government focus on local autonomy and 
decentralisation, implementation encounters problems. From the author of this study’s perspective, 
the biggest problem appears to be effective power separation between local government and central 
government. Other significant problems are that local autonomy in practice creates primordialism, 
oligarchic regimes, and clientelism politic (Jati, 2012).  The problems contradict the Indonesian 
ideal of a republic country that aims to unify the many different areas and islands into one country. 
While formally, local autonomy is intended to enhance local development, democracy, society 
participation (Government of Indonesia, 1945, 1999a, 2004, 2014a) however in actuality, 
autonomy has given big opportunities for local political elites such elites to hold and abuse the 
power for their personal and group benefit (Jati, 2012). The spirit of decentralisation is for better 
local development based on local characteristic and needs, but this cannot be seen in the real life 
of society.   
Large discrepancies now exist between the implementation of law (application in society) and the 
written law; the presence of which can significantly weaken a state (Aspinall & van Klinken, 
2011). The law is very sharp to below (implementation to ordinary citizens) but dull to above 
(people with certain power and positions). For instance, a white-collar criminal who has corrupted 
the state of billions may escape to other countries, or if they get caught, they might live in a prison 
with special facilities since they can use their money to bribe officials (Tempo, 2018). However, 
many street criminals who commit a crime driven by hunger can be badly beaten and sometimes 




2.7. Theoretical Framework of Collaborative Working Accountability 
A theoretical framework is a tool for a researcher to make a sensible frame of the phenomena under 
study that attempts to explain how and why an actor acts in the way it does (Llewelyn, 2003). In 
this study I use theoretical framework as a conceptual tool to understand the concept and theory in 
my research area of accountability. This theoretical framework both supports and challenges extent 
current theory in accountability.  
By analysing the accountability of involved actors in collaborative working in Indonesia with aims 
to improve performance in disaster responses, this thesis integrates theories from different fields 
including an accountability concept from political and administration theory. In analysing 
accountability, this thesis uses four fundamental question to analyse accountability; i) who; ii) to 
whom; iii) for what; and, iv) why. The accountability concept uses three perspectives to evaluate 
accountability to understand whether accountability is sufficient, in deficit, or overload; 
democratic, constitutional and learning perspectives. A narrow concept of accountability is 
possible, which analyses and assesses accountability as a social relation (Bovens, 2007), however 
when a broader concept of accountability is mobilised, then it can mean different things to different 
people (as per Bovens, 2006; Radin et al., 2016 and Romzek, 2014).    
In this study, accountability is used to study the interaction of actors in collaborative settings during 
every response phase of disaster management (mitigation, preparedness. response, and recovery) 
in repeated flooding in Garut (one of the most vulnerable area for disaster in Indonesia). In addition 
to traditional ways of analysing and assessing accountability, I also include an ecological 
perspective as a way to study and measure accountability. The reason to include ecological 
perspective is that Indonesia, as a country with recent experience of colonisation, would be 
identified by Riggs (1964) as a prismatic society.   
This study uses prismatic society theory (Riggs 1964) as a structural foundation. Prismatic society 
theory is used to understand the social interactions of society in countries whose systems might 
differ from the western world, from where the concepts of accountability derive (Riggs, 1964). 
Riggs theory of prismatic society is modelled for developing country particularly the post-
colonialism state (Adams, et al., 2011). Riggs attempted to conceptualise developing country as 
the situation where the existence of old and traditional characteristic of society which blends with 
modern model of society (Figure 7). Riggs models on prismatic society has been referenced by 
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many scholars studying developing countries; Riggs’ work has had great influence (Peng, 2008). 
One significant influence of Riggs’ concept is in understanding the organisational behaviour and 
administration of state within developing countries. In this study the concept of prismatic society 
is adopted to understand the social interaction of society in Indonesia.  
The reason for including prismatic theory in this research is that accountability might be perceived 
differently a country which has experienced colonisation. Accountability concepts have come from 
western thinkers and were then adopted by Indonesia. This does not mean that accountability 
concepts were absent from the Indonesian psyche, but they may have been in different forms or 
with different understanding. Formal accountability in the public administration system of 
Indonesia is a new concept introduced in 1999, however the concepts of democracy, transparency, 
equity, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility and equity  have been practiced for a long time 
(Mulgan, 2000). A form of accountability traditionally has been practiced by Indonesians although 
without naming it as accountability. Communities who live in rural areas are common to depend 
their live to nature. They have a strong belief that their life is mutual symbiosis with nature. This 
has been taught by their ancestors from generation to generation. They are aware of responsibility 
to protect and conserve nature. Failure to do these responsibility, they understand a consequence 
from overlooking nature which can harm their life in a form of natural disaster. Protecting and 
conserving nature are their integral part of life. Beside their relationship with nature, the 
communities have their own way in responding to disasters. They will help others without any 
instruction or demand.      
The practice of accountability is even more complicated when implemented in collaborative 
working settings (Bardach & Lesser, 1996); this is because in a collaborative context, actors have 
to deal with competing demands (Ebrahim, 2003). The nature of collaborative working 
arrangements (whether formal agreements exist between organisations or informal collaboration 
without any prior agreement) must be identified prior to, or during, analysis. New models of 
accountability which consider wider relationships, not only a one-to-one hierarchical model, have 
emerged (Wilkins, 2002). Public agencies have not escaped from this demand for new 
accountability forms; this has been particularly true once we entered the ‘age of social media’. The 
promotion of accountability to different forums is an urgent task globally for public sector 
organisations. It appears crucial for a model of accountability to ideally meet all forums 
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expectations. With the authority that they have, government agencies are expected to fulfil the 
needs of citizenry. Added to which they have formal accountability demands to their higher 
authorities. Agencies will be evaluated based on their performance. Measuring performance should 
consider both outputs and outcomes; which are the perhaps the most essential criteria. Performance 
measurement can only be as a direct result of agencies relationship with the forums; therefore 
agencies need to clearly communicate their tasks to forums.  
A plethora of studies on accountability in collaborative working within disaster contexts focus on 
a single event such as Hurricane Katrina (Koliba, Mills, et al., 2011b), the Challenger tragedy (B. 
S. Romzek & Dubnick, 1987a) and Australian bush fires (Taylor, Tharapos, & Sidaway, 2014). In 
disaster response, most studies specifically focus on the post-disaster response phase. However, it 
is stated here that in the context of accountability related to repetitive natural disasters doubt may 
be created if only an analysis and assessment of each singular event happens. Moreover, we know 
that disaster management consists of four distinct phases, with one phase affecting subsequent 
phases. Understanding accountability in this context needs a more complete in-depth 
understanding. Furthermore, it is stated here that ecological factors such as people, place, physical 
technology, social technology, wishes and ideas, catastrophe, and personality are environmental 
influences as to how people define accountability. This is a new concept identified within this 
study and is something entirely new in this field as it does not exist within previous publications. 
There is a need to understand this accountability model in a developing country which might be 
characterized as a prismatic society.  
Previous research in accountability within collaborative settings encountered different obstacles. 
Some critics have claimed  that a failure of accountability in collaborative working is caused by 
the lack of good communication (Baker, 2014; Dass-Brailsford, 2009). Others (e.g. Lai et al., 2014; 
Sargiacomo et al., 2014; Taylor et al., 2014) have stated that accountability cannot meet set criteria  
in multiple directions; such as both vertical and horizontal accountability and downward 
accountability to the victims and also to civil society organisations. Specifically, Taylor et al, 
(2014) stated that most accountability is for satisfying upward accountability (donors and higher-
level authority) but not for downward accountability (society and victims).  
Accountability is about  social relationships and interactions (Bovens, 2007; Mulgan, 2000), where 
comprehensively understanding accountability requires clear knowledge of the context setting 
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(O’Dwyer & Unerman, 2008). This research presents accountability in a specific collaboration 
setting in disaster management related to repetitive flooding. This research uses accountability as 
a media to capture social phenomena of responsibility, responsiveness, democracy, transparency, 
equity, efficiency, and integrity (as per M. J. Dubnick, 2002) in the Indonesian local government 
of Garut. Specifically, this research investigates, by using a sociological accountability framework 
adapted from Bovens (2006), how the practices of collaborative working accountability are 
implemented in repetitive disaster responses where government organisations and non-
government actors work together in dealing with flooding.  
Sociological accountability is practised to analyse the performance of an actor (Bovens, 2006). 
Analysis to this accountability concept allows questions related to whether accountability exists or 
is absent (potential accountability deficits [Mulgan, 2014]) to be addressed. In political and 
administrative contexts, accountability deficits are a category of democratic deficits (Arugay, 
2005). Democratic deficits exist in the realm between ideals and practices in the real world of 
democracy (Bastian & Luckham, 2003)  
This collaboration model is used since the public administration process of the current 
governmental system in Indonesia seems to use New Public Management which enforces 
government agencies to work with other agencies or to involve non-governmental organisation or 
individual in their services. However vestiges of traditional concepts still exist, particularly with 
regard to the strong control residual with central government. Dominance of New Public 
Management can be seen in the activities of government agencies and their programmes across 
multiple different sectors. However, New Public Service concepts are also found in certain 
practices, such as in disaster management, where government acts as the main actor delivering 
public service which cannot be delegated to other groups (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000).  
This research seeks to understand the accountability of actors in collaborative working context 
using the case of disaster management. This assessment of accountability is a narrow concept not 
a broad concept. A broad concept of accountability consists of various concepts such as 
transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and responsiveness (Koppell, 2005). 
However, within this narrow concept of accountability as a social relationship, I take collaborative 
working as a context of accountability practice with disaster management as a case.  
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Each question asked in connection with accountability will result in different nature of entities, 
and each nature has different accountability types (and subordinates). The nature of a ‘to whom’ 
question will result in groups of different forums to whom the account is rendered. Public sector 
organisations have many eyes resulting in at least five different kinds of accountability (Day & 
Klein, 1987); political accountability, legal accountability, administrative accountability, 
professional accountability and social accountability. Each accountability type has its own entities. 
For example, political accountability covers elected representatives, political parties, voters, and 
media.      
 
Figure 9 : Theoretical framework of collaborative working accountability 
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Figure 9 depicts a framework to understand Indonesian accountability in the case of repeated 
disaster. As a concept, accountability is disputable, as it can mean different things to different 
people. Accountability concepts may be more complex in Indonesia, a developing country that 
adopts western concepts for its public administration; concepts which might not suit its 
environmental situation. Also, as Riggs claimed, a developing country is different from a 
developed country. This impacts on not only the governmental system but also wider society. Our 
current understanding of accountability uses western perspectives of accountability which differ 
from developing countries such as Indonesia. It also seems pertinent to state again clearly here that 
accountability is a disputable concept that will have different meanings in different cultures and 
contexts including in Indonesian disaster response. It is also reiterated here that not all social 
relations can be categorized as accountability since they cannot fulfil the conditions of 
accountability such as participation, responsiveness, efficiency and transparency (Bovens, 2006).  
2.8. Summary 
This chapter discusses the theoretical background of accountability and collaborative working in 
the context of repeated disaster in the most vulnerable area in Indonesia. The use of accountability 
concept as a social relation in this research places the emphasis firmly upon a sociological 
framework and not on a more broad evaluative sense of accountability which can mean different 
thing to different people. This chapter argues for the use of sociological sense of accountability as 
the theoretical framework explaining the research, i.e. the way collaborative working is executed 
in repeated disaster.  
Collaboration is one way that apes, and particularly humans, obtain their goals and objectives. 
Over the past few decades changes within the public administration of Indonesia has provided 
opportunities for local governments to manage their territory based on their interests, which in turn 
has provided opportunities for local government to create collaborations within their public sector 
organisations. In addition collaborations can now exist with NGOs or private enterprises. If 
conducted in a systematic robust fashion an assessment of accountability should identify whether 
failure of accountability in collaborative working is caused by accountability deficits or 
accountability excess. This is based on assessments of democratic, constitutional, and learning 
perspectives. This thesis uses the concept of accountability to analyse actors’ experiences in 
rendering their account and also to assess accountability in collaborative setting within a 
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developing country which experienced colonisation. This research explores the way actors 
involved in collaborative working in disaster management manage their accountability and the 
reasons for accountability deficits or accountability excesses. The next chapter of this thesis 







This chapter explains in full the methodology applied in this study to research the phenomenon 
laid out in chapter 1 about accountability issues, involving many actors, in an Indonesian repeated 
flooding context. Repeated disaster responses consist of complex problems since they include four 
separate phases and involve many agencies from government, non-governmental institutions and 
individuals. Some actors join are involved with two or more phases, whilst others are just in one 
disaster management phase. Current theories on accountability insist that accountability is a 
disputable concept that means different things to different people. Moreover there is increased 
complexity of accountability within a range of different collaborative settings during repetitive 
four-phase disaster management. Seemingly the best way to understand accountability within this 
setting is by adopting a case study research technique.   
This research aims to study accountability in different contexts and collaborative settings that have 
perhaps been less explored in previous research; repeated disaster responses. The research 
questions for this research are as follows: 
4. To understand roles of actors that played vigorous roles in this disaster management 
5. To understand the working relationships between the different actors 
6. To analyse accountability arrangement which affects actions in every disaster phase  
In order to address these research questions, a case study methodology is applied due to its ability 
to understand knowledge of human affair based on context (as per Flyvberg, 2011). Other reasons 
to apply a case study research include the fact that accountability has multiple interpretations 
(Blagescu et al, 2005; Bovens, 2007; Romzek et al, 2014; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Schillemans 
& Busuioc, 2014), a the fact that a case study is suitable to study a context-dependent research. A 
case study aims to produce knowledge based on this context. The subjectivity around the act of 
defining accountability leads to the adoption of a case study strategy, since the case study research 
is expected to depict social phenomenon in real-life contexts (Flyvberg, 2011). The naturalistic 
style of case study is the reason that the case study approach is suitable to study the natural setting 
of the world without any modification or interference (Gillham, 2000). 
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The main components of research design when conducting a case study research are as follows 
(from Yin, 2014):  
i) The type of data to be collected which is based on research questions  
ii) Propositions related to the study  
iii) Unit of analysis 
iv) The logic linking the data to the propositions 
v) The criteria for interpreting findings  
Due to the phenomenon of accountability being specific to its context (in this case collaborative 
working within and Indonesian repetitive natural disaster responses context), this research is not 
aiming to prove anything specific that can be rolled out into other multiple different contexts, but 
is instead looking at the very fundamental nature of accountability itself and how environmental 
factors should impact on its design wherever it is needed to be implemented. The author hopes to 
expand our knowledge of how accountability within, and between, social groups in Indonesia is 
created; a country, as was shown in Chapter 2, that has experienced shifting social, political and 
administration system of government.  
At the beginning of the chapter in section 3.2, the methodology selection of this research is 
described, as well as an exploration of the ontological and epistemological assumptions of this 
research. The second section of this chapter (section 3.3) explores my case study research. This 
involves general terms and meaning of case study, how it is applied in this study, and how it helps 
to answer the questions I proposed. This is followed by a reflection on the specificities of disaster 
management as a research field. Chapter 3.4 contains the data collection methods that were applied 
in this study (material includes fieldwork notes, interviews, photographs, maps, and content 
analysis from national and regional mass media). Chapter 3.4 includes a constructive critique of 
my data collection and analysing methodologies, including potentially problematic issues. 
Additionally this section includes data collection procedures . Chapter 3.5 discusses the data 
analysis process. Chapter 3.6 discusses the ethical issues encountered in this study. Finally, there 
is a summary of this chapter.  
3.2. Research methodology 
Applying the right methodology is crucial when undertaking robust scientific research science. 
Ontologically, it is about what is reality? Is it external to an individual? Is it created or objective 
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in nature (Chua, 1986)? Ontology lies at the heart of the investigation (Burrell & Morgan, 2017). 
In this respect, it covers a phenomenon that can be observed, measured (so that the data can be 
processed), interpreted, verified, and then conclusions can be drawn. According to Burrell & 
Morgan (2017), ontological assumption is divided becomes two extreme sides, subjective and 
objective dimensions. Epistemology is also important. Epistemology includes normative aspects 
of achieving scientific validity of knowledge acquisition., This is about how the world can be 
understood and communicated to others (Burrell & Morgan, 2017). Ontology leads to 
epistemological and methodological assumptions.  
There are some basic questions that require scrutiny related to qualitative research and scientific 
knowledge within social science; there has long been an arguments that social science lacks 
objectivity because of its subjectivity (Castle, 1968). It seems that the question about the meaning 
of scientific knowledge diminishes the possibility of robust social scientific knowledge. 
Furthermore, the question of the researchers own ontological and epistemological assumptions 
have significant influence on research quality (Gialdino, 2009). 
This research attempts to understand accountability, which is about human affairs and its 
relationship to others and structure (Llewelyn, 2003). This research is not about absolute nature, 
such as the theory of gravity (which has only one truth). What is real can be context-dependent 
(Flyvberg, 2011); therefore knowledge is produced based on context. Understanding 
accountability by analysing and assessing its process among actors who collaborate will inform 
the nature of its relationship. Furthermore, as accountability is produced for good governance in 
practice, this study may inform and improve collaboration in Indonesian disaster management.  
There is a real need to create extensive description of accountability within this setting.  However 
it should be clearly understood that this research will probably not modify how social interraction 
manifests amongst government agencies, NGOs, volunteers, donors, and communities in 
Indonesia (although the sincere hope exists that it will!). When conducting interviews a semi-
structured interview technique was applied, which is more flexibly adapted to context so that 
knowledge can be produced based on interaction (as per Wiles & Crow, 2015). Semi structured 
interviewing enables participants to express their understandings and experiences (King & 
Horrocks, 2010). Interview questions were developed based on the previous answers of 
participants. Participants answered questions based on their own perceptions and experiences. By 
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deploying this strategy, thick descriptions of the situation in the field can be obtained. This might 
come from the actors' experiences in response to repeated natural disasters, the documents related 
to this setting, and actors' interactions with each other. All data can then be triangulated and 
subsequently justified.  
During this research several locations were visited to view current existence of situation (Figure 
1.1 in Chapter 1). In addition to conducting 33 semi-structured interviews with key actors, 
government documents maps newspapers, and visual/ artefacts were collected. The key actors are 
from middle to top position of local government officers in Garut, NGOs, and community leaders. 
As this research is not aimed at proving existing theories of accountability (which often take a 
more positivist paradigm), quantitative data collection methods such as surveys with close-ended 
questions and questionnaires were not employed in this study. Qualitative research methods aim 
to capture real life situations and peoples’ behaviour that cannot be quantified by numbers (e.g. 
human feelings and emotions).         
This study does not aim to confirm or falsify current theories of accountability, which utilise 
positivist paradigms. As Flyvberg ( 2011) found, a case study helps researchers to understand the 
edge of current theories, and it has the ability to develop new concepts, variables, and theories 
which have yet to be fully explored. Prior to the start of this study it was the preconception of the 
author that accountability might be translated differently by actors who work collaboratively in 
disaster responses. It was also thought that ecological factors might be the dominant influence 
within these accountability relationships. 
3.3. Case Study Approach 
A case study research methodology is currently trending in qualitative research; it is particularly 
popular in disciplines such as psychology, medicine, law, and political science (Creswell, 2013) 
since it has flexibility in different paradigmatic position (within both qualitative and quantitative 
research), study designs, and methods (Hyett et al, 2014). It also has the ability to work with 
different kinds of data such as interviews, observations, artefacts and documents (Yin, 2014). 
Additionally a case study brings a researcher closer to real life situations in which human 
behaviour can be understood directly; it is now well recognised that not all human behaviour can 
be understood simply through existing theory (Flyvberg, 2011) 
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However, defining a ‘case’ is not necessarily a simple thing, it can be quite challenging (Gillham, 
2000). According to Gillham (2000), a case can be an individual, a group, an institution or a 
community; defining a case is based on what questions need to be answered. A case is bound by a 
system, a time and a place (Creswell, 2013). The case study uses systemic inquiry to explore a 
real-life situation in-depth; this inquiry.is aimed at describing the phenomenon being studied.  This 
naturalistic style of case study makes it different from positivist study (which places the emphasis 
on experimental methods, hypothesis testing of quantitative data to determine the significance of 
result, a deductive approach from existing theory and/or isolation of behavioural elements for 
investigation and constructing evidence [Gillham, 2000] ).  
The limit for this research is an assessment and analysis of the accountability of involved actors in 
Indonesian repetitive natural disasters. This includes government policy makers , donors, citizens 
(from affected communities), and other direct actors (from every phase of disaster management - 
pre-disaster, during disaster, post-disaster) who respond to flooding in collaborative working 
contexts. To some extent, I am trying to find the existence of accountability mechanisms among 
the actors in the case of natural disasters responses. Since the main research question is trying to 
understand perceptions, experiences, opinions, and understanding (as per Yin, 2014), it appears 
the right choice to use a case study.  
The existing situation about the current nature of accountability within Indonesian collaborative 
working, when tackling natural disasters, is still unclear. Public sector organisations, NGOs, 
donors, community leaders and so on claim that they have done their jobs properly, and that money 
and resources have been used expediently. However according to two community leaders from 
two locations stated that they have not received treatments and services as they expected. Examples 
like this of two distinctly different perceptions make the situation more interesting for study since 
they have obviously had very different perceptions about accountability. There should be clear 
accountability for this situation due to its financial aspect (e.g. public money from taxes, donors, 
charity, or companies). However, the literature discussing this accountability is still massively 
under-developed. I would like to understand what really happens on the ground in Indonesia, and 
the context to accountability. As was laid out in detail in Chapter 2 literature exists which 
specifically explores accountability in collaborative governance (Koliba, Mills, et al., 2011b), but 
it focuses only a single phase of disaster management, the response phase. What’s more, that 
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research studies accountability in governance research, where a stable pattern of coordination 
exists amongst collaborators.  
Exchange of resources and actions are discussed and negotiated. As discussed in Chapter 2, other 
previous researches in accountability with the context of natural disaster setting claim that even 
when natural disaster happens repeatedly but the progress to make better accountability does not 
seem to be better (Baker, 2014; A. Lai, et al., 2014; Sargiacomo, et al., 2014; Taylor, et al., 2014). 
But, those researches do not focus on collaborative setting. 
There is no perfect method for conducting research; every method has its strengths and 
weaknesses. This is also true of case study methods. There are some issues which might appear in 
this method. Case study research focuses on a specific case within a context. Results may not be 
relevant to apply to other cases with different contexts; but this viewpoint is rejected by Flyvberg 
(2011) who thinks that a case study creates concrete knowledge which is more valuable than 
predictive theory since human affairs can be different based on context (Flyvberg, 2011). Another 
scholar thinks that the most crucial aspect to conduct a case study is getting access to the research 
object (Yin, 2014); BUT if a researcher CAN get access then a  case study can be the best option. 
Getting access to certain situations can be challenging however in this case my knowledge of the 
locale and my mastery of the local language and dialects proved immensely useful.  
There are two options when conducting a case study to understand phenomenon; a single case 
study, or a multiple case study. A multiple case study can aim to study differences and similarities 
between cases (Stake, 2005), it can be used also to identify similar or contrasting results (Yin, 
2014). A ‘multiple case study’ has the advantage to perhaps create a more convincing theory 
because it is grounded in more than one empirical evidence (Gustafsson, 2017). However, a 
‘multiple case study’ is time consuming and expensive (Baxter & Jack, 2008). A single case study 
has the ability to make a deeper understanding of the subject and thus a high quality theory 
(Gustafsson, 2017). A single case study can richly describe the existence of phenomenon 
(Sigglekow, 2007). In a single case study, it is plausible for a researcher to examine old theoretical 
relationships AND explore/create new theory (Yin, 2014). This study employs a single case study 
because it aims to understand accountability of particular area in facing repeated disaster. The 
single case study gives opportunity to understand phenomenon deeper with limited time.  The 
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single case study is appropriate for deployment here since this research is about a certain group of 
people.         
Chapter 3.4 explains the chosen methodological stance of this research which is suitable for the 
research questions introduced in Chapter 1. This research is studying empirical data with a 
qualitative approach; therefore my theories are employed as a lens to understand accountability. It 
is also clear that choosing disaster responses as potential value to understand accountability in 
collaborative working since disaster responses will involve more than one actor who work 
collaboratively (Koliba et al., 2011; Lai, 2011; B. S. Romzek & Dubnick, 1987b). 
3.4. Data collection methods 
My research focuses on public administration processes in Garut council, West Java, a part of 
Indonesia repeatedly hit by annual floods (see Table 1 in Chapter 1). A devastating flood occurred 
in 2016 that killed 34 citizens, and thousands lost their houses. Data was collected from the areas 
that experience repeated flooding. This covers three locations; the city of Garut, and two villages 
near the city. As part of my data collection I observed different sections (upper-stream and down-
stream) of the River Cimanuk, as well as forests, hills, sand mining, and farming areas.  Garut is 
one of the most vulnerable city in Indonesia (BNPB, 2013). Data was collected from various 
methods such as: location visits, semi-structured interviews, government documents, maps, 
newspapers, government websites, and visual/ artefact. 
3.4.1. Fieldwork notes  
The first activity of my fieldwork was visiting areas that had experienced repeated flooding in the 
city of Garut. Note taking (executed for qualitative descriptions) was conducted in the real setting 
of natural disaster responses. Firstly, I identified repeated flooding areas around the city to gain 
information about locations, actors, activities, objects and events. Note taking was aimed at 
providing a comprehensive picture of the case and the reality of flooding to the city to understand 





Figure 10: Map of three locations which experience repeated flooding 
Source: modified google map 
 
Between May 2017 to August 2017 I visited three specific locations (Figure 10) which experience 
flooding almost every year, and other areas which I assumed to contribute to flooding such as the 
upper-stream of the River Cimanuk, sand mining location, Darajat Pass tourism location, a forest, 
an upper hill farming area, and a dairy farm. During this exploratory fieldwork phase, I noticed 
community behaviour and the attitude to nature and local government activities related to disaster 
prevention, preparedness and/or rehabilitation. I discovered the interactions of citizens with local 
government and other “outsiders” from their community such as NGOs and businessmen. I read 
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government regulations (which contributed to disaster management), I listened to radio in the city, 
and I read newspapers voraciously.  
This initial process of data generation was to familiarise myself with the environment of disaster 
management (particularly flooding) in Garut. The initial note taking process was instigated to 
overview the activities of participants in the areas experiencing repeated flooding. I sought to 
understand how the daily life of local people contributes to mitigation, preparedness, response and 
post-flooding recovery. Basically I wanted to find out what the everyday activities were of the 
people who have connections to the flooding. Mostly the people who live in the city are urban 
workers such as civil servants, private business employees, entrepreneurs, etc. (like most other 
cities). Most of the villagers are farmers, dependent on farming their land.  
Understanding participants was a crucial activity in gaining knowledge of the interactions amongst 
the citizenry and between them and their government.  It can significantly improve the quality of 
research if a clear understanding is obtained of how people interrelate and their culture; it also 
facilitates the researcher with nature of which questions need to be addressed (Kawulich, 2005). 
This process allowed me to understand how citizens who lived in villages cultivated their lands 
for farming, their attitudes and behaviour towards nature, and how they interacted amongst 
themselves and with other neighbouring communities and citizens in the city. Additionally, I could 
learn how citizens interact with government and other outsiders to their social system (such as 
NGOs and businessmen). The process allowed me also to understand citizens’ activities in the 
contexts of formal and informal accountability mechanisms that occur in their daily life.   
Formal accountability in both type of communities - villages and city - is manifested in a formal 
administrative process. At the lowest level, there is Rukun Tetangga (RT) (a neighbourhood 
association) and Rukun Warga (RW) (a citizen association), which hierarchically is above RT. RT 
and RW are built by community initiative but its legality is confirmed by government 
administration at kelurahan/ desa (village administrative office) since their existence is expected 
to assist government administrative process at lower level. 
There are at least 30 families in one RT; an RW consists of a minimum of three RTs (dependent 
on a locations’ population density). This might be a bigger number of families if the area has high 
population density. According to the Indonesian Minister of Home Affairs Regulation no. 5/2007 
(Government of Indonesia, 2007a), RTs and RWs are institutions formed through local community 
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consultations which aim both to serve the community and assist government duties. They 
contribute actively to support local government development visions and missions. They become 
a bridge of aspiration between citizens’ participation and local government for better government 
services, development, and citizen empowerment. They have the function of coordinating among 
citizens and being mediators for the solution of community problems. Their tasks include assisting 
to deliver services to the community (that are the responsibility of the local government). Other 
tasks are maintaining harmony within the life of citizens, designing neighbourhood plans and 
implementing community-based development. RTs and RWs are expected to contribute in 
environmental management, to become facilitators who maintain communication and alignment 
of programs from government to citizens, and vice versa to provide input to government.  
The second process of fieldwork within this research was capturing physical evidence. I visited 
ten sites that I had been informed were contributors to flooding. I visited the Darajat tourism site 
which is located on the upper stream of the Cimanuk River as well as the PT. Raffles Pacific 
Harvest Dairy Farm, a farming area next to the upper stream of the Cimanuk River, a sand mining 
location, a water dam, a riverbank development project, farming areas and several housing blocks 
in the city. 
These visits were executed to enrich my understanding of the case; this action helped me to 
familiarise the case. Field notes helped me to develop assumptions and knowledge of the current 
situation in the city; information collected was used when conducting interviews with related 
actors such as high-level officers of local government, NGOs, community leaders, and other actors 
involved in disaster management.    
3.4.2. Semi-structured interviews  
Following visitation activities to several sites, I conducted thirty-three semi structured interviews 
with key disaster management actors, especially those related to repetitive flooding (see table 3.1). 
Interviews were aimed to identify the ‘life-world’ of the interviewee in order to capture and 
interpret described phenomena (as per Cassell & Symon, 2013) . Participants were actors’ who 
contributed to at least one phase of the disaster management cycle. Research participants can be 
grouped into three big groups (see table 3.1). The first group was a government group (N=16). 
This consisted of government administrative officers at middle or high-level positions in their 
governmental organizations. They came from local government department offices, village 
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officers, military, government owned corporations, and parliament. The second group was a non-
government group (N=14); participants were not bounded to the government system or they had 
their own autonomy in activities that were not hierarchically within government system - this 
included NGOs, corporations, academician and technocratic. The last group are community 
leaders (N=3), respected people in certain communities but their position has no direct relationship 
with government system. These people are religious leaders and/or indigenous community leaders. 
This group is different from non-formal village leaders such as head of Rukun Tetangga 









Head of local Government (Regent) √   1 
Head of Local Disaster Management Board √   1 
Local District Military Commando   √   1 
Local Forestry Corporation √   1 
Board of Local Development Planning √   1 
Local Parliament Member of Garut √   1 
Nature Conservation Agency Region 5 Garut √   1 
Fire Fighter Department √   1 
Resort Police Department  √   1 
Local Communication and Information Agency √   1 
Local Politics and Public Administration Agency √   1 
Regional Water Utility Company √   1 
Head of Local Political Party √   1 
Head of Village (RW/RT) √   3 
Jenggala outdoor activities organisation  √  1 
consultant company  √  1 
Academician  √  1 
Town Planer  √  1 
Communication Forum of Conservation Cadre Indonesia Region Garut  √  1 
Local Head of Disaster Risk Reduction Forum  √  1 
Red Cross  √  2 
Local Education Centre  √  1 
Corporation  √  3 
School Headmaster  √  2 
Local Community Leader   √ 3 
Table 2: Interview participant occupation and grouping 
 
Table 2 shows three groups of participants from government, non-government and community 
involve direct or indirectly with disaster management. Local Government participants came from 
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different roles, such as policy makers, supervisors, and executors. Two governmental corporations 
are included within the government group. Non-governments groups are actors who contribute to 
disaster management. They are from formal organisations, informal organisations, and concerned 
individuals. The third group is local community leaders who live in the area. 
Those actors mentioned above are the most appropriate participants for providing information to 
answer the research question of this thesis, since they are involved (directly or indirectly) in 
disaster management. They have experience with working with each other, and the majority of 
them were the heads of their organisations/ institutions. They were picked based on the reason of 
their involvement in repeated flooding. 
Nine high-ranking (heads of institutions or in charge of disaster responses) local government 
officers were selected from institutions involved with disaster response. They were: 
1) The head of regency - a regional leader with responsibility for development, safety, comfort, 
and harmony  
2) The chief executive of the local board of disaster management – tasked with coordinating and 
executing disaster management phases in the region  
3) A military official secretary involved during disaster response  
4) The head of the conservation department of Garut with responsibility for nature protection 
5) The head of the board of local planning and development for Garut  
6) The head of the fire department that helps during the response phase  
7) An official from the police department with involvement during recovery  
8) An official from the Local Communication and Information Agency of Garut with responsibility 
for collecting and broadcasting formal information from government  
9) An official from the Local Politics and Administration Agency which registers and builds 
government relationship with non-government organisations  
Interviews were also conducted with representatives from five NGOs involved in disaster response 
in the study area. The selection of these NGOs was based on their frequent experience with disaster 
responses in Garut. Also two high school headmasters were selected from urban areas that had 
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experienced repeated flooding; this was to understand their activities in every phase of disaster 
management and their collaboration with other actors. Some experts in public administration 
related to flooding were also interviewed.  
 Representatives from the corporate world were also interviewed. Companies were picked which 
were considered to be contributing to flooding issues. These companies had multiple contributions. 
Their activities might be triggering or exacerbating flooding but also these companies were 
routinely distributed some of their income for NGOs activities; e.g. for reforestation through their 
Corporate Social Responsibility programmes or they donated for logistics during flooding events.  
Community leaders are categorised in two different groups; a government group and a community 
group. I categorised one group as the government group since they function as informal 
representatives of government at the lowest level. It is stated in ministry of Home Affair regulation 
No 5 Year 2007. Although, they are elected by citizens who live in that area.  The second group 
consists of unelected community leaders (no democratic process but these people are respected by 
their communities); this group of community leaders are explained in detail in section 3.4.3. By 
interviewing these participants for this research, and generating data from different sources,  I 
could capture what was going on within collaborative working processes and observe how 
government and people worked together in facing repeated flood disasters. By doing this, I believe 
I obtained a thick and solid understanding of accountability within Garut’s disaster response sector.  
Interviews were aimed at gaining information about the following main themes:  
i) Actors’ perception about accountability  
ii) Actors’ relationship with other actors  
iii) Actors’ activities and contributions to each disaster management phase  
iv) Actors’ experience in collaboration with other actors 
v) Actor’s communication mechanisms with each other 
vi) Discussion and decision-making processes amongst actors, including power sharing 
vii) Whether or not actors valued other actors 




All interviews were conducted face-to-face with semi-structured questions. An interview guide 
was pre-prepared. The interview guide did not consist of word-for-word questions, but instead it 
consisted of topics which came from a mixture of existing literature, the interviewers’ personal 
experience and knowledge and informal preliminary work (as per King & Horrocks, 2010). The 
most important factor to be successful in interviewing is flexibility of questions (Cassell & Symon, 
2013). King & Horrocks (2010) suggested that the interviewer start with a question that the 
interviewee can easily answer and without potential embarrassment or distress. First of all, I visited 
participants (whether to their offices or their houses) to make an appointment. It was a big 
challenge to have some appointments, particularly with local government officers. There were 
many reasons that made making appointments challenging. One characteristic of government 
officers in the area is seemingly a lack of desire to share information outside of the government 
system, even for research purposes. Another reason was that they had tight time schedule for their 
activities. The appointment for interviewing local government officers was much easier after I had 
made an appointment with the head of local government Garut and he provided me with a 
recommendation letter to interview other government department officers (Appendice). This letter 
was then used when I revisited local government department offices and it definitely ‘opened 
doors’ that were previously shut. There was a very different welcome from local government 
officers and the other participants (from non-government and community groups) in this research. 
Representatives from non-government and community groups were much friendlier and very 
enthusiastic to be involved in this research. Furthermore, some NGO leaders accompanied me to 
visit some locations considered as the sources of repeated flooding.  
The selection of the participants to be interviewed was informed by national and regional media, 
government regulation of organisations involved in disaster management, and local citizens who 
lived in the area.  I interviewed them based on their own convenient time and place; either their 
office or house.  I applied a strategy to interview in a natural interactive way with two-way dialogue 
and not just questions and answers. From this strategy I obtained lots of informative data such as 
the personal attitude of participants. Any enthusiasm or irony during the interview could be seen 
from their facial expressions, language and/or their tone of voice.  
3.4.3. Population and Participants 
This research was undertaken in Garut Regency. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Garut is one of 
the most vulnerable places in Indonesia for natural disasters ranging from earthquakes, volcanic 
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eruptions, tsunamis, landslides, bushfires, and floods; however flooding is the most frequent. It 
happens every year with different levels of intensity. The biggest recent flood occurred in 2016 
killed 34 with thousands more made homeless. This attracted attention from the national mass 
media. Many donors became involved, and even the President of the Republic of Indonesia visited 
Garut a few day after the flooding.   
The majority of people who live in Garut are ethnically Sundanese; as in many other regencies in 
West Java. Sundanese culture still exists in their way of life although there is significant difference 
between the culture of urban and rural communities. This significant difference has occurred since 
the development of information technology in the regency that coincided with the Internet 
becoming popular; which helps people communicate and access the latest news and information.  
Three populated locations were chosen in this research to represent all communities. I used to live 
in these areas so I am familiar with the local communities, their habits, daily activities and 
interaction with other communities and nature. I interviewed six their representative leaders as 
participants of this research. As was explained in the previous section there were two groups of 
community leaders in this research; informal leaders whose position was respected based on their 
position as a customary leader or religious leader, and the second group made up of the lowest 
level of local government administrative system. These community leaders were looked to as the 
representative of communities if there was any collaboration or partnership required with other 
organisations such as government, NGOs, donors, and other voluntary groups. Community leaders 
were responsible for community safety and harmony. They were decision makers in the 
community and they worked on behalf of the community. Their function as community leaders 
were not their main job since there was not any remuneration for their duties. Both groups worked 
based on moral responsibility to their society. Even those who held a formal position, as 
government officers at community level, were not formally remunerated.  
Beside those community leaders, I picked heads of local government department offices in Garut 
and other decision makers in relevant areas of local government. The other group of participants 
were people who were involved with, understood or influenced at least one phase of disaster 
management (such as local NGOs, academicians, town planner, and corporations). Collaborative 
working in this research does not mean that they work all together at the same time; it may involve 
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only a few actors, but it must have contributed to, or be expected to contribute to, disaster 
management.  
I also interviewed three participants who were not directly involved in disaster responses, however 
their knowledge and analysis were crucial to enrich the findings of this research. The first actor 
was an academic. Another actor was a local expert in public administration and development study. 
This actor was involved in several consultations with local government for making development 
policy. Another actor was a town planner. Information from the town planner was important for 
understanding spatial plans and regency development.   
3.4.4. Procedure  
Data was generated by visiting several different sites related to flooding within the study area. I 
talked to the people and I saw their daily activities and routines. I made notes and I took pictures. 
During these activities some people informed me about actors involved with different disaster 
response phases (mitigation, preparedness, response and rehabilitation). They told me the contact 
details of people that I should talk with to gain information.  
As soon as I got this information, I started to visit their offices and I provided my invitation letter 
to participate in my research. At the onset of my fieldwork I wanted to complete a total of 55 
interviews. Due to logistical considerations this number was reduced to 33; I consider this number 
to be sufficient for this research. Each semi-structured interview with participants took around an 
hour. Interviews were conducted in two different languages, Bahasa Indonesia and Sundanese, 
both of which I am 100% fluent in. The majority people in Indonesia do not have sufficient 
capability in English. Bahasa Indonesia is the national language and it is a formal communication 
media for government officers, corporations, and non-government organisations. Sundanese is a 
local language used by local communities to interact amongst themselves. The majority of 
communities in this area understand the national language but some terminologies of Sundanese 
do not exist in the national language (Bahasa Indonesia) and vice versa. For example, 
accountability is “akuntabilitas” in national language but the “akuntabilitas” term does not exist in 
Sundanese. I created close meaning of every terminology to fit local contexts. For example the 
term “akuntabilitas” is understood by most Indonesians as ‘responsibility which is implemented 
through formal reporting mechanisms’ (Muhamad, et al., 2000); this is translatable into Sundanese. 
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I simplified language based on the understanding of interviewees – trying to pitch each interview 
to the appropriate level. 
The interviews started by providing or reading the participant information sheet (Appendices II) 
to inform interviewees about the research objectives and goals. This was followed by handing the 
participant consent form (Appendices III) for signing (if they agreed to take part in the research). 
With permission from participants I recorded interviews and I also made ] notes during interviews 
just in case there were technical issues with the  recording. During these interviews I garnered 
information about other actors and sources, which enriched my data. After completing my data 
collection from multiple different sources, I then analysed my data. 
3.4.5.  Document analysis  
Documents are available texts and images without researcher intervention (Bowen, 2009). 
Document analysis was employed to analyse government policies, regulations, news, laws, and 
other written documents, whether in virtual or paper format. This included visual artefacts such as 
pictures/ images, maps, charts, and so on. Data from documents can then be combined with other 
data sources. Data processing in document analysis is conducted by thematic analysis where 
patterns are recognised within data with the emerging theme becoming categories for analysis 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Coding for document analysis is executed through re-reading 
and reviewing data; this can then be added to predefined code, such as interviews, if document 
analysis is supplementary to other research methods (Bowen, 2009) 
I analysed government documents (laws, regulations, and policies related to disaster management 
phases and administration processes. Documents included Indonesian constitutional laws and 
regulations, which are applied to all Indonesian territory, and local government regulations, which 
have only a localised context. I compared and analysed each document to understand 
interconnections and relationships. One purpose of these activities was to identify connections or 
contradictions. Legal government documents can be used to identify legal accountability. 
Conformity to current laws, policies or regulations can then be measured. I also aimed to illuminate 
and identify current accountability understanding within the public administration of the study 
area.   
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News was selected from different source of media, online and offline. Mass media was selected 
from ‘reputable’ sources; reputability was identified by their company profile, reputation and 
credibility.     
3.5. Data Analysis 
Data analysis was executed by conducting coding from various sources. According to Saldana 
(2009) the coding process consists of three steps. The first step is making code from sentences, 
paragraphs, images, etc. The second step is categorising the produced codes, and the third step is 
generating theory from categorisation.  The ‘first cycle’ coding process can be analysing single 
words to full sentences and it is followed by the ‘second cycle’ which has a greater range; such as 
longer passages which enable primary content and essence to be captured (as per Saldana, 2009)  
Different data types were analysed in two steps. The first step was manually analysing the data. 
Images were given themes and context. Interview recordings were transcribed and analysed. 
Analysis was started by reading through all transcriptions to identify key points and issues. After 
this, all transcriptions were reread and coded by cutting and grouping code manually (see Figure 
3.2).  
However it was soon obvious that this strategy created confusion, since one passage can be in two 
or more categories or themes. Therefore I needed to find another more effective and efficient way 
to code interview transcribes. After attending training provided by the University of Liverpool 
about coding using Nvivo version 11. I started to use Nvivo. It does not work to create themes or 
categories automatically by itself but it does aid with the grouping process. The software can 
recognise Bahasa Indonesian words, which helps to search certain words and their relationship to 




Figure 11: Manual coding process 
 
The second step was to upload all interview transcriptions, images, news, government policy and 
other supported data to Nvivo application software, which then combined and analysed the data. 
Nvivo was used just to make the work more efficient since the coding process was executed 
manually. Nvivo has the power to analyse different kind of data at the same time. For example, it 
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can analyse data from interview recording transcriptions, photographs, and other documents. 
Nvivo may help to triangulate data at the same time from different sources. 219 codes were 
generated from all data. These codes were then grouped into categories. and a map was produced 
(Figure 11). 
Categories and codes were placed into a graphic in order to understand the relationships among 
those categories or themes (see figure 3.2); four groups were created. The first group is disaster 
management, which includes four phases. This group depicts the dynamic process of the activities 
of actors’ that worked in each repetitive flooding disaster management phase. It shows the level of 
each actors’ contributions to every disaster phase that was placed in a table (see table 3). Group 
two is models of collaboration among actors. Mechanisms, processes, issues, and models of 
collaboration were revealed. Different relationship models among involved actors were created 
based on this map (see Table 4). The third group is accountability models using results from 
relationship between the previous two groups (disaster management phases and collaboration). 
This resulted in different models of accountability and how accountability works within this 




Mitigation Preparedness Response Rehabilitation 
Government Agencies Low Low High  Low to Medium 
NGOs Low low to Medium High  Low to Medium 
Military Low Low High  Low 
Media Low Low High  Low 
Politicians Low Low High  Low 
Community Leaders low to Medium Low High  Medium to High 
Volunteer Low Low High  Low 
Table 3: Actors' contributions to disaster management 
Table 3 depicts the degree of contributions from involved actors to every disaster phase. Each 
actors’ contribution to every phase (mitigation, preparedness, response, rehabilitation) will be 
discussed later chapters. Actors’ contributions to different disaster phases includes their process 




Figure 12: Mapping codes and categories relationship 
Table 4 reflects models of interactions among involved actors through all disaster phases, the data 
for which was generated by analysing relational processes in Figure 12. This relationship among 




NGOs Military Media Politicians Community Leaders Volunteer 
Government Agencies peers/ principal peers/ principal peers Peers peers principal-agent peers 
NGOs peers/ principal peers peers peers peers Peers peers 
Military Peers peers principal-agent peers peers Peers peers 
Media Peers peers peers peers peers Peers peers 
Politicians Peers peers peers peers peers Peers peers 
Community Leaders principal-agent peers peers peers peers Peers peers 
Volunteer Peers peers peers peers peers Peers peers 




The key findings of this research are presented in four chapters of analysis; one for each different 
phase of disaster management. The first of which analyses collaborative working accountability 
during the mitigation phase. This includes the relationships between people, government and 
nature. During Chapter 4 two alternative approaches of disaster mitigation are presented and 
discussed. Chapter 5 focuses on the preparedness phase. Chapter 6 is very related to  Chapter 4  
(about mitigation) and Chapter 5 (about preparedness) because both of them are pre-disaster 
activities. Chapter 5 discusses finding of accountability process during preparation to face flooding 
by actors and citizens. The response phase chapter, Chapter 6 is specifically focused on the 
devastated flooding event of 2016. The last chapter of analysis, Chapter 7, discusses post-disaster 
findings . Within each analysis chapter direct quotes are provided from every interview (translated 
into English). The translation process was executed carefully by conducting cross-check 
translations with my colleagues by sending my translation without mentioning interviewee’s 
names to maintain anonymity.   
3.6. Ethical Issues 
As this research involved humans ethical consideration was required. Maintaining confidentiality 
and the anonymity of participants in this research is crucial. A loss of confidentiality and/or 
anonymity may affect participants’ safety or jobs. In order to avoid any upcoming ethical issues 
caused by this research, research ethics was applied for and granted with application number 0538 
on 18th January 2017 prior to fieldwork data collection (see Appendix I). Issues which might 
require ethical justification were: i) data protection; ii) anonymity of participants; iii) sensitive 
questions; and, iv) the risks and benefits which may occur to participants involved in this research.  
Regarding ensuring data protection, all interview recordings, images, notes, and other documents 
were saved in my University of Liverpool M drive . The file in M drive could only be accessed by 
me and my supervisors. All physical documents were destroyed. The data was fully protected by 
personal password.  
The anonymity of participants in interviews was explained in participant information sheet 
(Appendix II) which was handed to participants to be signed ; all participants were voluntarily 
involved in this research. Their name or initial would not be stated in this research but their 
organisations might appear in this research; however, their identity could not be identified. I 
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informed to participants that when the thesis has been completed it will be available for them to 
access.   
This research took place in Garut regency and involved government officers with high positions, 
chiefs of NGOs, local political leaders and other important public figures. I come from this place 
and I am familiar with the characteristic of high profile officers in the area and the people who 
surround them. Access was not easy, and neither was persuading them to participate in this 
research. Most Indonesian government officers avoid sharing information which may cause 
trouble to their positions or institutions although public transparency is regulated in Indonesia; 
people have rights to access public information from government - but in practice it rarely happens. 
Secondly, public figures in Garut are busy people who may prioritise their time for their jobs and 
personal activities. They might regard spending time for my interview as unimportant. However, 
once I had a letter of recommendation from the head of local government in Garut it became easy, 
as the majority of people in Indonesia, and particularly in Garut, will oblige if their higher authority 
recommends them. 
By doing this, I realise that there is bias in this research. I come from this area and I have 
experienced repeated flooding since I was child. There might be subjective judgement to this work. 
However, this repeated failure in tackling flooding which causes disruption to people who live in 
the city needs robust academic research. Many people face this issue during rainy season and 
attendant threats to their health. Over the years flooding has affected thousands of people, causing 
them to flee their homes, and killing many. Conducting this research might provide an opportunity 
to reveal what is happening to the city. I hope that this research will offer genuine and practical 
solutions.  
3.7. Summary 
Case study as a strategy in this research, consisting complex of methods, seems to be the best 
strategy to answer the research questions of this thesis. The idea of using case study strategy in 
this research was inspired by a book “Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice” from 
Flyvberg (Flyvbjerg, 1998). The case in this book was a development in a city of Aalborg, 




Philosophically, I use a constructivist paradigm in this research since the meaning of reality is 
constructed by one’s mind (L’Abate, 2014); accountability can have different meanings for 
different people. It depends on who defines accountability or where accountability is being used. 
For example, the famous debate about accountability between Friedrich and Finer (see Chapter 2) 
proves how different people in different system of public administration interpret accountability 
in different ways. Conducting case study research allows me to understand social phenomena in 
comprehensive way by involving different sources of data.  
The next four chapters (Chapter 4,5,6, and 7), are the detailed discussions and analysis of this 












This chapter is the first analysis chapter  of this study. This chapter focuses on the mitigation phase, 
often regarded as a cornerstone of cyclic disaster management (Coppola, 2007; Ha, 2017; LeDuc, 
2006). It is more specific in this chapter to discuss how government, non-government and citizens 
in Garut contribute to preventing and reducing disaster risk, especially (but not limited to) repeated 
flooding. The roles of actors involved who are contributory to, or are involved with mitigation of, 
repeated flooding is also explored in detail in this chapter. It is stated clearly in this chapter that 
when looking at the nature of catastrophic events, it is possible to identify causative failures in 
mitigation plans and structures that led to, or are significantly contributory to, those hazardous 
events. 
There are several sections in this chapter. It is started by discussing local government of Garut 
efforts to mitigate flooding. This section 4.2 explores the development of laws, regulations and 
policies at local government level which relate to greater scale plans. It is followed by  section 4.3  
discusses mitigation of the spatial plan context in Garut. These two sections explore the dynamic 
of plan design and modification which involve many different actors (both active and/or passive) 
during the process. Actors come from different backgrounds and often have different motives. 
Motives range from economic motives, political motives, and existence motives. The third section 
discusses the failure of planning processes which leads to catastrophic flooding to Garut. The 
section 4.4 analyses structural mitigation which includes construction of physical building. This 
section is followed by section 4.5 which analyses relationship between plans and disaster 
mitigation. Section 4.6 specifically analyses each actor contribution on disaster mitigation. The 
contribution from government and non-government actors and   community based mitigation 
which is practiced based on their understanding and knowledge of prevention disaster from 
generation to generation.  The last section is a conclusion of disaster prevention efforts from actors 
and its related accountability context. In addition, it offers some recommendation for improvement 
which might lead to accountability. 
91 
 
4.2. Local Government Development Plans 
In Garut the spirit of local autonomy provides opportunity for local government to manage its 
territory quite independently in many areas. The local government is allowed by constitution to 
design its own regulations and policies which are adapted to local needs, as stated in Article 42 of 
Law No 32 Year 2004 and Law No 10 Year 2004 (Government of Indonesia, 2004a, 2004b). 
Article 42 states that parliament has the duty and authority to make regulations which are discussed 
with head of local government for establishment.  
 
The local regulation No. 7 Year 2011 clearly states basic tasks and functions of the BPBD. The 
BPBD is led by local secretary as ex officio leader, but the main responsibility is in the head of 
local government (Regent). There is a chief executive of BPBD which is appointed by Regent who 
runs the organisation. The chief responsible to Regent through local secretary.   
Other regulations which are relevant to prevention or mitigation is development plans and spatial 
plan. The facts that flooding has occurred to the city repeatedly every year does not mean that the 
local government ignores disaster issues in its planning for city development and its spatial plan. 
The plans include environmental issues and conservation concerns. Development plans cascades 
up from general to more specific plans. The different levels are:  
1) Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Daerah/RPJPD (a long-term local development 
plan),  
2) Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Daerah/ RPJMD (a medium-term local 
development plan), and  
3) Rencana Kerja Pembangunan Daerah/ RKPD (a working plan/short-term plan). 
Conceptually, local governmental planning needs to be in line with upper levels of government 
institutions such as provincial and national levels. However, many conflicts of interest exist during 
designing and implementation of plans. 
The RPJMD, RPJPD, and RKPD are frameworks which guide local government’s decision making 
and planning. These will be manifest within programs that must be fitted to specific areas of 
development. Spatial planning requires mapping areas for development. Different planning needs 
(e.g. planning for industrial areas, housing, farming, conservation, forestry, etc) have different 
requirements and points to consider. For instance, the Garut RKPD for 2017 focused on the 
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development of agritourism. This program will require development areas, which are specifically 
suitable for this need. This development ideal appears theoretically simple, however, the process 
of designing, implementing and modifying plans is in reality very complex. This issue also 
permeates RPJPD, RPJMD, and RKPD which often do not follow their own guidelines or 
regulations.  
4.3.  Development Plans Case  in Garut  
 
Three local development plans above (RPJPD, RPJMD and RKPD) plus spatial plan contribute to 
disaster mitigation. This section will analyse how these contributions from each of this plan to 
disaster mitigation in this study. This analysis is executed by comparing between development 
plans concept and practices.   
4.3.1. Long Term, Medium-term and Short-term Development Plans 
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2 the local government RPJPD has a twenty year span (2005-2025) 
which refers to national and provincial level long-term development plans (Local Government of 
Garut, 2011b). This long-term development plan is followed by RPJMD (a medium-term plan of 
five years); the latest medium-term plan is 2014-2019 (Local Government of Garut, 2014). The 
RKPD is a more concrete plan which is a short-term annual working plan.  
 
Development Plans Concept 
 
Plans are prepared and organized by local government independently with consideration to 
national development plans as stated in Law No 25 (2004) and Law No 32 (2004). There is a 
guideline in local governmental planning called the ‘Regulation of Home Affairs Ministry of the 
Republic of Indonesia No 86 Year 2017’ that, in theory, must be adhered to. This regulation 
explains the planning, controlling and evaluation mechanisms of local development, mechanisms 
for designing the evaluation of local regulation for long-term plans, middle term plans, and 
mechanism of modification for long-term plans, middle-term plans, and local government working 
plans.  
Figure 13 depicts the design development process behind a local government plan. Local 
government development plans have to refer to national and provincial development plans. 
National and provincial level of RPJP, RPJMD and RKPD can be translated differently by one 
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local government to others. The translation depends on the characteristic of every local 
government that can support to its national and provincial level of government. For instance, 
development plans in national production will focus on intensifying farming and its supporting 
infrastructure in agricultural area. However, the development plan can be translated differently in 
tourism area. The lowest level of development plan is a working plan from every local government 
agency. The working plan normally designed through Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan/ 
MUSRENBANG (Development Planning Multi-Stakeholders Consultation Meeting). 
 
The mechanism of designing RPJPD starts from suggestions of many different stakeholders such 
as from NGOs, local community leaders, local government departments, and enterprises. They put 
forward their ideas, opinions, and wishes through Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Daerah/BAPPEDA  (Board of Local Development Planning). Then, ideas and opinions for this 
long-term development are brought to the local house of representative to be discussed with 















The planning process appears rational and bureaucratic which is ideal for guiding the local 
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Figure 13: Flow of local development plan (adopted from Indonesian Law No 25 Year 2004) 
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government to better performance since everything has been regulated (ranging from the design 
process, to controlling processes and evaluation mechanisms. There is a designed standard for 
every plan that enables control and measures achievement. Theoretically, the process of designing 
RPJPD is without interference from the current Regent (head of local government). The Regent 
has only 5 years in his position, based on the election process, whereas the RPJPD is for 20 years. 
This means that current RPJPD (2005-2025) was created a long time before the current leadership 
period:  
The RPJPD is created by referring to Rencana Pembangunan Jangka 
Panjang Nasional/RPJPN (long-term national development plan) and has no 
relation with the leadership of local government  (local government officer of 
Board of Local Development Planning Garut).  
 
Development Plan in Practices 
The RPJPD process and mechanism of planning process is different from the other two 
development plans (RPJMD and RKPD). The RPJPD is designed with reference to Provincial and 
National RPJP (see Figure 13). This is very rational and deliberately bureaucratic so as to create 
good governance practices. There is a process where accountability mechanisms are created 
hierarchically from long-term development plans up to yearly development plans. In practice, there 
are strong influences of executives and legislative for designing and modifying the RPJMD and 
RKPD plans. Current executives (power holders) translate RPJPD to five-year development plans 
(RPJMD) based on their own motives, which are often significantly influenced by political process 
such as political promises to constituents during campaign: 
There is ambiguity actually, when RPJPD is broken down to five-year context 
of RPJMD. This must refer to RPJPD but designing the RPJMD is influenced 
by direct election at local level which consists of political promise from elected 
leader. So, RPJMD is not fully a broken down from RPJPD.  (Head Executive 
of Pusat Informasi dan Studi Pembangunan (PISP)/Centre of Information and 
Development Study) 
This situation also is confirmed by an executive of local government officer in the Garut Board of 
Local Development Planning;  
RPJMD is a five yearly plan which is a derivative of RPJPD but it is somewhat 
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different in depth because the RPJMD is more characterized by regional 
leadership. Yes, as well as in the national level, it is heavily influenced by the 
president. In fact, this is a bit ambiguous actually. uh..uh.. when RPJPD is 
cascaded to the five-year context of RPJMD should be the RPJPD is a main 
peg but because RPJMD is nuanced by a direct election process in which there 
is political promise of the chosen leader so that sometimes RPJMD is not 
completely as a reflection of RPJPD (Chief Executive Officer of Board of 
Local Development Planning Garut)” 
 
This is highly related to the accountability process that is created by the Regent to convince voters 
that the Regent keeps its political promises during campaign to its constituents. Failure to fulfill 
the promises may create distrust from constituents that can contribute to electoral losses.  
There are several motives that trigger the Regent to put its interests in RPJMD. Firstly, the direct 
election process is costly; every candidate has invested a great amount of capital in their campaign. 
Candidates use ‘money politic’ by bribing community leaders or handing out money directly to 
citizens (Aspinall & van Klinken, 2011). Some candidates are backed by businessmen. They 
support the candidates during the campaign while in turn the candidates must pay in return in the 
form of projects or changing/modifying regulations which benefit the businessmen involved 
(Trihartono, 2014a). Secondly, the Regent mostly makes promises to citizens during the campaign. 
The Regent could make a social contract with citizens to convince that the promises will be kept 
(Sanit, 2004). This is a democratic process in which citizens could depose the Regent if he/ she 
fails to keep the promises. In turn, the Regent can abuse its power as an executive to design and 
modify the RPJMD to keep its promises. This was admitted by BAPPEDA of Garut:  
Here, there is a little missed or confusion because the long-term of 20 years, 
2005-2025, yes for twenty years, although requirement of designing RPJMD 
has to consider RPJPD but actually this elected candidate creates programs 
in such a way that can attract voters so that many programs that are not in 
line with RPJPD (local government officer of Board of Local Development 
Planning Garut). 
The social contract in voting system of Indonesian politic is aimed to improve elected 
government’s performance. The social contract is made since human in the state of nature has fears 
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(as Hobbes stated in Leviathan). The contract consists of agreement between candidates of 
government leaders with voters. There is nothing wrong with the social contract and keeping 
campaign promises. However, this becomes a trade-off between keeping promises and following 
long-term plans. The Regent tends to ignore blue print of development to satisfy its certain voters. 
Fulfilment of promises during campaign is one of the ways to keep power being held since the 
promises will be used as a weapon for political rivals to attack or impeach the Regent 
This can be clearly seen in the development strategy of every different leader, which tends to differ 
from that of the previous leadership. The elected candidate will implement their programs in line 
with their vision, mission, goals, and objectives. The RPJPD is translated differently to RPJMD. 
Strategies and approaches are different. This does not only occur in local level but in national level 
happens similar situation. For example, the previous president of Indonesia for the period of 2004-
2014 programs focused on stabilizing citizen welfare by subsidizing petrol and Bantuan Langsung 
Tunai/BLT (Unconditional Cash Transfer) (world bank, 2012).This was aimed to stabilise the 
purchasing power of citizens. However, the current president (Jokowi) with his Nawa Cita vision 
focuses on maritime management, infrastructure development, food sovereignty, and sufficiency 
of energy as stated in RPJMD 2015-2019 (Goverment of Indonesia, 2015).   
Democracy and development plans 
From this evidence can be seen that there is a tension between bureaucratic and democratic process. 
On one side, the bureaucratic process is aimed at creating good governance which local 
government implements its policies and practices based on procedures and mechanism of 
development plan process. On the other side, the democratic process requires elected Regent to 
fulfill campaign promises. These two processes (bureaucratic and democratic) creates different 
accountability concepts. Bureaucratic accountability is created among government system without 
direct involvement from citizens. Although, there may be scrutiny from legislatives but this is 
more a political process that consists of bargaining between elected representatives and executives. 
Democratic accountability is more to direct performance measurement from citizens to executive. 
The head of local government (the Regent) is the one who will have direct impact from citizens 
for their performance because the Regent is in a political position, whereas departments in local 
government are administrative positions (directed by the Regent).  
 
Currently Indonesia adopts direct elections where each person votes to elect a president, governor, 
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mayor, or Regent. Within this system, candidates must have significant capital investment to 
campaign. Some candidates come from business backgrounds, others are backed up by 
businessmen in a ‘shadow bureaucracy’ (LIPI, 2006). The candidates can use two legitimate 
pathways whether through political party support or independent pathway (jalur independent) 
(Government of Indonesia, 2004). Through political party support, they need to give some amount 
of capital in order to have support from political party elites (termed a political dowry or mahar 
politik) since they need a political vehicle to ride. They pay to party elites for approval as well as 
campaign costs (Trihartono, 2014b):  
A big amount of [money] as a condition to support makes “price” of each 
chair becomes expensive. Here, ‘mahar politik’ plays in candidacy. It mustn’t 
be small money to get supported, although in a certain case the support is 
given for free (BBC Indonesia, 2018) 
This new paradigm of democratic process in Indonesia has had a significant impact on the 
development of local government planning processes, particularly in relation to budgeting. There 
are many interests from different parties such as businessmen, political parties, parliaments, law 
enforcers, civil societies, and NGOs to involve during the process:  
They are trapped in that patterns (planning). They are grouped in different 
sections with the system of equality in sharing the budget not to be based on 
functions of each department since they need to have projects in every section. 
Then, they will depend his programs in parliamentary session. There will be 
bargaining with members of DPRD (local house of representatives) to be 
approved. In turn, some amount of percentage from the program is given to the 
member of DPRD” (a chief executive of consultant company).  
If this budgeting game is identified by law enforcers, there will be another game played between 
law enforcers such as police or judiciary and suspect. There will be a negotiation between them.  
The hardship is not completed in that stage (planning), if the head officers are 
identified have problems, there will come from judiciary or law enforcers such 
as policemen and so on. This can be compensated by a project. For example, 
Mr. A*** is indicated involvement in corruption. He will be interrogated. 
During interrogation, there will be negotiation. Law enforcers would say: 
“rather than I investigate your case, I will save you but just give me a project” 
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(a chief executive of consultant company).  
Different roles are taken by NGOs. They play as successor teams of parliament members which in 
return they will ask for projects to the members if they are elected. These types of NGOs are 
normally social and political NGOs (Aspinall & van Klinken, 2011).  
Interests among involved actors in designing and implementing development plans are very 
dominant. Actors may claim that their contributions in development plans are aimed for better 
services to citizens, but there is more to fulfill their interests and advantages for their groups or for 
individuals within their circle.   
The three development plans (RPJPD, RPJMD, RKPD) are constructed very rationally. They are 
ideal for developing local government. They involve many different stakeholders including low 
level government organisation such as kecamatan (sub district) level and desa (village). 
Mechanism of plans are executed whether top-down or bottom up:  
The processes are still the same (long-term plan, medium-term plan, short-term 
plan) involving stakeholders. These are executed by participative, technocratic, 
top-down and bottom up approaches. These approaches are applied to design 
plans which are started from initial design then publishing to citizens then public 
hearing then public consultancy, there is MUSRENBANG (Development 
Planning Multi-Stakeholders Consultation Meeting) before it is stated as local 
regulation”. (local government officer of Board of Local Development Planning 
Garut).  
Development plans are then manifested in programs. The programs will be suited to plans, 
however they do not always run as expected. Since the plans state general guidelines only, but the 
programs can be specified to be certain projects, there are opportunities for fraud because local 
government departments have freedom to execute budgets allocated to them. Here this is explained 
by a businessman involved in this vicious circle:  
There is a stealing or a hiding (from project). For example, there is a training 
project which needs equipment and accommodation. Accommodation can be 
marked up and equipment can be marked up too such as for t-shirt. Plans are 
faced to reality of budget allocation. The allocated budget of five billion can 
be for building or official travels or it can be for training. So, what a freedom 
for them (to allocate the budget). For example, a project tittle might be freely 
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decided such as in educational improvement program, the project detail will 
be decided based on to interest of department. The department will decide the 
project which benefiting to its member personal income. It decides to have 
book procurement project. So, it locks project specification such as the type, 
thickness, contents, etc. As a result, other companies cannot join procurement 
process since deadline has been stated when procurement is published  (a 
chief executive of consultant company).   
Implementation of the development plans will need locations for its execution if they relate to 
physical development. For instance, a city plan provides housing for low-middle income citizens. 
The city will search for a suitable location for the plan. There will be many considerations before 
deciding the location such as accessibility, land price, and the most important part is allotment of 
land. The consideration of land utilization can be found in spatial plan regulation. The three 
development plans should refer to the city spatial plan. 
Collaboration within local government system in three development plans has little contribution 
to creating better performance in creating good public services to citizens as a whole. This is 
caused by personal or group interest within government departments, executives, and elected 
representative. Involvement of non-government actors is more triggered by transactional motives. 
There are several types of accountability within this process. They are democratic accountability, 
administrative accountability, and political accountability. Democratic accountability exists 
between the Regent and its constituents. This is very personal to the Regent although its process 
crosses departments and agencies. Administrative accountability is manifested in the bureaucratic 
process of development plans that involves different level of local government executives. 
Accountability is judged based on fulfillment of requirements from predetermined policies. 
Administrative accountability is measured by higher position in hierarchical order. There is very 
little public involvement in this type of accountability. Lastly, political accountability is between 
executives and elected representatives. The ability of elected representatives to control executives 
is heavily influenced by economic motives. A lot of money is spent by elected representative to 
lure citizens into voting for them. This has triggered more corruption among elected 
representatives and executives. This can be seen from significant increase of corruption cases 
identified every year since 1997 based on publication of Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 
Indonesia/KPK-RI (Indonesian  Corruption Eradication Commission) in 2018 (Indonesian 
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Corruption Eradication Commission, 2018).  
Following these three development plans, there is another plan that is focused on implementing 
these three development plans. Those three plans will be executed in practice based on location 
and allocation of spatial in local government. This is called a spatial plan. 
4.3.2. Spatial Plan 
A spatial plan in the Republic of Indonesia is stated in constitution article 33 paragraph 3 Year 
1945. This is followed by Law No. 26 Year 2007 about spatial plan (Undang-Undang Penataan 
Ruang/UUPR) (Government of Indonesia, 2007). The law exists to execute mandate for creating 
national territory space which is safe, comfortable, productive and sustainable based on the 
national insight and resilience. 
Spatial plan is designed to control spatial utilization by systematic zoning system through zoning, 
permitting, incentive and disincentive, also sanctions. The sanction in this law can be in the form 
of administrative and criminal sanctions. The sanctions in this law are given not only to executors 
who violate the law but also to government officers who issue permissions. 
This has been more than a decade since the spatial plan law was published, in which the law is 
expected to resolve spatial issues effectively. However, there are many spatial plan violation cases 
in the past which some of them have not been solved up to now such as in Aceh (Walidin, 2017), 
2017), Surabaya (Aminah, 2017) and Jakarta (Surharyo, 2017).  Problems are related to law 
enforcement issues and corruption (Jazuli, 2017). The law is expected to bring changes in spatial 
plan aspects. However, implementation of spatial utilization control faces many issues.  
Local government administration is guided by Law No 23 Year 2014. Based on to this law, every 
local government in provincial level and regency/ city has authority and autonomy to manage its 
territory.  In accordance to this, spatial plan serves as guideline for designing spatial usage based 
on its function and for issuing spatial utilisation permit. The law of spatial plan is intended to 
achieve development plans. It controls spatial utilisation and it urges government to work in 
integrated manner across all departments in accordance with every department duties and functions 
in the spatial field.  
However, the lack of coordination in the control of space utilization creates a low degree of 
integration in spatial plan since spatial arrangement is cross-cutting, cross-regional, and cross-
stakeholder.  Sectoral ego among government agencies often becomes a trigger for ‘controlling 
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issues’ in spatial utilisation. Different interests and motives of each institution and department 
become main factor causing sectoral conflict. The sectoral conflict across institutions occurs 
because of this sectoral ego. For instance, the spatial plan law No 26 Year 2007 and Forestry Law 
No 41 Year 1999 conflict in local government arena. On one hand, the spatial utilisation permit 
for the forest exists in the forestry law Article 1 paragraph 3 :“The forest area is designated and 
or set by the government to maintain its existence as a permanent forest” (Government of 
Indonesia, 1999b). If land conversion for any other business such as mining, industry, and so on 
in forest area, it needs permit from ministry of forestry. On the other hand, land utilisation permit 
can be issued by local government. Spatial plan Law 26 Year 2007 article 26 paragraph 3 states 
“Spatial plan in local government is a foundation for issuing permit” (Government of Indonesia, 
2007d). These two laws may cause jurisdiction conflict which in turn will resist law enforcement 
for spatial plan in Indonesia.    
Cross sectoral conflict can be reduced by analysing and understanding definition of space and 
spatial. This might refer to spatial plan law article 1 point 1: “Spatial is a place that includes land, 
sea, and air, including space on the land as a single territory, the place for mankind and other 
living beings perform activities and maintain their living” (Government of Indonesia, 2007d). 
From this definition can be understood that sectoral regulations or laws must be in line with the 
spatial plan law. Having said that, any violation in spatial utilisation should be sanctioned using 
spatial plan law since spatial plan is a spearhead for development.  
Spatial plan in local government level refers to the spatial plan Law No 26 Year 2007. In local 
government, the spatial plan is called Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah/ RTRW (Spatial Plan). The 
spatial plan becomes peraturan daerah/PERDA (local government regulation) in local level. The 
regulation of spatial plan is crucial for development in local level since all three development plans 
will need spaces if the plans relate to physical development:  
RTRW is actually a macro policy which is a masterplan. If RPJP relates to 
programs and RTRW is more focused on spatial context. So, RTRW is a space 
for activities. For example, there is a program of economic development in 
farming, it will search location for the farming. When we talk about RTRW,  
it is about space and it is about container (for the program), RPJPD talks 
about content. So, there are two equal sides, RTRW talk about space, about 
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container for activities and RPJPD talks about activities (local government 
officer of Board of Local Development Planning Garut).   
Development plans and spatial plan are mutually dependent. Development plans describe policies 
and programs, the policies and programs need spatial which is accommodated by spatial plan. 
Local government spatial plan might not be as an independent development planning. It should 
refer to higher level of spatial plan. Regency/municipalities spatial plan must refer to province’s 
spatial plan, province’s spatial plan must refer to national spatial plan (Figure 14).  
Figure 4.2 depicts relationship between the levels of spatial plan and its entities. National spatial 
plan covers all territory in Indonesia. This is as the highest level of spatial plan which consists of 
all islands in Indonesia and national strategic territory spatial plan. One island spatial plan covers 
all provinces in the island. For example, Java island covers six provinces such as Capital of Jakarta, 
Banten, West Java, Central Java, East Java, and Special region of Yogyakarta. The national spatial 
plan becomes reference for national strategic territory plan and province spatial plan. National 
strategic territory spatial plan refers to island spatial plan since the location of this spatial plan will 
be one certain island. This hierarchical spatial plan goes downwardly to regency/ city level. Spatial 
plan detail of regency/city is spatial plan at district level, which is the lowest spatial plan. It usually 
covers several villages/cities. However, local strategic territory spatial plan is plotting certain area 
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The spatial plan hierarchy above (figure 14) seems rational and ideal for implementation of the 
three development plans described earlier (section 4.2.2). This is aimed to contribute to good 
development. In a disaster management context this spatial plan is expected to mitigate or prevent 
harmful effects to citizens from many kind of disasters. However, the spatial plan has not been 
practiced as it is stated in Law No 26 Year 2007. There is extractive economic motives from local 
government for its development with little concern to disaster mitigation (see section 4.3).   
4.3.3. Government, Citizens, and Stakeholders in the Plans 
As explained in the previous section, development plans and spatial plan are inter-related and 
mutually dependent. In addition, both plans are mandated to be integrated by National 
Development Plan System Law No. 25 Year 2004 (Undang-Undang Sistem Perencanaan 
Pembangunan Nasional) as well as Spatial Plan Law No 26 Year 2007.  Spatial plan must refer to 
long-term development plan and spatial plan also must become a guideline for long-term 
development plan (Rudiyanto et.al, 2015). However, Rudiyanto et.al (2015) claims that the plans 
sometimes conflict and contradict one another. It occurs since there are conflict of interests among 
sectors and actors and there is no clear technical guidelines for synchronising at local level.  
The design processes for temporally different development plans (long-term plan, medium-term 
plan, and short-term plan) differ.  In local government contexts, the design process of development 
plan will be led by Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah/Bappeda (Board of Local 
Development Planning) but it works collaboratively; involving local government bodies, citizens 
and private businesses (Bappenas, 2016). The RPJPD consists of local government vision, mission, 
objectives and goals which refers to Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional/ RPJPN 
(national long-term development plan).  The RPJPD must be renewed a minimum of one year 
before it expires. Bappeda prepares draft of RPJPD before conducting Musyawarah Rencana 
Pembangunan/ Musrenbang (Development Planning Multi-Stakeholders Consultation Meeting) 
which refers to RPJPN and the current RPJPD. The draft of RPJPD is discussed during 
Musrenbang with multi-stakeholders such as professionals, bureaucrats, military, police, lawyers, 
academicians, community leaders, politicians, NGOs, business enterprises, and so on. Based on 
this result, Bappeda will make final draft of RPJPD before it is stated as regulation by regional 
representative council. The process is cyclical since the current RPJPD, which is close to expire, 
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will be used as a reference for the next upcoming RPJPD (see Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: The process of designing RPJPD 
 (Source: adopted from National Development Plan System Law No. 25 Year 2004) 
The design process of two other plans (RPJMD and RKPD) also have similarity. They are prepared 
by government entities and discussed through Musrenbang before they are enacted as local 
regulations. However, this is different from the design of spatial plans.  The spatial plan is 
outsourced to consultant. The consultant can be a professional in development or an academic. 
The similarity with development planning is involvement of multi-stakeholders during the process. 
The process is rationally prepared to accommodate all stakeholders’ needs since they are involved 
in process. They can put forward their ideas, opinions, strategies, expectations and objections to 
the draft during Musrenbang. It is a model of planning which adopts a bottom-up participative 
approach (Suherman & Muluk, 2008). Local government might know hopes and expectations of 
stakeholders and citizens in general:  
It involves every element of society. It starts from sub-district level. When the 
public hearing taken place, we start public consultation from beginning of 
musrenbang in district level and then it goes to regency. So it is different with 
the annual planning of musrenbang starting from the village level…so we 















including other element of stakeholders  (local government officer of Board 
of Local Development Planning Garut).  
Nevertheless, mostly it does not run as stated. In practice, development plans designers will refer 
to spatial plans. The spatial plan is designed by consultant who normally does not have enough 
knowledge about an area. Most of them come from a big city, and are not local consultants. They 
learn and analyse area based on literature and documents, but they know little about what is 
happening and the real situation. This creates somewhat dodgy development plans:  
Normally, it starts referring to spatial plan, sir. But it is a little bit unique 
because RTRW is often revised. I had an experience when I made masterplan 
for fishery area. So, I had to refer to RTRW. Data in RTRW showed that region 
with abundance of fish was in Bayongbong, eh.. Sukawening but this data 
from RTRW did not suit to fact. So, if we use RTRW as reference is not possible 
technically but if I use factual data it does not fit to RTRW. We face two 
choices, we chose violate (RTRW) but we are right or we follow RTRW but we 
lie? he..he..he...dilemma (a chief executive of consultant company).  
In addition, bottom up participative approach seems to be just lip service. Government shows that 
it accommodates people’s voices, but their decisions sometimes are according to what have been 
voiced by citizens.   
As stated in the law of spatial plan, violation of RTRW will face consequences. Consultants have 
no choice in their job. It becomes pragmatic for consultants since they must refer to RTRW 
otherwise it is violation of law. According to Spatial Plan Law No 26 Year 2007 Article 69 
paragraph 1:  
Criminal sanctions for people who do not adhere to a predetermined spatial 
plan which results in a change in spatial function is a maximum of 3 (three) 
years imprisonment and a maximum fine of Rp. 500 million”(Government of 
Indonesia, 2007b).  
The consultants will ignore their conscience to avoid consequences. As a result, some development 
plans are useless and cannot be adopted for programs. If the plans are implemented, they might 
not create good result for an area.   
Consultants come from professional group such as academicians and Consultant Company, but are 
government funded. As a result, they will follow orders from funders. They will show to 
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government and citizens that they are professional and capable to do the jobs. They know that they 
report to laypeople but the reason for consultants to use scientific terms is that the consultants want 
to show their professionalism:  
That is difficult for citizens to criticise…yes, there is an exposure. Local 
people are invited to attend the exposure then they come and there will be 
discussion to put forward questions and they will be answered and finish. 
When they want to go home they will be given envelop (money). So, it rarely 
gets to detail such as FGD (focus Group Discussion) or until the issues are 
identified or until issues in society identified. Participants (stakeholders) are 
only listeners. Listening which is without asking and criticising. So, it is one 
way. For example, such a lay person faces table graph, colourful maps on the 
design of a cool presentation. How can they criticize? (a chief executive of 
consultant company)  
Some citizens attend invitation with a feeling of pride since the invitation is sent only to specific 
group of citizens or stakeholders. They feel that they are important group of people because they 
are invited to discuss the future of the local area. Furthermore, they will get incentives for their 
attendance.  Citizens come from different education backgrounds and occupations. Some of them 
will find difficulties to understand the plans. In the worst cases, their attendance is just a formality 
and only a tool to legitimise a development plan.  
The main purpose of Musrenbang is to create local development, welfare and community 
autonomy based on citizens interests. This is a mechanism to show that government is transparent, 
open, responsible and democratic (Suherman & Muluk, 2008).  The spirit of Musrenbang is a 
dialogic forum which is participative with bottom up and top down approach. Practically, this is 
not always easy since capacity and capability of citizens are different from one region to others. 
For instance, the citizens who live in the city with better education and more information might 
have better capacity. However, citizens who come from low income with low education and live 
in villages and rural areas might have less initiative during discussion:  
…bottom up or top down process depends on capacities of citizens. If citizens 
are low capacity and less initiative so top down approach must be executed 
by bureaucracy but if citizens are smart with full of innovation and inspiration 
so bottom up can be important, indeed, it is more applicative, and it can lead 
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for better. Ideally, both should exist. (academician) 
There are many conflicts of interest, political motives and other obstacles too. The draft of plan is 
designed by Bappeda. Although it refers to other higher-level plans and previous plan, Bappeda 
can put it interests in this draft. The consultant could direct stakeholders and citizen to follow what 
it has been formulated:  
It is normally formulated by Bappeda, what we call involvement is attending 
during exposure since all consultant works must have exposure...in 
preliminary report, we talk about methodology, talking about how the steps 
are. For instance, Mr. M attend the preliminary report. A consultant discusses 
about regional development using local equation approach. The consultant 
convinces that approach will result a good thing. (a chief executive of 
consultant company).  
The conflict of interests is usually in designing programs. The programs are created based on 
different sources. Program design is created in RKPD (short-term plan) process. This includes 
budgeting for the programs. The program design sources are from different inputs:  
…there is an approach based on project from consultant, there is input from 
the Regent vision and mission, there is input from Bappeda, one more thing is 
input from bottom that is from musbangdes (village development multi-
stakeholders consultation meeting), musrenbang of sub-district, musrenbang 
of council. The fifth input is from department. The sixth is from aspiration 
from parliament  (a chief executive of consultant company).  
Parliaments have budget rights in the form of aspiration budget. The budgets rights may result in 
longer process of local budgeting plan because of negotiation between the parliaments and 
executives. Executives may use strategy by offering flexibility of aspiration budget to parliaments 
since they have that budget rights.       
Intervention from parliaments is strong because parliament has budget rights. Parliaments 
sometimes propose programs that are not in line with development plans and musrembang. They 
might have political motives to share projects to their constituents and attract voters. Another 
motive is financial motive for personal purposes:  
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…the problem is political situation where politically legislators design 
budget aspiration with their function as institution is different between 
central and local government. Normatively, executives are stronger power 
with their regulations but, practically pressures from legislators by 
intimidation, hard ways and other ways... in local government, groups and 
negotiations are in secrets. Politicians close to executives in secret which in 
turn they can intervene policies  (academician) 
The executive of local government is headed by the Regent, who attains their political position 
through democratic elections. There is another power in local government as the leader of civil 
servants which is called the Local Secretary. In disaster management, The Local Secretary is ex 
officio  of the head of BPBD Garut. The head of BPBD is a policy maker for disaster management 
in local government and a coordinator for the integrated disaster management systems. The 
position of Local Secretary as the head of BPBD has advantages and drawbacks. As the head of 
all local government agencies and departments, it enables the Local Secretary to command and 
coordinate across a range of local government agencies. The Local Secretary has a power to create 
policies such as budgeting allocation for disaster management programmes. However, the Local 
Secretary has limitation in capability and capacity of disaster management. The Local Secretary 
has failed to accommodate disaster management programmes in development plans (see section 
4.2.1) 
The Local Secretary, as the head of BPBD Garut, is assisted by a chief executive. Based on local 
regulation of Garut number 7 Year 2011 article 12, the chief executive of BPBD’s job duties and 
functions are as coordinator, commander and executor (Local Government of Garut, 2011a). These 
functions do not happen or they are limited to be practiced: 
 …this is our weakness; our weakness is limited in coordination whereas one 
of BPBD functions is coordination function. For example, if there is a 
collapsed bridge, I can’t order head executive of PUPR/ Pekerjaan Umum 
dan Perumahan Rakyat (Public Works and Public Housing) to fix it because 
we are at the same level in government hierarchy. (Chief Executive of BPBD)  
The Chief Executive of BPBD could easily avoid its responsibility as a coordinator and a 
commander by a reason that it has a limited power in executing duties. These functions are relevant 
for the Head of BPBD (Local Secretary) although the functions are too technical for a police maker 
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such a Local Secretary. Ideally, there should be clear coordination between the Head of BPBD and 
the Chief Executive of BPBD. Based on my finding, Head of BPBD is incapable of transferring 
its power to Chief Executive of BPBD because the Chief Executive position in local government 
hierarchy is at same level as other agencies.  
All in all, local development plans and spatial plan are a rationally good opportunity for local 
government to mitigate disaster because they have clear phases from long-term of 25 years to 
annual development plan. These plans could anticipate unexpected disruption from flooding. But 
it does not work well since there are many conflicts of interest from political positions such as 
member of parliaments, the Regent, and agencies.  
There are some practical issues which needs consideration regarding development plans and 
disaster management in Garut. These issues are explored in the next section. 
4.4. The Plans and Natural Disasters  
As discussed in the previous section, the planning process of local development plans and spatial 
plans face many conflicts of interests, interventions, and abuses of power. As a result, planning 
might become formalistic routines for fulfilling laws and regulatory demands. In a narrow context, 
mismanagement in spatial plans tends to create natural and environmental damage. Repeated 
flooding hitting a city is one of the consequences from mismanagement in development plans and 
spatial plan. The most significant contribution of mismanagement in the plans is land conversion. 
Land conversions occur in areas near the city of Garut, rural areas, and forested areas near the 
upper stream of rivers in different forms of conversion such as farming, tourism, and factory.  
4.4.1. Land Conversion from Farming to Housing 
There have been many developments of new housing around Garut. Since the city of Garut has 
limited space for development of new housing, the developments are executed in nearby areas, 
which are mostly farming areas. Land conversions from farming to housing surrounding Garut 
contribute to resistance of water absorbance by soil since the surface is blocked by concrete. Water 
run-off flow directly to drains and some of the drains go directly to brook but others go to drainage 
system on the side of street. Again, there is another problem of drainage system on the city. If the 
drains are not too narrow and shallow, the drain is blocked by litter from street. It is described by 
Head of FK3I/ Forum Komunikasi Kader Konservasi Indonesia (Communication Forum of 
Indonesian Conservation Cadre) : 
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 There might be intolerance of development itself where there should be more 
water absorption area, but the fact is that growing housing development. 
What I mean by this is water from raining is not absorbed by soil because a 
lot of concrete floor, the water goes to narrow drain and the drain is blocked 
by litter from human activities. Because of high density of water, the water 
goes to surface and return to housing and becoming flood. (Head of FK3I).  
Local government has regulation for housing. There are terms and conditions before issuing 
permit; such as environmental impact assessments. However, most implementation is not like what 
housing developers propose on paper to government. There is an issue of control since developers 
(can) use their money for bribery. Local NGOs insist that most new housing developments ignore 
their own environmental impact assessments:  
developers should provide housing which is environmentally friendly where 
there should have many water absorption area. It can be engineering water 
absorption or more ideal drainage system  (Head of FK3I) 
Housing demands are very high in a developing region like Garut. Some housing areas are prepared 
for local citizens settlement, but some of them might buy more than one house for investment. 
There are many properties owned by people from neighbour cities such as Bandung, Jakarta, 
Bekasi, and Tangerang. Travel time is about 4.5 hours from the farthest city to Garut. There has 
been increasing numbers of tourist visiting Garut  - up 50% since 2010 (faisal R, Darsiharjo, & 
Miftah Wirakusuma, 2016) – due to its natural tourist attractions. This makes people from other 
cities invest in property in Garut:  
housing is a basic need but when investor comes, sometimes it is not a need 
for society but need which is created by investor (town planner)    
Land conversion can be easily executed if it does not violate current spatial plan regulations. 
Executives and legislatives play their game; they will revise spatial plans before issuing permits 
for land conversion. Most of land conversions occur in farming area. The executives will issue 
permit for housing, mining, tourism or industrial plants. There can be a crime during a process of 
permit. Business owners can bribe executive or legislatives for the permit: 
This housing area is close to city. It was a farming area. At the beginning I 
proposed for land conversion to BPMPT (Badan Penanaman Modal dan 
Pelayanan Terpadu/ Board of Investment and Integrated Services). My 
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proposal was not approved. I asked my colleague to sort this out. He told me 
that I need to provide three hundred fifty million rupiahs in cash and send the 
money to Mr.X. A few days later I was called by them to expose my housing 
project plan in front of several related institutions such as agricultural 
department, BPMPT, local secretary, water resource and mining department, 
and Bappeda. There were several questions and answers, but I think it was 
just formality (housing businessman).  
The case of this land conversion from farming area to housing is caused by inconsistancy of data 
from two departments; Bappeda (Local Spatial Plan Department) and Dinas Pertanian dan 
Hortikultura (Crops and Horticulture Department). Based on information from a housing 
businessman that his experience in proposing housing permit was blocked by different data being 
used by different department:  
He (head of local spatial plan department) said that was fine with the area 
since based on RTRW the location was not green but yellow area. However, 
Crops and Horticulture Department stated that the area cannot be converted 
to housing  (housing businessman).  
Though, he could get the permit after giving money to a government officer close to the Regent. 
Probably, this is just a trick to get money from the developer. During my field work, the case could 
not be verified whether the money was handed to Regent but the result was his housing permit was 
issued.  As a town planner stated:  
RTRW, which should be a guideline in development process, but it is 
sometimes violated and any violation of RTRW has never been firmly dealt 
and it is processed to a court. It is quite rare for us to hear violators of the 
RTRW imprisoned or tried through legal mechanisms. The consequence is 
generally only in the form of fines and that too may be negotiable (town 
planner). 
The land conversions have occurred in forest areas and on hills which near to the city of Garut. 
The city of Garut is surrounded by mountains and there are several hills in the area. One location 
on the top of Mount Putri was a forest which was converted to dairy farming.    
4.4.2. Land Conversion from Forest to Farming 
This is another government policy of land conversion claimed by local environmentalists to 
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significantly contribute to urban flooding. Garut local government issued a permit for dairy farm 
PT. Raffles Pacific Harvest. The farm is located on the top of mount Putri (Figure 16). The area 
was claimed as customary forest by Dinas Lingkungan Hidup Kebersihan dan Pertamanan/ 
DLHKP (Environment and Gardening Agency); the 72 Hectares covers 5 villages (Lovita, 2017). 
Based on my own observations, the farm used to be a forest that slowed the pace of water run-off 
upstream of Garut. One local government officers stated that “that is what on the top of valley is 
owned by perhutani and some parts owned by citizens. Of course, there will be an environmental 
impact assessment and so on before issuing permit” (government officer). However, it can be 
observed clearly the environmental destruction caused by this dairy farm. The dairy farm area is 
on the top of the mountain covering 72 hectares; the clearing of the forestry has reduced the 
capacity of the soil to absorb water during precipitation. Thus large amounts of water flow directly 
to lower levels (i.e. Garut). Additionally, opening a new road to the farm has produced increased 





Figure 16: Dairy Farm location (PT Raffles Facific Harvest) on the top of Mount Putri just above 
city of Garut. The top image is a map of location from above and the bottom image is a closer 
image which shows the environmental damage caused by the farm 
 (image source:  google map, accessed 4th August 2018) 
There is a sectoral ego in Garut local government departments. Each department has its own 
technical map data, and little willingness to share this information with other departments. 
Moreover, when I tried to access some data, one officer said that the map is not for public perusal. 
Basically, technical maps refer to spatial plans. There is no policy to integrate this technical map 
from all departments. This information should be open access and citizens who need should be 
able to access this information. The current situation is that there is a problem with data 
transparency at the local level although there is a law for public information transparency No 14 
Year 2008. In practice, many local government departments still classify some information. 
Citizens who need to access the data should go through bureaucratic process. Some data and 
information are published on local government websites but most data and information are out of 
date and only certain data gets published on this website (Government of Garut, 2018).  This has 
become a ‘public secret’ that there is classified data:  
What I know is that technical map is precious and becomes privacy if it relates 
to valuable location. This is controlled by certain officers in government  
(academician).   
Thirdly, land conversion occurs in rural area or in the forestry area. Firdian et.al (2010) found that 
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land utilization in several areas of Garut does not fit to spatial plans. Land utilization in upper 
stream will have effect to lower stream of the area (Firdian et al, 2010). Land conversions are not 
all illegal when conducted by local governments. The roles and conduct of citizens and 
businessmen in land conversions are also important. Several citizens who live in rural area open 
new farming area because of economical motives. Most of them are low income families and they 
open new farming area to survive. They have opportunity to solve their financial problem by 
joining government program in community-based forestry program. However, most of their 
farming process is different from what has been agreed mostly. They prioritise personal motives 
beyond environmental protection.  
Indonesian government created the Law No. 41 about Forestry in 1999 (Government of Indonesia, 
1999c) The law was followed by ministry of forestry released regulation of community forestry 
program in 2007 (Ministry of Forestry, 2007). The regulation then became foundation for Perum 
Perhutani (state owned forest enterprise) to create Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Hutan Bersama 
Masyarakat/ PHBM (Community Based Forest Management) program. Land is owned by 
perhutani but community can utilize the land with profit sharing mechanism. The program is ideal 
to help community and protect forest around villages. Perhutani creates terms and conditions to 
join the program. The program aims to cultivate the forest with tumpang sari (agroforestry). 
Tumpang sari method obliges community to plant trees around crops. Practically, it does not work 
as stated in the terms and conditions:  
Actually there is agreement between community and Perhutani, but when there 




Figure 17: Forest degradation by farming in upper stream of Cimanuk River  
Local government can revise the spatial plan if it is needed. This depends on current situations and 
conditions. For instance, the 2016 Garut flash flood made Bappeda initiate revisions to spatial 
plans:  
...the revision of RTRW to control spatial utilization along the river and upper 
stream land rehabilitation is included in the planning content. (local 
government officer of Board of Local Development Planning Garut).  
This revision opportunity might create opportunities for businessmen/ corporations to force local 
government to revise the plans in line with their interests by using their money: 
Since local government power to manage is only for 5 years period, based on 
election model, there might be negotiation with investors. (town planner)   
 Investor could have a license for development of housing or building in an area which is not 
allocated for such development. This occurred on riverside land in Garut. This led to worse 
flooding. The development of the riverside which cross the city  did not follow the regulation of 
Ministry Public Works and Public Housing No 28 Year 2015 which stated that building must be 
10 meters from river point but there are building which is built just above river (See Figure 18). 
The local government of Garut clearly issued the permit for development of building without 





Figure 18: Top image shows development of shopping centre in town which seems to violate 
regulation. Two bottom images show a protest executed by a local NGO (FK3I) about development 
of shopping centre. 
 (image source: documents of FK3I) 
 
There were several efforts conducted by local NGOs about the development of a shopping centre, 
They petitioned Dinas Lingkungan Hidup, Kebersihan dan Pertamanan/DLHKP (Environment, 
Hygine, and Lanscaping Agency) for a public hearing. They protested by conducting strike and 
putting a banner ‘SALAMETKEUN CIMANUK’ (SAVE CIMANUK) next to the shopping 
centre. However, their efforts seemed useless since there was no change to the development of the 
shopping centre. There was a local group of bodyguards which protected this development and 
subsequent operation. The shopping centre now operates although it still leaves many issues. Local 
NGOs seemingly did not have the power to fight this violation.  Environmental issues of Cimanuk 
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River occurred in its conservation too. 
4.4.3. The River Conservation 
There is an issue of coordination among local government agencies for river Cimanuk 
conservation; the River Cimanuk crosses many different areas. At the head of the river, it is mostly 
a forest conservation zone. This is mostly followed by ‘production forest zone’ which is managed 
by Perhutani. Following these two forest zones, there will be a farming area and then urban 
settlement. Each zone is handled by different agencies. 
River Cimanuk conservation is under provincial level authority. It is managed by Balai Besar 
Wilayah Sungai Cimanuk-Cisanggarung /BBWS (Cimanuk-Cisanggarung River Basin). The 
BBWS Cimanuk-Cisanggarung organisation has the responsibility to preserve, utilise and protect 
the river. In doing its functions, the BBWS have to facilitate coordination among agencies at local 
levels. The BBWS aims to empower community also in managing water resources such as river.  
However, there are many issues in practice. BBWS is a government organisation at the provincial 
level, however some of its policies are created at provincial level but with minimum involvement 
from local organisations and community. For example, the reconstruction of parts of the river 
embankment was executed by a national company with only the very minimum of local 
government and community involvement in the process: 
their location [office] is in Bandung and Jakarta. They didn’t know situation 
about locations. We facilitate them to coordinate with head of district and sub 
district. We become a guide to show them locations (Head of BPBD) 
In turn, this resulted in ineffective and inefficient programs. Provincial and national government 
mostly execute programs with only a minimum understanding of local characteristics.  
Additionally government agencies often execute programs through private enterprises by 
tendering mechanism; which provides ample opportunity for corruption. This is borne out with 
statistics, 80% of corruption cases in Indonesia is in procurement of goods and services (Movanita, 
2017).  
A large amount of budget has been allocated for Cimanuk River conservation every year. For 
instance, there was allocated 138 billion rupiah in 2018 for maintenance only (Ministry of Finance, 
2017). There is lots of money distributed for river maintenance and conservation to other 
institutions such as Dinas Lingkungan Hidup, Kebersihan dan Pertamanan/DLHKP 
(Environment, Hygiene, and Landscaping Agency) for the reforestation of riverside. Reforestation 
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program in conservation zone is distributed through Balai Konservasi Sumber daya Alam/BKSDA 
(Natural Resources Conservation Agency) from Ministry of Forestry: 
We are an organisation which is directly under ministry of forestry. Our 
operations are funded by the ministry. (Head of BKSDA) 
Implementation of this mitigation or prevention program for flooding seems to be partially visible 
in every organisation in government. Firstly, there are three different level of government with 
responsibility for different functions (national, provincial and local level). BKSDA works under 
the authority of the national level ministry of forestry. BBWS is responsible for maintenance of 
river such as embankment programs, irrigation, and water flow normalization. BBWS works on 
behalf of provincial levels of government. At local level, DLHKP works under authority of the 
Regent. Secondly, there is a BPBD but it does not get involved in river conservation although 
mitigation is a part of BPBD duties. Although there is a great amount of budget allocated for river 
Cimanuk conservation, it could not overcome repeated flooding to city. 
The three situations above (two land conversions and river conservation) show that government 
designing plans related to mitigation might lead to repeated flooding because each government 
agency worked and had responsibility only for its own activities. Government had created 
development plans and spatial plans for city but the plans were not executed holistically with all 
involved actors communicating openly. The plans were aimed for citizen welfare and development 
but seemed to ignore flood prevention.  
4.5.  Plans and Disaster Mitigation 
Coherent plans are crucial for disaster prevention and mitigation. Local government has a 
significant role for implementation. With the power it has, local government can design or revise 
current regulation. If government officers work professionally and responsibly, a flood can be 
mitigated. Of course, local government should involve other actors in planning. Communities, 
professionals, NGOs, and other related actors will have significant contribution if they are 
facilitated properly.:  
Spatial plan is an instrument of spatial utilization which of course very 
important to protect environment from potential natural disaster, spatial plan 
manages conservation space, cultivation space, and development space  
(town planner).  
Communities have valuable knowledge to preserve their living environment from generation to 
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generation. Modern spatial plan design that ignores local wisdoms has contributed to natural 
disaster: 
 What I understand from tracing to our ancient, our ancestors responded to 
natural disasters by marking vulnerable spots. So, when we talk about natural 
disasters, although in Sundanese culture we do not recognize natural disaster, 
there has been change in cultivation pattern and housing pattern which are 
not well-managed, so natural order is influenced. Therefore, we are difficult 
to detect natural sign since the signs are gone  (local community leader). 
 A concept of accommodating local values and wisdom has been stated by Riggs (2006) about 
prismatic society; this is being lost in adopted modern public administration in Indonesia, and 
specifically in Garut. There is a local government development duty to find win-win solution 
between short-term economic interests for citizen welfare with long-term environmental 
management which in turn will create better life and better environment.  
Old period had no RTRW, but communities through their understanding from 
generation to generation managed their territory locally, for example in 
Sundanese community in West Java created zoning area for spatial because 
of generation to generation, the local knowledge has generally been tested 
and there always be revision from generation to generation (town planner).  
Before government interrupted ancient forest management systems that were implemented by local 
communities, the community managed the forest with consideration of safety and local welfare. 
However, since government has started claiming forest possession, there is perturbations and 
distortion especially when the forest has high economic value. A new concept of forest 
management may not have been proved for conservation, but it might make sense economically. 
Professional and NGOs such as academicians and environmentalists understand current 
conditions. They need to contribute their opinions on how to design and plan to prevent natural 
disasters. Their contributions should not only be in the form of formalistic invitation to attend 
Musrembang but they should be accommodated throughout the process from conceptualizing plans 
up to monitoring. Local government can be a leading sector for planning process, but this must 
involve other related actors holistically for all process. For instance, local government has made 
conceptual revisions learning from the 2016 flash flood. This must be done by discussing, 
consulting and engaging other actors during the process of planning: 
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 We have strategic plan for disaster such as spatial plan revision for 
controlling spatial utilization along the river, rehabilitation area in upper-
stream also included in the content (local government officer of Board of 
Local Development Planning Garut).  
Businessmen and their investments are good for region development and economic acceleration if 
they are regulated and controlled during implementation. Local government has central position 
to execute this. Local government has its power and authority on behalf of citizen:  
Investors propose permits to local government or central government. Here, 
although local community refuse them, if government gives them permit so 
spatial plan can be negotiated for economic benefit  (town planner).  
Investors are profit oriented in general and they sometimes ignore the negative externalities of 
their business in generating more profit. On the other side, executives and legislatives are easily 
lured by financial offer from businessmen. There are many cases of corruption in Indonesia which 
involve businessmen and government officers or parliament members:  
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) 
states that about 90% corruption cases occur because of collaboration 
between businessmen and power holders (CNN Indonesia, 2016).  
This fact is insisted by the town planer:  
Negotiation potentiality is open widely since permits are issued by 
government, meanwhile public participation does not work effectively  (town 
planner).  
This might occur because of minimum of public control. Legislatives who are expected as a control 
body seemed to fail to play their roles. Most of them are still trapped by the vicious circle of 
election processes which requires a great amount of financial capital (Rumesten RS, 2014).  
Clearly, plans which rationally could prevent flooding have failed their primary functions. From a 
government perspective a trade-off exists between economic development and disaster prevention; 
this is further discussed in the next section. 
4.6.  Actors Contribution for Mitigation 
4.6.1. Government and Non-Government Contributions for Mitigation 
Mitigation processes manifest in different forms whether they are executed by government or 
citizens. The local government of Garut is expected to include disaster risks reduction in their 
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development plans as mandated in the Indonesian Constitution No 24 Year 2007. Mitigation based 
development plans can be executed in the forms of spatial plan, infrastructure development, 
building regulation and control, education, and training.  
Repeated flooding to the city of Garut could be mitigated if development plans and spatial plan 
are prepared to face water discharge during raining season. There might be some efforts which are 
practiced by government in Garut such as upper stream river embankments, reforestation, and 
development of irrigation. However, these efforts have failed to tackle flooding every year and 
thus cause disruptions to citizens which cost their wealth or/and life.  
Very minimal effort seems to have been exerted by the local government of Garut for non-physical 
mitigation. This is admitted by the Head of Local Board Disaster Management:   
Mitigation has not been optimum so far. Why is that so? The reason is our 
limited human resources [in BPBD]. For example, we had introduced 
several locations about what is mitigation but I think introduction society to 
mitigation is not sufficient. We need to prevent society from disaster. (Head 
of BPBD Garut) 
Mitigation processes tend to be practiced less by government and more by citizens. For example, 
the local government of Garut are careless about household waste. Trash bins are not located in all 
areas in the CBD or in residential areas. This makes citizens put their household waste on 




Figure 19: Bad waste management is one problem which contributes to flooding 
 (image source: http://garut-express.com/warga-garut-keluhkan-baunya-tumpukan-sampah-di-
sejumlah-jalan-protokol/) 
The local government of Garut faces issues in waste management. Dinas Lingkungan Hidup 
Kebersihan dan Pertamanan/ DLHKP (Environment and Gardening Agency) fails to collect and 
dump waste regularly (Ghani, 2019). Waste can be abandoned for up to a month. This waste can 
easily block water drainage if rain comes. Also some citizens throw their household waste to 
directly into the river. There are minimal facilities for citizens to put their waste to be collected 
and there is no regular schedule by DLHKP to collect the waste from housing. Furthermore, there 
is very low education about waste, even in schools.  
FK3I, as an organisation whose mission is environmental conservation, takes action to provide 
awareness about waste and flooding to society, although only at a very small scale; the organisation 
does not have sufficient funds to support its activities. FK3I funds come from voluntary donations 
(members, individual donors and corporations), which are scarce. FK3I activities are unstructured 
and not regular. Its members are voluntary and they work in their spare time.   
There are also some efforts from local non-government organisations such as Forum Pengurangan 
Resiko Bencana/ FPRB (Disaster Risk Reduction Forum). The FPRB is involved in informal 
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education to society or formally involved in conducting research; they propose their ideas to local 
government of Garut to be included in development plans:    
We have conducted research and analysis since 2012 for disaster mitigation. 
We have analysed 24 sub-district problems and we have proposed solutions 
for mitigation to related agencies in Garut. But, there is no real action from 
government agencies about our proposal or disaster mitigation to society. 
(Head of Local FPRB)  
Another failure of government agencies in prevention of flooding is in natural protection. 
Government agencies that take responsibility for this duty are BKSDA and Perhutani. BKSDA, 
as a conservation agency receives their budget from central government directly without any 
intervention from local government. However, there is a lack of transparency about its budget and 
distribution. Citizens (including NGOs) do not have access to its budget. The head of BKSDA 
claimed that its agency succeeded to protect conservation zone and the head of BKSDA blames 
nature: 
We proved about factual condition in the field [during public hearing], our 
forest is still in a good condition. What has become our responsibility and 
duties, we executed properly. The flooding is not only caused by forest 
degradation on the upper stream but high intensity of rainfall and absorption 
area can cause problems  (Head of BKSDA)  
Government agencies claimed that they have contributed to disaster mitigation although they were 
not optimum. There are many factors that cause this problem such as lack of coordination among 
agencies, as well as the lack of volume and quality of human resources. Contributions from non-
government organisations and individuals occur but contributions might not be communicated to 
other non-government groups and governments agencies. This makes their contributions less 
significant in preventing flooding. Besides, most non-government organisations and individuals 
work voluntarily, which limits their investment. There is also another group that contributes 
directly to prevent flooding. This group is the community who live near the Cimanuk river or who 
live up-stream. This group consists of community leaders and their communities. They are close 




4.6.2. State versus Local Wisdoms in Mitigation 
Humans normally have the basic instinct to survive and adapt to their environment. It happens 
everywhere in every territory. People who live in a jungle, mountain or lowland environment have 
adapted their ways to nature. They learn from generation to generation. People and nature 
intertwine to become an inseparable system. Nature can force people to adapt; nature is a 
significant force stimulating societal behavioural change.  
This happens in Garut disaster mitigation too. In historical times, indigenous people regarded 
nature as God (animism belief) before they converted to Islam. Some of these indigenous 
communities still exist in Garut today but they live in very rural areas. For the people who live in 
city or suburb area, this belief is still inherited to some people or at least it influences their 
relationships with nature. This belief is very strong to old people. In a disaster context, old people 
respond differently to every natural hazard. They analyse nature changes to understand the 
possibility of natural hazards.  
Indigenous people in Garut never experienced such catastrophic flood previously:   
What I understand from tracing back to our ancestors, their attitude 
[ancestors] to face hazard by marking potential hazards. If we talk about 
disaster, we do not recognize disaster because it does not exist in our 
terminology. The marking of potential hazards could not be executed again 
because there is a change in land cultivation, unorganized housing which in 
turn natural balance is affected. This makes us difficult to detect natural sign 
anymore because the signs disappear (head of local community) 
Elders state that there is no disaster concept in local beliefs. Preventive action is beyond simply a 
response to a natural hazard. They create zoning systems for area they live. Take forest 
management as an example, three zones of the forest are created. The first zone is leuweung 
tutupan (closed jungle), which is the most sacred zone; no one is allowed to enter this zone. They 
believe that if we enter this type of forest perpetrators will be cursed. The second zone is leuweung 
titipan (protected jungle). This type of forest is almost similar to closed forest, but people can enter 
as long as they have permission from sesepuh (head of tribe). People cannot use any resources 
from these two types of forests. The last zone is leuweung garapan (cultivation forest). People can 
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use resources from this zone for farming, shepherding, and logging. Cultivation forest is located 
surrounding community settlement. They live communally, working and sharing together. They 
still use local wisdoms in managing their life and place, led by sesepuh. People respect their 
sesepuh totally. Sesepuh have absolute power to manage their people and territory.  
Their ways in connection with nature and how to prevent disasters such as flooding to their area 
are very effective: 
Because this is generation to generation, local knowledge generally has been 
tested and it will be improved by generation to generation [if there is a new 
thing]. This is different with a new idea about managing environment 
although it makes sense economically but there is unknown for the effect to 
surrounding environment. (Town Planner)    
People who live outside of indigenous communities, such as in city and suburbs, are 
administratively managed by local government. They must follow government system in disaster 
management. A specific organisation for disaster management is quite new since it was established 
in 2007 at the national level. It can be traced from the establishment of disaster management 
organisation as manifested in government constitution number 24 year 2007. In local level, local 
disaster management boards was created in 2011 by issuance of local regulation number 7 year 
2011. Before the existence of the disaster management board, there existed Satuan Kordinator 
Pelaksana Penanggulangan Bencana dan Pengungsi/ SATKORLAK PBP (Coordinator Unit of 
Disaster Response and Evacuation), which only focused on during disaster and post disaster 
responses. There was a little attention to mitigation, preparedness, and rehabilitation phases (See 
Table 3.1). Since the regulation was created, local government of Garut should have adapted its 
regulations and policies to disaster issues because this board exists in Garut. This is expected to 
contribute to regional spatial plan especially to town planning, farming, housing, mining, forestry, 




Figure 20: Tourism object in conservation area of Papandayan 
Government created forestry zoning systems for spatial plans that adopted local community 
wisdom. However, approach and implementation are very different. Government prioritise the 
development of economical contribution for local income and community welfare. The first zone 
is conservation area, similar to closed forest. The different is that the forest can be entered by 
people. People can have activities in this area such as tourism, but natural resources cannot be 
exploited for logging or farming (see Figure 20). In practice, some conservation areas have been 
exploited by individual citizen or even large corporations. Illegal logging, mining, farming and 
tourism are examples of the exploitation. People illegally exploit natural resources for their own 
benefit. However, corporations have some legal standing since they receive recommendations and 
permits from government. Environmentalists believe that permit processes involve corruption in 
government (e.g. bribery): 
 Based on the fact, there is no permit for excavation of sand. That is illegal 
and cases like this is common because there is money game in this 
business.” (Local Head of Disaster Risk Reduction Forum)   
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Old and modern conservation systems results in different scales of natural hazards. Indigenous 
people keep the forest untouchable, which can reserve spring water, biodiversity, and forest 
ecosystem stability. People are only allowed to use cultivation forest zone for their needs. They do 
not exploit nature for their living. They have beliefs that nature is not an object to be exploited, 
rather as a subject that will influence human life. They live a simple life. However, the modern 
system of conservation uses science and technology. It is believed that conservation area and forest 
can be utilised for human needs as long as it does not create disasters. Government rationality for 
disaster management might be true to some extent. Their programs may overcome short time 
economic issues while they try to manage and prevent natural disasters by implementation of 
science and technology. In practices, there are many frauds and misconducts.  
It is argued that the modern system of spatial plan might solve people’s problems. The local 
government of Garut adopts the system to supposedly accommodate the needs of the people. It has 
engineered nature with science and technology under the belief that the forest could be productive 
as well as protected. However, deforestation occurs massively everywhere around Garut (and 
elsewhere in Indonesia). Land conversion is unstoppable since individual farmers and corporation 
can do business in forest areas. Law enforcement is very low, bribery and corruption are endemic 
at every bureaucratic level . As stated by Aspinall and van Klinken (2011), corruption and illegal 
activities are entrenched in Indonesian society. However, Indonesia is not a complete Hobbesian 
jungle. There are many good people within bureaucratic systems and wider society, but they are a 
minority. Within bureaucratic system their position is usually low. Most of them are not decision-
makers.    
There is a different view between local government and non-government organisations in disaster 
management. Government argues that if disasters can be prevented, land can be utilised. 
Government needs to fulfil people needs. Government regards that land utilisation can help local 
income which in turn may increase people welfare. However, environmentalist NGOs claim that 
the citizens are happy with their simple life as long as there is no natural disaster. They prefer to 
protect their land without massive exploitation. They argue that land utilisation for their benefit is 
just justification from government. The fact is that it will benefit certain groups or individuals in 
government position.   
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Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (Local Board Disaster Management) organisation is 
filled up by officers from different government organisational structures. There is no specific skill 
in disaster management of its staffs up to now since they mostly come from different governmental 
departments. This occurs in all departments or agencies because of job rotation.  The head of local 
government has the power to rotate the position of his officers. Job rotations sometimes are 
subjective decision from heads of local government. The head of local government can easily move 
anyone who is regarded as not good in performance to new places. This might exist bribery from 
officers who want to have better position. Also in the higher echelons of Indonesian bureaucracy 
ineffective practitioners are more often ‘promoted away’ rather than sacked.  
It appears that, with respect is to disaster responses, there has been no significant effect from the 
existence of Local Board Disaster Management. Take the mitigation phase as an example; 
government tends to prioritise economic development over disaster mitigation. Some hills and 
forests are set for farming and industrial locations and farming area is set for housing. This is one 
reason why the city repeatedly floods .  
The organisation structure of Local Board Disaster Management exists with clear functions, but it 
seems not to work properly. The functions sometimes overlap with other agencies in activities. 
The character of officers is still influenced by traditional views in their duties and jobs. They often 
prioritise services to citizens based on citizens’ social status and kin.  
The people who live in the city are heterogenic, although the majority are natives. They have 
different types of jobs, education backgrounds, beliefs, wealth and so on. Some of them have 
modern influence in way of life and others are still traditional. There are mixed in society. For 
example, some people respect to others by their social status, educational backgrounds or wealth. 
However, some of them value others are based on their achievement and performance.  
Some people respect to government officers because of their position as government officers. They 
obey government officers by executing their polices and instructions. However, others tend to 
neglect and criticise officers if they cannot work properly. This critique will be analysed in the 
next section about accountability of involved actors.    
4.7. Summary 
According to my analysis in this chapter, development plans have big impacts on disaster 
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mitigation. Actors from different groups contribute to this whether positive or negative 
contributions. Their contributions in collaborative working pattern define type of their relationship 
each others. There are two categories of relationship, as principal-agent or peers. Some actors can 
bridge both categories. They are government agencies and NGOs. From these relationships can be 
identified accountability types among actors.   
There are a few actors which contribute to the mitigation phase. They are from government 
agencies, NGOs, and communities. Some of their contributions during mitigation phase are 
executed without collaboration with other actors. They are obliged to be accountable within their 
organisation hierarchy. This can be vertical accountability to their superior or it can be downwardly 
to their staffs, members or indirectly to community.  
Government agencies have failed to fulfill their crucial functions in disaster prevention. 
Theoretically, they have designed different development plans (long-term, middle-term, short-
term and spatial plans). These plans are blueprints for local government development that can 
include disaster management within the plans. Practically, government agencies tend to prioritise 
economic development by extracting natural resources and ignoring disaster mitigation. This can 
be seen in land conversions. Local government of Garut rationalises its development as efforts to 
accelerate community welfare development . However, this study found that some developments 
are suspected to have been influenced by fraudulence behaviour, such as bribery.    
Plans are designed by government agencies. The process includes inviting non-government 
organisations and community leaders but this seems only a formality, since local government 
officers decide the members of planning processes. In turn, accountability is regarded as a formal 
reporting process among them. 
Affected communities regard government as having minimum contributions to prevent repeated 
flooding. Government agencies claimed that they have followed process for creating good 
governance. However, their administrative focus of accountability has failed to prevent repeated 
flooding. However they believe that they have fulfilled their duties of accountability through the 
design of plans involving different stakeholders and community.  
Government agencies focus on formal process of accountability such as reporting. They pay less 
attention to community and environmental change in Garut such as rainfall discharge. In turn, their 
efforts to mitigate flooding such as development of river embankment, reforestation, and 
development of irrigation seems to have failed. Collaboration in mitigation can be categorized in 
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two types. Direct collaboration and indirect collaboration. Indirect collaboration is caused by the 
same goals, but actors don’t work directly together but independently contribute to goals. 
Accountability for this type of collaboration is not to co-collaborators, but it does create 
accountability for actors with specific forums. 
The three development plans (long-term plan, medium-term plan, short-term plan) are expected to 
be in accordance to one another. Theoretically, the shorter plan should refer to longer plan. 
However in practice that is often not the case. There are many conflicts of interest among actors. 
The plans have been created just for a fulfillment of administrative requirements.  Election system 
which gives executive power for 5 year has led to environmental destruction. The politicians have 
invested a lot of money for campaign. Therefore, it might lead to economic motive for returning 
their campaign investments . Furthermore, these development plans must refer to spatial plan as a 
guideline to implement the plan if the plans relate to spatial utilities. The problem is that spatial 
plans experience many revisions based on the needs and political will of power holders. 
Development becomes unclear in direction. This can impact to natural preservation and 
environmental stability, which in turn can lead to natural disasters such as flood, landslides, and 
drought.   
Nature is needed by humans for their life. However, human should not become a predator of nature. 
Economic development should not entail the cannibalism of existing nature by land conversion 
and deforestation. Human and nature must be considered as a mutual symbiosis. This becomes a 
reason that local wisdom must be explored to understand how humans can live in harmony with 
nature or co-dwelling with nature.  Nature is not an object that can be exploited without any 
consequence. Natural exploitation will not only affect humans but all other existing organisms as 
well.   
Development, if it is well managed, should not always cause environment degradation. Human 
existence and nature should be in balance. The balance will be created if human needs are fulfilled 
and nature preserved. Human and nature are not two separated entities, but they are bounded in 
symbiotic mutualism. Local community beliefs of human and nature are a bonding system 
(inherited from generation to generation) in Garut. Government, as a legitimate body to manage 
the region seems to fail by creating development plans that contribute to natural disaster creation. 




Based on these facts, government entities (such as executive, legislative, and judicative) seem not 
to work as expected. There are very clear job functions and descriptions for each of them as stated 
in laws, regulations and policies. Government entities are an interconnected system. Executive is 
an entity to do the jobs, legislative is an entity to control what executive does since it is 
representative of citizens, and judicative role is to uphold constitution. However, those entities 
might not fully work based on what they should do. On surface, it seems that they work based on 
job descriptions and functions, but according many conflicts of interest exist. This is like a game. 
Government is the owner and the creator of a game. It makes a rule, it decides the players, and it 
appoints the referee; all of whom come from government circles. Citizens are merely spectators. 
They watch the game, but they cannot change results. Citizens may voice their hope, expectations, 
and needs as spectators and supporters, BUT decisions belong to government. 
Legislative, which is expected as citizens’ representative does not work on behalf of citizens. As 
a member of parliament, legislative prioritizes its constituent above all citizens. This might be as 
a part of its commitment to being accountable to its constituent since election mechanism is based 
on region. The Regent as an executive leader which is voted by all citizens fails to act responsibly 
in planning process. Especially in long term development, the Regent may regard short-term plan 
and medium-term plan during its authority. Accountability of Regent more in formal form which 
is manifested in regular reports to the house of representatives. If it follows the game which has 
been agreed among all players, everything will be fine. Citizens are in a powerless state since their 
power has been transferred to legislative. They are just spectators. 
There is an ombudsman process if there is something wrong with the government violation to the 
plans, but it can be executed by certain group of people who understand how to do it. This is 
sometimes not easy to follow.  
Government accountability in the development plans and spatial plan is being questioned by 
people (citizens, NGOs, professionals, academicians, etc.). Government contributions to prevent 
natural disaster are minimal; this allows repeated flooding to the city. Citizens who live in the city 
blame the government without knowing that the plans had input from citizens (that is what 
government claims).  
The big issue in this case is a communication and coordination mechanism among actors during 
designing, revising and publishing the plans. Accountability has three processes. Starting from 
communicating information and continuing to discussion or debate; the final process is ratification 
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(Bovens, 2006; Bovens, Schillemans, & Hart, 2008). Transparency of data and information, a vital 
part of accountability (Romzek, LeRoux, Johnston, Kempf, & Piatak, 2014), simply does not 
happen. People fail to discuss since they do not have enough information from government.  
Departments in government must work together and act as one. Sectoral ego must be limited, and 
this is the job of the executive leader (the Regent) to execute. If government can work as one, it 
should be possible to create integrated data and information for the public. This can be done by 
publishing on the Internet, the written press, or dissemination through community leaders. This is 
one of the ways for controlling and facilitating ideas from citizens. 
Theoretically, local government public administration system has adopted western concepts. It can 
be traced to government system in Indonesia from national to local level. It is manifested in laws, 
regulations, and policies. This includes accountability system and mechanism. Adopted 
democratic system in development plans appears to be rational and ideal on paper. In practice, this 
system has resulted in an excess of corruption within government, which can abuse its power for 
individual interests. Repeated flooding is only one product of this failure to govern Indonesia 






“Forewarned; Forearmed. To be prepared is half the victory.” (Miguel De Cervantes Saavedra3) 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter continues the previous analysis chapter. Previous chapter focuses on dynamic 
activities involving different actors to mitigate possible future occurrence of natural hazard. This 
chapter focuses on activities during the preparedness phase. Both mitigation and preparedness are 
pre-disaster activities.  While mitigation is activities related to pre-disaster planning which 
involves structural and non-structural development to eliminate or reduce future risks, 
preparedness is how people prepare to face future disaster. This study investigates preparedness 
failure which leads to catastrophic flooding.   
This chapter is delivered in a number of sections. Section 5.2 discusses actions and activities of 
preparedness in government agencies including BPBD, education department, social department, 
public health, fire fighter, police department, and other service agencies within government circle. 
They act as a group of actors from local government. There is another kind of group involved in 
disaster preparedness, which includes non-government organisations, businesses, and individuals. 
Apart from those two groups that contribute to the preparedness phase, section 5.3 analyses public 
preparedness in facing hazardous events, specifically flooding. 
5.2.  Government’s Preparedness 
5.2.1 Emergency Operation Plan  
As mandated by Indonesian Constitutions, all citizens are protected by the country. This means 
the country is responsible to protect and to save citizens including during events of disaster. These 
actions can be started by designing contingency plan, Emergency Operation Plan (EOP), preparing 
government staff through trainings and exercises, and providing tools and equipment to assist in 
disaster responses. Chief of BNPB has issued regulation No. 24 of 2010 on Guidance of Designing 
 
3 Miguel De Cervantes Saavedra is a Spanish writer (1547-1616). He is the author of Don Quixote (1605-1615). 
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Emergency Operation Plan (EOP) for Disaster. This regulation clearly defines the step by step of 
how to design EOP and describes who will be involved when disaster strikes. EOP document is 
designed by each local government based on the probability of future occurrence of disaster. The 
regulation No. 24 of 2010 also mandates each local government to create contingency plan based 
on its area and society characteristic. 
Existence of this regulation seems to be a golden key for success in disaster preparedness (Coppola, 
2015a). It, however, gives little help to prepare local government agencies and their staff in Garut. 
Although flooding occurs almost every year, based on a participant information, there is no 
contingency plan to face flooding in Garut: 
Why was there chaos? [during response of flooding]. Because there was no 
contingency plan. In response to flooding there is no contingency plan yet which 
should be made by BPBD as a leading sector for disaster management. If there is 
a contingency plan in BPBD, we can examine that plan involving all related 
agencies or stakeholders in the plan. This contingency plan should be introduced 
to all related agencies and when flooding happens, we just open the plan and we 
will know what to do. (Secretary of Local Military District) 
This occurs because of the incapability of BPBD of Garut to design contingency plan. Most staff 
in this agency has limited capability in disaster management. This is caused by the irrelevant 
background of staff in BPBD of Garut. The majority of BPBD of Garut staff are deployed from 
different agencies and they do not have the knowledge or experience in disaster management: 
One of our expectations is that our human resources can be filled by staff who are 
capable in the future. To be honest, we do not have expert in disaster. This is very 
important [to have experts in disaster] to strengthen our team in BPBD. (Chief 
Executive of BPBD of Garut)  
Moreover, even the Chief Executive of BPBD has limited capability in disaster management, since 
he was the head of sub-district of South Garut. The deployment of staff from different department 
is caused by job rotation policy adopted by the administration system in Indonesia as regulated in 
government regulation No. 11 of 2017 on Civil Servant’s Management. The regulation is aimed 
to rotate civil servants to better position based on their competencies, career development, and 
performance. However, this job rotation causes a situation where staff are not capable for their 
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new positions since they lack in experience. Furthermore, the number of staff who work in BPBD 
is limited. There are only 29 staff in BPBD of Garut who must work in all area of Garut (Statistics 
of Garut Regency, 2017). 
These 29 staff are working as supervisors responsible under Chief Executive of BPBD of Garut. 
Their status are as civil servants whose jobs can be rotated to other agencies based on performance 
measurement from the Chief Executive of BPBD of Garut. This creates a situation where the Chief 
Executive becomes ‘a king’ served by their staff. It becomes ironic when they are called civil 
servants, but they work to please their Chief Executive and otherwise can be rotated to other 
departments.       
BPBD of Garut is an agency responsible to design and implement EOP as mandated by regulation 
No. 24 of 2010.  EOP must include other agencies and involve other potential actors in its 
document. Theoretically, EOP is a document that covers who will be involved if a disaster event 
occurs, and the responsibility and actions of involved actors (individuals or organisations) include 
when and where they are involved, and how to save citizens from their vulnerability. EOP may 
include lists of equipment and facilities within and outside its organisation (Coppola, 2015d).  
BPBD of Garut has failed to create EOP which costed victim vulnerability and chaotic situation 
during disaster responses (see Chapter 6). Involved agencies from different department faced 
confusion in their activities during a response to disaster: 
We did not have any guidance that informs us when a flooding occurs what we need 
to do, this or that. The agency [BPBD Garut] has not designed this yet [EOP] up 
to now. What I know is that there is no coordination in detail about job description 
from BPBD if disaster strikes. (Head of BKSDA of Garut) 
This is insisted by a local NGO that BPBD of Garut does not have an emergency response plan 
and know how to accommodate involved actors during disaster response: 
I do not know which one a procedure from government is. This means that when 
disaster happens, we race with government to collect updated information. In every 
disaster, we go directly to locations whether there is a victim or not. If there are 
victims, we will save them first and we will coordinate with government after the 
victims are saved. (Head of FK3I) 
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EOP as a document which provides guidance to face potential disaster in the future is a plan for 
government agencies and other involved individuals or organisations to do their activities during 
disaster response. This includes their responsibility. Failure to design this EOP has resulted in 
chaos in many activities during disaster response such as logistics, evacuations, and debris 
clearance (See Chapter 6). 
Although there is a BPBD agency responsible for disaster management, there is no emergency plan 
or EOP created by this agency. If there is a disaster, there will be a Regent who gives instructions 
to every government agencies or administrative staff from the regency level to village level: 
…, The Regent, in every occasion such as when the rain occurs in a long period, 
he will instruct all functional agencies such as BPBD and Social Department to 
be well prepared and they should be in alert. This is not only for functional 
position [BPBD and Social Department] but related head of sub-district and head 
of village have to follow instructions from the Regent. (Head of Communication 
and Information Agency of Garut) 
The statement from Head of Communication and Information Agency of Garut reflected that 
BPBD waited instructions from the Regent when disaster occurs. This is insisted by Secretary of 
Local District military which said “They [BPBD staff] don’t have any contingency plan”.   
5.2.2. Response Exercise and Training 
The response practice among actors has not been executed by local government of Garut in 
preparation of facing any disaster. Chief Executive of BPBD of Garut admitted that asking other 
agencies to execute an activity such as response practice is problematic because BPBD is at the 
same level with other agencies: 
“Our function is as a coordinator for disaster management, but this is not enough 
for disaster response. There must be a command system because disaster response 
requires quick response. My position as Chief Executive of BPBD is equal to other 
agencies. I do not have the power to give instructions to other agencies. It must be 
the Regent or Local Secretary who gives instructions …our function in disaster 
response is weak.” (Chief Executive of BPBD of Garut)  
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BPBD as a coordinator is incapable to organise other agencies’ activities relating to disaster 
preparedness. Major problems of this incapability are lack of skills and knowledge from BPBD 
staff. It has been stated earlier that BPBD staff come from different backgrounds with little 
experience in disaster management including its Chief Executive  
It does not mean that local government of Garut does not hold any practice. There are several 
practices which have been executed by BPBD of Garut, but the practices are for citizens’ 
preparedness, such as evacuation simulation when volcanic eruption occurs (see Section 5.3). 
There has not been any opportunity where government agencies involved in flooding (e.g. BPBD, 
Search and Rescues, Social Department, Public Works, and Spatial Plan Department) create 
practice or training among themselves.  
5.2.3. Equipment 
Equipment is crucial for any kind of disaster response to reduce number of injuries and deaths also 
number of property damage caused by disaster (Coppola, 2015d). There should be sufficient in 
kinds and numbers of equipment.  
BPBD of Garut has its standard emergency equipment although it is limited in numbers (Local 
Government of Garut, 2015). There are rafting boat, first aids, power generator, tents, and so on 
(Figure 5.1). BPBD may borrow from other agencies or private enterprises if they need some 
equipment they do not have. For example, BPBD may borrow a backhoe or excavator from Public 
Works and Spatial Planning Agency if there is a landslide blocking the road.  
We usually borrow equipment from other department or other local NGOs if we 
do not have them. For example, I may borrow heavy equipment such as excavator 
from Public Works and Spatial Planning Agency and we will have to pay for it. 
(Head Executive of BPBD of Garut) 
However, there is no guarantee that the tools are available in the other agencies and whether those 
tools can be lent to BPBD, since there is no prior agreement between them as stated in EOP (section 
5.2.1). 
During a response phase, several equipment are normally available in NGOs and voluntary 
organisations. These organisations have their own equipment for their activities. They usually use 
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their own equipment to save people or they help government agencies’ activities. They rarely lend 
their equipment to other organisations.  
BPBD of Garut mostly depends on other agencies or private enterprises for tools and equipment. 
Figure 21 shows that BPBD has limited number of equipment and it is not well-organised. The 
equipment is stored inside office without proper location. This can create trouble in emergency 
situation when BPBD staff need equipment. They may not be able to easily acquire the equipment 
because of this unorganised placement.  
 
Figure 21: Tools and other equipment in BPBD of Garut office 
   
There are a lot of equipment available in governmental agencies and NGOs which can provide 
support during disaster responses. However, they have not been inventoried by BPBD of Garut. 
This might result in slow response, since they do not know who the owner of certain equipment is 
and will not be easy to retrieve them: 
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As an institution which has responsibility for disaster response, BPBD should have 
their full equipment for emergency situation. But, BPBD of Garut often waits for 
our involvement for evacuation. I think BPBD has limited equipment. They often 
borrow our boats or our camping equipment. They sometimes [request to] borrow 
something that we do not have such as caving equipment. You know, BPBD never 
know what our activities are and they do not know what kind of equipment we have.  
(Head of Jenggala Outdoor Activity Organisation) 
Collaboration in equipment usage occurs only spontaneously during disaster responses. There is 
no specific agreement created to prepare for disaster response during preparedness phase. This 
type of collaboration, as Bryson, Crosby, & Stone (2015) stated, is a collaboration caused by 
environmental turbulence.   
Failure in disaster preparedness by government agencies is caused by many factors. Government 
staff who work in BPBD of Garut mostly lack the knowledge of disaster preparedness: 
To be honest, we do not have any expert in disaster management or graduates from 
disaster management education background. I think this is important to strengthen 
our existence and staff in BPBD. (Head Executive of BPBD of Garut)     
The Regent of Garut, as an administrative leader with the highest position in the administrative 
hierarchy of local government level, fails to organise and direct their agencies to prepare for 
coming potential disaster. While flooding occurs repeatedly every year, there is no specific 
preparation from local government agencies led by The Regent (see Section 5.2.1). 
Beside government preparedness, there are several efforts executed by community leaders in upper 
stream of Cimanuk River to prepare citizens in facing hazardous events: 
We know that we face flooding every raining season. I ask my community to 
provide  kohkol [bamboo alarm] in their house to alarm others if there is flooding, 
although the efforts are not specifically to prepare citizen for facing flooding. 
Citizens in general, prepare themselves to face flooding based on their 




    
5.3. Public Preparedness 
Local Government of Garut have attempted to train their citizens to face potential disaster in order 
to prepare them. The local government of Garut usually works based on budget allocated for their 
activities. This happens also in disaster preparedness for citizens.  
BPBD of Garut has executed several programmes funded by local or central government although 
there is no specific programme for flooding preparedness. For example, there was a drill 
programme of volcanic eruption evacuation for communities who live near a volcano. This 
sometimes involves several government agencies, communities, and NGOs. There was also a 
programme of general preparedness training for communities such as introductory of disaster 
preparedness: 
There is an introductory programme which is executed by BPBD to citizens. There 
was education about disaster. For emergency responses, we create TAGANA/ 
Taruna Siaga Bencana (Cadets on Disaster Alert). Creation of TAGANA is part of 
our education [programme] to citizens through TAGANA, because TAGANA is 
created in communities and its member are local communities. (Secretary of 
BAPPEDA)   
Several communities were drilled based on planned programme from BPBD of Garut and their 
team from other agencies and NGOs. They had to follow the programme including attending and 
executing instructions from BPBD. This is a one-way simulation training programme where 
communities only have to follow instructions (Local Government of Garut, 2015).  
However, this programme did not cover all sectors. The education sector is not covered by this 
programme. There is less formal and informal education about disaster preparedness especially 
flooding to students at school or society as a whole: 
No, there is no such programme from local government [training]. They 
[government agencies] never come to our place and explain about flooding. For 
example, there is no explanation from government if there is a flooding, we just 
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use our own instinct  or how to prevent flooding coming to our area. (Headmaster 
of PGRI High School) 
Moreover, schools facing repeated flooding never have any training about preparedness for facing 
flooding. Figure 22 shows how rooms in school such as office and classrooms do not have 
evacuation exit doors, alarm, and sufficient signs for evacuation (top figure). Classrooms have 
only one main door without emergency exit. This may cause a problem if the door is blocked. 
Pupils could be in danger if they could not escape from their rooms. The headmaster of PGRI High 
School admitted that students do not have sufficient information about disaster preparedness 
particularly about flooding.   
 
 
Figure 22: All classrooms in one of schools facing repeated flooding do not have evacuation exit 
doors and alarm installed (top image). There is no evacuation sign in school yard (bottom image). 
142 
 
The headmaster informed the researcher during interview that school curriculum does not include 
disaster information or training for pupils to face flooding: 
 There is no program from local government for school such as if flooding 
occurs, we must do this or that. There is no socialization on how to face and 
prevent flooding. There is a curriculum about environment in Pendidikan 
Lingkungan Hidup/ PLH) (Environmental Education Module). But, it does not 
give detail on disaster and prevention. (Headmaster of PGRI High School) 
 
Regarding flooding, communities have very minimum understanding and knowledge of facing this 
disaster because there is lack of training and education programmes from government. There was 
only one programme for a certain area from a local NGO: 
Long time ago, there was an NGO that gave us understanding about flooding in RT 04. They 
told us how to survive from flooding. (Community Leader 2)  
This local NGO worked individually without any coordination with the local government authority 
such as BPBD. This programme also occurred only once without any follow up programme or 
unclear for its continuity.   
Communities that are repeatedly affected by flooding have their own strategies and efforts in 
facing disaster. They have very strong bound among them. They can identify their community 
members who live in their areas. If there is someone missing, they can be identified easier by them 
particularly by their leaders: 
We are very close with each other within our neighbourhood. I know all members 
of our community. We usually have meeting once a week on Friday morning to 
clean our area or sometimes we have a meeting in my house if there is any 
information from government which I need to share to my community. 
(Community Leader 3)  
Every house of the community near Cimanuk River in rural area has kohkol (instrument from 
bamboo to alert citizens from hazardous events) (Figure 23). Community uses certain way to sound 
the kohkol, such as by hitting it rapidly to create loud sound if there is emergency situation which 
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requires people to evacuate to a safer place such as when flooding starts to come to their area. They 
will hit it in a slower tempo to alert people to prepare that there might come a hazardous event. 
Beside this kohkol, the community normally uses loudspeaker from mosques.  The loudspeaker is 
put on the top of roof of a mosque. Muslims use this for prayers’ calls.   
 
Figure 23: Tools and Media Used by the Local Community for Early Warning  
 
 (left) Kohkol is a traditional alarm system used by a community living in the rural area. (right) 
Loudspeaker from a mosque normally used to call people to pray can be used by the people to 
inform any important information.  
 
5.4. Summary 
Local government of Garut has limited capacities and efforts in disaster preparedness. 
Theoretically, the local government has a regulation No. 24 of 2010 about Guidance of Designing 
Emergency Operation Plan for Disaster. This regulation, however, is not practiced by the local 
government of Garut, particularly by BPBD of Garut, during flooding response. There is no EOP 
guidance for every involved actor from government agencies, NGOs or volunteers, and 
individuals.   
Based on the analysis in this chapter and the explanation from involved actors, there is markedly 
little contribution from all actors for disaster preparedness.  BPBD of Garut has a TAGANA 
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programme aimed to educate citizens at lowest level of community group in villages. However, 
this programme is aimed to young citizens: 
One of the examples is that we empower community in village by creating Desa 
Tangguh Bencana/ Resilience Village to Disaster (TAGANA Village). We change 
people’s mindset on disaster by recruiting young generation there. We give them 
training about disaster. But this programme depends on availability of budget. 
(Head Executive of BPBD of Garut) 
This cannot effectively spread knowledge about disaster preparedness to all citizens in village, 
since there is a hierarchy system in the community where elders may not listen to youths because 
they feel that youths lack in experiences. 
Coordination among government agencies and NGOs is still a big issue during disaster 
preparedness phase. No coordination activities exist among them. Every government agency 
including BPBD of Garut may execute any programme without any notification to other agencies 
or NGOs.  
Apart from that, several programmes executed by governmental agencies or NGOs seem to give 
little contribution to disaster preparedness. Their efforts to educate people or to prepare themselves 
to face disaster are without knowledge of what would happen in the future, since disaster consists 
of uncertainty in size and effect to community. This can diminish community trust to them, since 
what they deliver to community, such as knowledge and information, has no guarantee to work for 
disaster responses.   
Without proper disaster preparedness, every government agency and other actors work without 
clear contingency plan. There is lack of practice and training among government agencies, NGOs, 
and volunteers. This can be seen during previous disaster response phase which was very chaotic. 
This chaotic situation is discussed in the next chapter about disaster response phase.  
 










The mitigation and preparedness processes, analysed in the previous two chapters, have a 
consequence in the response phase that is discussed in this chapter. This chapter aims to understand 
how actors, from different backgrounds, with different capacities and motives, work 
collaboratively in the response phase of a sudden onset of repeated flood disaster. Then, it proposes 
to identify and understand the concept of accountability in the context of collaborative working, 
specifically during such a chaotic situation.  
Repeated flooding of the city of Garut occurs most often in the rainy season each year. The areas 
covered by flooding can be in different sizes from time to time and in different intensity, which 
result in different effects on the socio-economic condition of the citizens (see Table 1 in Chapter 
1). This includes different actors who are involved in response. If the flooding affects certain 
community areas with minimum damage, then only a few numbers of actors will be involved. This 
chapter focuses on the flooding response during devastated flooding that occurred on 20th – 21st 
September 2016. The case is a good example to understand accountability concepts in the context 
of collaborative work among actors during a sudden onset disaster response phase, particularly 
collaborations without prior agreement or by accident.  
Government agencies and groups of communities worked during the flooding to evacuate citizens 
and to distribute logistics. Some of them worked collaboratively under the coordination of the 
Local Board of Disaster Management (BPBD) because BPBD is the appointed organization 
responsible for disaster responses. Theoretically, this seems to be ideal in responding to a disaster 
where there is a certain government organization to work as a coordinator (BPBD) and other actors 
that support the response, such as the Red Cross, Police, Search and Rescue, fire-fighters, the army, 
NGOs, communities, media, and volunteers. Practically, there are many issues regarding 
coordination, communication, instructions, and job descriptions. Some of the actors are those who 
are frequently involved in any disaster situation, but some others work voluntarily and their 
involvement is based on their willingness and availability. Some actors have previous experience 
of responding to flooding, but many are working without any prior experience and their 
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involvement is only triggered by moral standards and a sense of common humanity. Collaboration 
is expected to work more effectively during a response phase, since every second is meaningful 
for the life of citizens. This could happen if there is good governance of activities. However, the 
reality in Garut seems far from this ideal situation. Each actor may face accountability, whether 
internally or externally and morally as well. They may need to be accountable within their internal 
organisations, to their collaborators, and to society. If accountability exists, to whom are they being 
accountable and how does the mechanism of this accountability work? How is accountability 
created among actors in a chaotic situation where there is no prior commitment or agreement? For 
what activities do they become accountable if the activities overlap during the response? 
The first section of the chapter discusses the collaboration process during an emergency response. 
It explains the emergence of uncertainty during the response to a flash flood in 2016 that involved 
local government institutions or agencies and non-government actors, which includes NGOs, 
community leaders, volunteers, and mass media. The second section describes the events when the 
flash flood had ended, and immediately the process of saving lives and evacuation started after the 
hazard. The last section draws some conclusions. It explains the findings on accountability in 
collaborative working during the response phase of disaster management which may contribute to 
new understanding of accountability within collaborations in sudden onset disasters.   
 
6.2. Collaboration during emergency response 
The City of Garut was cloudy and there was a little rain pouring in the evening on Wednesday, 
20th September 2016. Most people normally go to bed around 7 or 8pm because they wake up 
early, at 4 or 5am, for prayer and to start their activities, preparing to go to work as farmers or as 
office staff, who start at work 7am. There was no sign that flooding was going to happen that 
evening, since there will usually be heavy rain before flooding in the swamp areas. Citizens who 
live near Cimanuk river are used to having floods, but not as devastating as that night. The water 
from the river started to flow into their houses, but they did not really put any great store by this.  
However, before a sudden flash flood started at 10 pm from the upper stream of the river and 
flowed down to the city, the people on the upper stream, who live not far from Garut city in the 
Sanding area, noticed signs of flooding because they are familiar with the river. From generation 
to generation, they learn about the river’s characteristics, because the River Cimanuk is a part of 
their life. They wash their clothes, take a bath and fish in the river. In the afternoon, they noticed 
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that the water level of the river had risen. They started to communicate among their neighbours 
about the situation. They double-checked the river in the evening and they noticed that the river 
characteristic was unusual: 
…we know if the flood is about to come to our area since we recognise signs of 
flooding. [interviewer: How?] Our people have a standard if the flood will come. 
They recognise the change from the increasing level, whirlpool and colour change 
in the water. If the water colour is like that [brown], it will become a bigger flood, 
so we evacuate ourselves. That is why there were no victims in our area because 
we had known before the flash flood. Only our properties could not be saved. It 
was about half an hour before the flash flood came that we knew and informed 
our neighbours to evacuate. So, we prevented ourselves before it happened. (Head 
of Local NGO).  
Before the flash flood came, people who live in the Sanding area had saved themselves to a safer 
location. All people were safe, but not their houses. Most of the houses were damaged by the flood, 
including furniture and other valuable things. They were evacuated by a command from the 
community leader in their area and were also helped by neighbour communities. They were 
evacuated to the community hall, mosques, and their neighbours’ houses.   
The flash flood continued to sweep through the city after crossing several sub-districts in the upper 
stream. At the city, the Lapang Paris area was the first area hit by the flood. The flash flood 
continued to the lower stream in the city and swept through several areas of housing near the river, 
such as Rengganis, Leuwidaun, Bojong Sudika and the last was Cimacan. Cimacan was the area 
most devastated by the flash flood which killed more citizens here than in all other places.  
The flash flood that hit the first location in the city at Lapang Paris affected many public facilities. 
It swept through the army dormitory, the Red Cross blood bank, primary schools, a secondary 
school, Tarogong Kidul sub-district office building, the police station, and a general hospital Dr. 
Selamet. The aftermath of the disaster attracted many people to come to help or just to satisfy their 
curiosity. People who lived in the army dormitory woke up from their sleep after hearing people 
were shouting about flooding from the loud speakers of the mosque, before the power line was 
shut down. However, people continued alerting others by using traditional alarms made from 




There was no official emergency alert before the flooding from the local government. It came 
suddenly without any notice and people started to evacuate by themselves and helped neighbouring 
citizens before the military, the police and some volunteer organisations’ members came. It was 
only for a few minutes that this area was soaked by flood. Some people from this area could not 
save their lives and they were swept away by the flash flood. Hospital patients and their families, 
doctors, nurses and staff panicked in the rush to evacuate themselves. Electricity was suddenly 
shut down, creating a more dramatic situation. People ran amok in different directions as they tried 
to find a safe place and some of them tried to find their families. That was a chaotic situation. They 
did not know what to do and how to save their lives. There were no evacuation procedures in 
almost all buildings, such as the hospital, the dormitory and other government buildings. This was 
admitted by the head of the local disaster management board: 
So far, there is a mitigation process, but it is not optimum. The reason is that we 
lack human resources in this part. For example, we have introduced about how 
to respond to when flooding comes, but only in few places. Moreover, this is not 
enough for only a socialisation. There is a need to prevent flooding. (Head 
Executive of BPBD) 
6.2.1. Leadership Issues During Emergency Response  
Less than an hour after the flash flood, other first responder officers arrived from local government 
institutions, such as the army, the police, search and rescue, BPBD, and fire fighters, . Before they 
arrived, victims evacuated themselves and were helped by their neighbouring communities and 
some local outdoor activity organisations, such as from the rafting adventure team and from nature-
lover/outdoor organisations. They tried to save the citizens’ life: 
The situation was uncontrolled and chaotic. Communities from the army 
dormitory tried to save their life by swimming to the road [Jalan Pembangunan] 
and some of them climbed to roofs because they could not swim. I came to the 
location after I read information from a Whatsapp Group and my house is not far 
from there. There were some of my colleagues from other organisations who had 
already been there to help. (Head of NGO). 
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The process started by evacuating their own families to safer places before any help come. The 
head of RW contacted its RTs to check their neighbours who were trapped by the flood. The head 
of RTs knew each of their neighbours. They talked to the head of RW about neighbours who might 
be left behind because they were incapable of evacuating themselves, such as children, old people 
and the disabled.  
RTs got a lot of information from their people who had evacuated about missing family members. 
Each RT returned to the location with some of their people who voluntarily offered help and with 
the help of neighbouring communities who live near the location. They used minimum tools for 
evacuation, such as rope, flashlights and inflated inner tubes. A few minutes later, military officers 
came, followed by police officers and other voluntary organisations. 
Although there were some government staff from different institutions, there was no one taking 
control of the situation and being in charge of responses. Actually, Garut has its structural 
administration system in place, since this was not the first time that flooding occurred in Garut 
(see table 1.1 in chapter 1). Moreover, Garut experiences many different types of natural disasters. 
The hierarchy for the administration consists of a command and control mechanism which is 
headed by Sekretaris Daerah (Local Secretary) as the Head of BPBD. The Local Secretary is not 
a political position since a chief is a public servant. This is the highest position of in the civil 
service in local government. The position is below the Regent (head of regency) and its function 
is to assist the Regent in administering local government. The Local Secretary answers to the 
Regent (Government of Indonesia, 2003).  
The Local Secretary is ex officio head of BPBD Garut. In addition, there is a mechanism of job 
specification during emergency responses. For instance, the Search and Rescue team is led by the 
National Search and Rescue Board. Members of the team come from different institutions, such as 
the military, the police, firefighters and volunteers. Another example is in the health team. The 
health department is in charge to help injury victims physically and mentally. Members of this 
group also come from different institutions and backgrounds such as the military, the Red Cross, 
volunteers and other local government agencies that relate to health issues. This has been clearly 
stated in regulation of head of national disaster management board No. 14 of 2010 about guidelines 
of emergency response command post establishment (BNPB, 2010). 
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Practically, this administrative system and mechanism did not work well during the flooding. The 
command of the disaster response was led by a military commander. The military commander was 
appointed by the Regent to lead the disaster emergency response since the Regent realised that the 
Chief Executive of BPBD was incapable of responding effectively to the flooding on the second 
day: “…vice of the task force is the chief executive of BPBD and head of the task force is the 
commander of the district military commando.” (Secretary of District Military Commando) 
This made things more complicated. A military style of management, with rigid command system, 
made decision making slow because it needed to wait instructions from the top. It is admitted that 
military has the agility in responding to instructions. Soldiers will listen and follow commands 
from their commander without arguing and asking questions. However, this may create 
disharmony among members of teams who come from different institutions with different 
organisational cultures. Furthermore, the military focuses on agility and effectiveness of responses 
without considering the situational, cultural or physiological condition of the victims. For instance, 
the military ordered the evacuation of all victims to provide shelter, to ease identification and 
donation distribution. This resulted in a more chaotic situation, since family or relatives of victims 
wanted them to stay in their houses. Victims had no option to decide where they could stay 
temporarily because the military forced them to live in a shelter. Living in a shelter was not a good 
idea since there were many limitations, such as sanitation. It might be different if they could live 
with their relatives because they could be treated better by their relatives.    
Military and police officers were the first government elements who arrived in the location. They 
worked without any commands and instructions from anybody. They used their instinct and skills 
to help victims. Some of them swam against the current since they have the skills. Others only 
waited on the side of the road to evacuate the victims to places of safety.  
It was clearly shown that structurally it didn’t work 100 per cent. When it 
happened, who was the first who came to the location? Of course, we were and 
several police officers. We brought our military equipment… there was a little 
chaotic situation in location since it was not clear who was in charge. (Secretary 
of District Military Commando).     
The military was very responsive to help victims. They were really dominant during the disaster 
response. The Secretary of district military commando claimed that the military organisation 
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structure was the most prepared organisation. They had a clear hierarchical command in a certain 
territory. They had a picket system which was always on standby in their base. When the flood 
started to sweep through the city of Garut, the military was very fast to evacuate and to help 
victims. Their commander instructed the soldiers to help the victims and they were very fast to 
respond to their commander. The military has a certain degree of respect from the citizens. There 
are also a majority of people who are fearful of the military in Indonesia (van Klinken, 2008). This 
was useful in the emergency:   
If BPBD was in charge, there is less of a command line. However, if the 
commando from KODIM [district military commando] was in charge, people will 
fear them. We need military soldiers, since there are many NGOs in Garut [which 
normally use threat to scare people]. So, if KODIM were in charge, they will fear. 
We need a disciplined and decisive leader. If BPBD led with its condition, the 
leader was new and didn’t know about disaster response, he will be struggling to 
cope with the members of the team and the natural disaster itself. (Chief of 
Regional Red Cross West Java, Indonesia). 
This chaotic situation does not mean that they worked individually for their own goals and 
objectives. They had the same objective, to save people’s life. However, the way they worked was 
uncoordinated, improvised and with verbal and informal communication. Military officers were in 
the front line to order evacuation processes.  
6.2.2. Role of Community in Emergency 
In another location, Cimacan, the flash flood swept through approximately an hour after Lapang 
Paris location but there was no warning to community who lived in this area. There was minimum 
help from local government elements and voluntary organisations, since they concentrated in 
Lapang Paris, although Cimacan was the most devastated place hit by the flood. Another reason 
was that they had limited officers available that night. Therefore, people saved their life by their 




Figure 24: Map of flood swept Cimacan area (Source: Modified Google map) 
Cimacan is located in a cul-de-sac and consists of densely populated urban housing near the river 
(Figure 24). Inside the red lined area is the location affected by the flash flood which swept through 
the housing, killing many people, and thousands of citizens were evacuated.  The area is not plotted 
for housing by the local government. It is illegal to live and build houses alongside the river, but 
the people can pay to buy land there and build houses illegally. Poverty is another problem in 
Garut. Unfortunately, most victims in Cimacan were poor citizens. That was one of the reasons 
they chose to live near the river Cimanuk because land price was cheaper than other places. As 
stated by one citizen, Cimacan, people live there because they have no choice to live in a better 
place, since land and housing prices in the city are expensive. Besides, most of them have poor 
educational backgrounds and they did not know whether it was illegal for them to live near a river, 
since they claimed that they paid to buy the land or houses in Cimacan. Although they lived there 
illegally, there was no action from the local government to clear the land:  
Yes, citizens here are unaware of the law. They do not understand about legal 
proceedings. If the people are aware of it, it is impossible to live there because 
they will not get any paper for the land and housing. Their reason to live there is 
because if they rent a small house it will be more expensive each year. They chose 
to buy land there, they said to me that they did not know if the area is forbidden. 
That is what they said to me. (Head of Village 2).   
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Ironically, there were administrative systems of citizenship such as RT/Rukun Tetangga 
(neighbourhood group) and RW/Rukun Warga (community association). However, RT and RW 
are not a part of the formal administrative system of local government, since the lowest level of 
administrative system is a village institution or indigenous village (Government of Indonesia, 
2018; The Republic of Indonesia, 2014). The RTs and RWs are part of Lembaga Kemasyarakatan 
Desa (village community institutions). In addition, there are other institutions, such as Karang 
Taruna (youth organisation), Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga/PKK (empowerment of 
family welfare organisation), Posyandu/Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Integrated Service Post), and 
Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (Community Empowerment Institution) (Government of 
Indonesia, 2018). Their function is crucial to bridging between government and citizens. 
These village community institutions and indigenous villages provide facilities to accommodate 
citizen aspirations, to be a partner of the village administration, to get involved in village planning, 
execute, and control development, and to improve village community services. Working in these 
organisations is voluntary. They are not paid to work, but they are happy to be part of one of these 
organisations.  These village community institutions exist in illegal area. 
In a normal situation, every head of RT is connected by its RW. They communicate using social 
media groups, such as Whatsapp. For instance, the Head of RW needs to hold a meeting to carry 
out a particular program from the local government. The RW will post the information about the 
program and schedule a meeting on the social media group. If the program needs to be informed 
to citizens, each RT will publicise it to its citizen in the neighbourhood.  
However, in an emergency such as the flash flood, coordination using social media application did 
not work as expected. Most of them were sleeping when the first signal to alert them was the loud 
speaker from the mosque before the electricity shut down.  
By using social media such as Whatsapp and Facebook, citizens publicised to the wider public 
about the situation in Cimacan. The information spread out fast, since most of the citizens in Garut 
city had social media accounts. They responded to the situation in Cimacan by informing officers 
and other actors who had concentrated to help in Lapang Paris. Military officers, the police, the 
SAR team and voluntary organisation members who were helping people in Lapang Paris split 
their team to go to Cimacan.  
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The information through the social media spread very fast. People from other parts of Indonesia 
were informed about the situation, in particular, to people who had connections and relatives in 
Garut such as family, friends, or colleagues. Moreover, this was blown up by the news media. 
Firstly, information was collected by local news media that were involved in those locations 
(Lapang Paris and Cimacan). They came from local printed newspapers and local online 
journalists. The news was spread out in the following morning locally and nationally through the 
Internet.  
During an emergency response situation, there were different types of collaboration. Citizens who 
lived in certain area have their strong bonds and relationships among them. Their leaders are 
informally connected to each other and they will help the affected community without any 
instructions. Local government agencies, military, NGOs and volunteers came to help victims. 
Collaboration among them is caused by a turbulence (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015). There was 
no prior commitment among them to work together, since there was no contingency plan in place. 
BPBD as a disaster management agency failed to execute its duty as a coordinator for disaster 
responses. This created a chaotic situation for citizen who live in the affected areas.    
6.3. Collaboration in Immediate Response after the Flood 
The widespread information had negative and positive consequences.  On the one hand, it attracted 
a lot of people to see what was happening. They flocked to the location to see the damage and took 
photographs to be uploaded on their social media status. Many of them were ordinary people, 
political elites and artists. They had different motives and interests. Some of them only wanted to 
share the situation and condition. Others had motives for image branding such as artists and 
politicians that wanted to be regarded as good people who cared for the victims.  
The situation at the location and on the road access to the location was chaotic. As a result, their 
visits interfered with people who were working to search for other victims or clean houses of mud. 
On the road, traffic jams were everywhere. Humanitarian teams were blocked by traffic jams which 
hindered their access to the location. There was no one responsible for driving the visitors away 
from the locations or to manage traffic to ease access for the humanitarian aid. 
On the other hand, the spread of information helped other people be aware that there was a 
humanitarian call for assistance. They helped victims in the forms of material, immaterial, and 
moral support. A lot of voluntary organisations came to help. They were not only from local 
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organisations but some of them were also from national organisations. They came from different 
types of organisations and different background of skills. There were specific organisations 
capable of disaster responses, such as Red Cross Indonesia and the Search and Rescue team. 
However, the majority of them did not have specific skills in disaster response. They were from 
political parties, youth organisations, religious organisations, and other non-government 
organisations.  
There were several organisations, often voluntary organisations, that worked in their own ways 
without any coordination or communication with existing disaster emergency response teams. 
These types of organisation had their own missions and objectives. They wanted to use their own 
organisation’s identity, such as flags and uniforms. Their purposes were showing to the public that 
they cared for and helped people. They might expect to gain public attention and pride to their 
organisations:  
They didn’t join the search process with the military. There were many volunteers 
who claimed that they had skills in search and rescue or they had experiences to 
do the jobs. They did it by themselves. Of course, there were volunteers who joined 
the team, such as boy scouts. They were grouped to three zone teams. These teams 
consisted of official SAR team, police, military, and BPBD. These teams were 
commanded directly by the head of task force [military]. The volunteers who didn’t 
join came from sympathisers of PKS [Welfare Justice Party], or from PKB 
[National Awakening Party] or known as Banser[Barisan Ansor Serbaguna/ 
Multipurpose Ansor Front]. They didn’t coordinate that they would search for 
victims because they wanted to show their flag [organisation identity]. They did 
search for victims here and they did community service there to be popular. (chief 
of local journalist) 
This situation was much like a similar statement from the Regent: “They did humanitarian 
programs individually. They wanted to exist, and their existence is highlighted”. 
They might think that by doing their work individually, they could be popular. Popularity is very 
important for certain purposes. This can be different from one institution to another. Political 
parties need popularity to increase voter numbers. This humanitarian work may increase citizen’s 
trust that the party pays attention to citizens. A company might need it for branding. This 
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humanitarian mission is expected to promote its company brand. Different missions could motivate 
NGOs. Their organisation branding may increase trust from their donors. Again, this was also the 
effect from media attention. Since almost all mainstream media from national, regional, and local 
levels reported the event, they got free publicity and promotion indirectly.    
There was an interesting situation during the emergency response. Everybody 
concentrated in certain points. Actually, there were a few locations that had been 
affected by flooding on the upper stream. It happened at a small rural area such 
as Cibodas in Samarang. The locations were undetected by the Task Force. They 
reported to PMI [Red Cross] and it became our additional duty, but it was good 
for us which became our opportunity to have more attention from donors. (Chief 
of Local Red Cross Garut).  
However, most organisations and volunteers worked together to help communities in evacuation 
and searching for missing people. Although they worked together and they had the same mission, 
to help victims, there was no clear job function and task division: 
As far as I know, I haven’t found any legal document which regulates our 
communication scheme. We are usually spontaneous. When disaster happens, we 
gather in the disaster location or Local Board Disaster Management Office and 
we have an initiative to share jobs and duties. (Chief of Nature Conservation 
Agency Region V Garut, West Java). 
 
6.4. Logistics Management and Supply Chains  
 
BPBD Garut, as a local government organisation in charge of disaster management, has an 
emergency and logistic department. It is responsible for accepting aid from donors and distributing 
the aid to the victims. However, the BPBD has no specific storage for its logistics (see Figure 5.1 
in Chapter 5). The canned foods are only put in a warehouse in the backyard of their office without 
considering temperature and air circulation of the building:  
To be honest, we, in BPBD Garut, do not have a storage yet, but we provide a 
temporary place for logistics storage from central and provincial governments 
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which are given to us. They are put inside a warehouse on the backyard. (Chief 
Executive of Local Disaster Management Board Garut). 
Other logistics are put inside the office without proper management systems (see Figure 5.1 in 
Chapter 5). The logistics are not well-managed by the organisation. 
The food buffer stock is prepared for hundreds of families. This number is only enough for 
handling two RTs (neighbourhood communities). It is far from enough since every year the 
flooding affects more than a thousand citizens who are evacuated (see table 1.1 in Chapter 1).  The 
Head of BPBD Garut claimed that this number is decided since they can get supply from national 
or provincial level if there is an emergency situation. However, the flash flood that occurred in 
2016 proved that BPBD Garut could not handle the logistics supply to victims, since it was tackled 
by military logistics: 
Actually, there is a regulation in the military if I am not mistaken which stated 
that within one to two days, administrative mechanism can follow after 
distribution. This is regulated in our internal instructions in a non-war military 
operation. It is stated in Indonesian National Military regulations that the military 
must give supporting assistance to local government if needed. Logistics can be 
distributed ahead, and an administrative letter can be sent to military base within 
2x24 hours. (Secretary of District Military Commando) 
Military logistics helped a lot to overcome the critical situation, since BPBD logistics were 
insufficient. Immediate responses after flooding identified there were 2,525 victims.  The first 
response for logistics supply to victims was taken from Military Ready to Eat. Military has better 
management system of logistics. It stores were enough (MRE). It normally uses MREs for military 
rations for supplying soldiers. 
Logistics management in the military can be integrated with the disaster emergency operation of 
BPBD. The military had sufficient stock of MREs for its soldiers for a certain period of time. 
MREs are periodically supplied to district military base to maintain its stock. However, BPBD 
Garut experiences expired stock if there is no disaster response. There will be waste, since the 
stocks must be destroyed and replaced by new stock. There will not be any waste if logistics of 
BPBD is integrated with military logistics since military uses its logistics for its soldiers on a 
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regular basis. It is stated in the regulation of Head of National Disaster Management Board No. 13 
of 2008 about logistics management and equipment for disaster responses system, that it needs to 
be executed at the right time, right place, right amount, right quality, right target, and right needs 
based on priority scale and standards (BNPB, 2008). Logistics during emergency responses can be 
supplied from military stocks if the logistics system between BPBD and military is integrated.  
System integration of logistics is prospective since the Law No. 34 of 2004 about Indonesian 
Military Forces states that one of duties of the Indonesian Military Forces is supporting disaster 
responses (Sekretaris Negara Republik Indonesia, 2004). The law is supported by another Law No. 
24 of 2007 about Disaster Responses which explains that the Indonesian Armed Forces’ 
involvement in disaster responses is a military involvement for civil mission (Government of 
Indonesia, 2007c). 
This integrated system of logistics might overcome issues during the critical time of disaster 
responses before humanitarian aid comes from donors, NGOs or other institutions. This is 
normally within the first week after a disaster. There should exist also logistics management from 
donors or other aid agencies. The amount and specification of the aid sometimes, however, cannot 
be predicted. There was a mess in logistics management from donors. A number of donors were 
confused as to where to drop their donation:  
There was all in mess when aid came. Instructions asked them to drop logistics in 
the district military base or resort military based. Victims wanted it to be 
distributed directly to them since some of them had received logistics directly from 
donors. They received it directly from a political party, although the logistics was 
not what victims needed. The political party wanted to distribute directly to a 
location where it has its mass basis. The party collected used clothes or food to 
be donated to its supporters without understanding their needs. The party focused 
on certain affected communities to distribute logistics although the logistics were 
not what they needed. Actually…, the victims needed medicines but, since there 
was no coordination, victims received unwanted logistics. For example, certain 
communities received a lot of used clothes and they threw them away or used them 
for moping or cleaning their houses. Citizens from Leuwidaun village protested 
because citizens in Paminggir village received better donations directly from 
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donors. They said it was not fair distribution by KODIM. That was what 
happening in the field. (chief of local journalist). 
This view is added by one of the leaders of Forum Pengurangan Resiko Bencana/FPRB (Disaster 
Risk Mitigation Forum). The Forum is an organisation that is concerned with disaster responses.  
Members of the forum come from different institutions, communities, youth groups, artist groups, 
and corporations. Its activities involve all disaster phases (mitigation, preparedness, response, and 
rehabilitation), although its focus is on mitigation: 
Complaints from recipients of donation triggered conflict among victims. It was 
caused by the donations not coming to the post first, but donors distributed 
donations directly to victims. This automatically created uneven distribution. 
Some groups could get more donations where others got nothing. (leaders of 
Disaster Risk Mitigation Forum).   
Victims who were affected in locations that were more exposed by media would get more 
donations. Media coverage was massive in local, regional, and national levels. This was one of the 
reasons for the uneven distribution. There were many reasons that some donors preferred to 
distribute their own aid directly to victims. This might be caused by a lack of trust in government 
institutions, due to the high index of corruption in Indonesia including in disaster responses, such 
as in response to the devastating tsunami in 2004 in Aceh (Brooks, Klau, Orr, & Stanford, 2010). 
Another reason is discussed in the previous section — political campaign or branding image of 
donors’ popularity.   
Logistics distributed from local government accounts must follow its mechanisms and procedures. 
This must be preceded by disaster statement from the Regent. The statement is created based on a 
report from hierarchically lower levels of government (village). From the village, the information 
will be passed to kecamatan (the sub-district) level and it ends in the Regent. This statement 
becomes a reference for BPKAD/Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan Aset Daerah (Board of 
Financial Management and Local Asset) to transfer the account from the contingency fund to 
certain accounts or departments which are needed for disaster responses. The contingency fund 
budget is allocated based on previous experience of expenses in disaster response. The amount of 
money allocated is only an estimation: 
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For flooding, if there is no certain government sector directly tackling this, it 
can be tackled by BPBD. If it relates to evacuees, money will be transferred to 
the social department. If it relates to damaged school buildings, money will be 
transferred to the education department. (Secretary of Planning and 
Development of Garut).  
This financial distribution from the local government to victims is a long process, since 
calculations of needs by every involved local government department had to be done. This is 
normally led by BPBD for calculation of damage, number of victims, and amount of logistics 
needed to be distributed to victims. This calculation measures disaster impact on physical 
infrastructure and housing. A total number from the calculation will be used for transferring funds 
from the contingency budget to certain local government agencies. Money goes to the social 
department for a quick response after the disaster. This can be in the form of logistics or cash to 
be distributed to victims. If the budget is insufficient, particularly for big costs such as public 
infrastructure rebuilding, it will be allocated for the following period of budgeting mechanism.  
There is a complicated logistics and financial calculation and distribution to victims. Firstly, BPBD 
is responsible for calculating the impact of the disaster, but its staff have limited skills and 
knowledge of the calculation of physical damage from a disaster. Most of the staff come from 
different education backgrounds and experiences (See Chapter 5.2.1). 
The calculation is only based on the estimation of the number of victims and damaged buildings. 
It takes a long time to calculate the number of victims who are safe and who require quick response. 
Besides, financial sources are not only from unexpected budget allocation. There will be financial 
incomes for disaster response such as from the regional government, national government, and 
donors. These donations may overlap with the local government’s money from the contingency 
budget allocation. Data gathering is another problem in the local government. It can be imagined 
how it is complicated in disaster response, since it is already difficult to gather data in a normal 
situation. There is no integrated system of financial administration for disaster responses. 
Based on the last flash flood, the flooding task force team announced that the team accept 
donations from donors. This was based on a policy from the Regent. The donations were physical 
materials, such as clothes or instant food, and money. The team stored materials in military 
warehouses and money was transferred to the Task Force team’s account. The account was created 
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at day 2 of the disaster response. The account was designed to receive money from individuals, 
private companies, or other non-government organisations. However, donations from central, 
regional or other local governments were transferred to the Dinas Pendapatan, Pengelolaan 
Keuangan dan Aset Daerah/DPPKA (Department of Local Revenue, Finance, and Asset 
Management) account. There was no integration of these two accounts for the response. The Task 
Force team tackled some clothes, food, drink, other emergency materials and money which were 
typically incidental expenses and some money was transferred to other related departments from 
DPPKA account.  
This double account meant each account had its own cashflow. The problem was in control and 
audit. The Task Force’s account received a lot of money. This account was signed by persons in 
charge from two institutions. They were the head of Task Force from the military and the chief 
executive of BPBD. Cash disbursement had to be signed by these two institutions. Two 
institutions’ approval was aimed to control financial disbursement. However, there was no public 
report made from these two institutions about the cash inflow and outflow. They made the report 
only to the Regent as the head of the local government.  
The DPPKA received billions of money from the central government, regional government, other 
local governments, and foundations. The account from DPPKA will be transferred to different 
departments based on assessment of BPBD related to the needs for disaster response. For example, 
the account in DPPKA transferred funds to the local social department account for victims’ daily 
allowance. This cash disbursement was not communicated to cash disbursement from the Task 
Force team’s expenses. Although the emergency responses Task Force spent financial incidental 
expenses, the victims received double donations from two different accounts. Moreover, certain 
groups of victims received direct donations from individuals, corporations or other donors apart 
from the government.          
Secondly, logistics were distributed by emergency response Task Force team immediately after 
the flash flood. The team had meetings frequently every evening involving all actors to evaluate 
what they had done and discuss the planning for the following day. The team gathered information 
from all involved actors from different locations. It included logistical needs and supporting 
facilities of affected communities. Logistics handling was very complex, since it included direct 
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distribution from individual or corporate donors to communities without coordination and donated 
to the team with no experience in logistics handling such as the Armed Forces:  
In a panic condition, donations came from everywhere. Persons who received 
logistics could be anybody, they were stored anywhere because they did not 
have skills and knowledge about logistics management, and it was the same in 
distribution. There was confusion, I just left like that because I could not argue 
with DANDIM [military]. Logistics was piled up outside buildings and he made 
an estimation of the logistical needs in each location without any assessment. 
He distributed stuff that had been received, and what happened? There was a 
mess, used clothes from donations were piled everywhere in every location, 
since the community did not need them. Instant foods such as noodle could not 
be cooked since victims lost their cooking equipment or it wasn’t working. That 
was stupid, right? (Chief of Local Red Cross Garut) 
Since logistics distribution to victims was uneven, some of the victims initiated to get the aid 
directly from the commando post. Citizen asked for logistics for their life and family, but it was 
refused by one of the BPBD staff, since the individual did not bring a recommendation letter from 
RT, RW, and village officers which stated that the individual was a victim of the flood. The staff 
acted to prevent misuse of logistics ending up with the wrong recipient. It cannot be judged that 
the staff’s action was wrong. The staff acted to prevent people taking advantage for personal 
benefit to receive free logistics from government. However, the action cost a lot for BPBD.  
Victims could not be blamed for not following the procedures. Firstly, they had never been told 
about the administrative procedure. Most of them were uneducated and came from a poor family. 
They felt inferior to meet government officers. Secondly, it was in an emergency situation. They 
came to the post to receive aid and food for their family because they were starving. They returned 
to their temporary location with empty hands, without any food for their family. These types of 
victims were uncoordinated victims, since they did not coordinate with their community leader 




6.5. Collaboration Model  
As can be clearly seen in the previous section, collaboration was created unintentionally. During 
the flash flood, representatives of local government departments, the military and volunteers 
initiated assistance by themselves without any instructions from the Regent. The Regent made 
instructions for an immediate response after the flood. It took two days for the Regent to make a 
decree and disaster status statement. This was one of the reasons that made the response chaotic, 
since there was no contingency plan for the response. The Red Cross is one of the experienced 
organisations in an emergency situation, but it had no power to run it since the authority was in 
the military’s hands.  
BPBD is expected to act as a coordinator for every disaster phase, as mandated by Law no 24 of 
2007 about disaster management and the local regulation No. 7 of 2011 about the establishment 
and organisational structure of Local Disaster Management Board (Government of Indonesia, 
2007c; Local Government of Garut, 2011a). As a responsible organisation for disaster 
management, BPBD should be a coordinator, a commando, and an executor. It is supported by 
other actors in executing its duties. This is admitted by its chief executive: 
Disaster management is depicted in our logo which is a blue equilateral 
triangle.  On my uniform, there is this blue equilateral triangle symbol. The 
symbol means that BPBD cannot work alone, there must be a synergy among 
government, communities and enterprises. Disaster is an unexpected even; the 
responses can run smoothly if this blue equilateral triangle is executed 
properly. It means that there must be the roles of government, community, and 
enterprises. (Chief Executive of BPBD Garut). 
Based on previous experiences in tackling flooding, there is a gap between laws or regulations and 
practice. Every time flooding occurs, there is always a lack of coordination, misalignment, 
overlaps and miscommunication.  Leadership and organizational structure become crucial 
problems. The chief executive of BPBD Garut has minimum skills and knowledge in disaster 
management, since the official has no formal education backgrounds and experiences in disaster 
management. In local government affair, the official has little power to manage coordination with 
other agencies:  
164 
 
Yes, I have an obstacle with local government agencies. The coordination 
function is not working, although disaster responses require agility and it must 
be in a command system. Meanwhile, the chief executive of BPBD is equal to 
other leaders of SKPDs. The fact is that a command system started from the 
Regent to local secretary as ex officio of BPBD to coordinate in disaster 
responses. From the local secretary it continues to all SKPDs including our 
department. So, in this coordination function, we are weak. For example, when 
a bridge collapsed in the flood, I can’t ask the chief executive of public work 
and housing directly. (Chief executive of BPBD)  
He claimed that he had no power to command and control. However, a requirement of command 
system may be effective during or immediately after a disaster, since there should be one leader to 
be followed for instructions. Volunteers and other actors might not be confused during disaster 
responses if there is a leader. The chief executive of BPBD was at the location during the flash 
flood, but he could not command actors from different institutions and communities, since he did 
not have any idea on how to cope with the flash flood. This incapability of responding to a disaster 
event led the Regent to decide the military should lead the emergency responses on the following 
day. 
The chief executive of BPBD has a minimum understanding of coordination. He believes that 
coordination is the role of command and control where he has the power to command other 
institutions. Although there is a routine meeting among head of local government agencies which 
is facilitated by the Regent, it does not create a comprehensive collaborative working atmosphere. 
Practically, they work together during disaster or after emergency responses. However, this 
collaboration is without planning or any guidelines. This occurs repeatedly every time a natural 
disaster hits Garut: 
So, our coordination in the field was just simple coordination without any 
designed coordination mechanism. Our agencies communicate verbally in the 
field. (The Regent of Garut)    
Although it was spontaneous, there was massive assistance from many different actors from local 
government, communities, and enterprises. They worked all night to evacuate affected 
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communities with minimum facility and equipment. This social capital which exists in Garut 
communities can help in emergency response.  
Military involvement during the flooding was equal to other actors. It was not as a leader. 
However, citizens do not dare to face the military, since historically Indonesia was led by a dictator 
with a military background for 32 years. Citizens have traumatic experiences with the military, so 
most of them will follow what the military commands. It was not only for citizens but other 
voluntary organisations felt inferior in front of the military. The military, much like other voluntary 
organisations or community, got involved to help victims without any request from any institution:  
I think it was emergency, we must help citizens. However, if KODIM had been 
involved for 24 hours but then there was no administrative process, we could 
retreat our troops and await further instructions from our higher commander. 
However, based on my experience, it has never happened. We, as military, have 
a moral obligation to help victims. (Secretary of Military District Commando 
Garut) 
It is clearly stated in the law and regulation of disaster management that the leader is BPBD for 
the local level and BNPB for national level. However, there is always appointed military to lead a 
disaster response. According to chief executive of Regional Red Cross West Java, the reason for 
the appointment of the military a leader for the disaster response is that the military has a clear 
command system. Therefore, it makes it easier for instructional process. Another reason is that 
military instructions will be followed by other actors.  
On the one hand, the military is good for agility. It has one command system which must be 
followed by the lower line. It will be faster to execute duties. On the other hand, there is no chance 
for members under this command to argue or disagree with instructions. This system does not 
always suit all occasions, for example in a collaborative system involving organisations with 
different characteristics and cultures: 
My leadership was challenged in that situation. If I were young, that would be 
a fight between me and military. They [soldiers] have no experience in 
governance. One more thing, their style is military style, that is different for 
disaster response style. That was not nice, I was offended, I experienced bad 
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things that time. I am more experienced in disaster response than them. (Head 
of Local Red Cross Garut)  
This proved chaotic in practice. Quick responses of a military style to flash flooding could not 
work in line with the needs of victims and readiness of other actors. Military coverage for such a 
large affected area was limited. The military command system might not be suitable for all 
different locations. Instructions from the commander of the Task Force did not cover some areas 
such as PGRI secondary and high schools.  There were many actors involved and they worked 
collaboratively: 
The problem in the field was not always easy to overcome. Many people were 
involved but it was not effective. There were the national SAR team, police, 
BPBD and volunteers during the flash flood without anybody providing them 
with instructions [leader]. This kind of situation happened for three days. 
People who were involved in the emergency response changed almost every 
day. There were different personnel from organisations [SAR, police, BPBD 
and volunteers] from one day to another. It was very slow since they had long 
conversations before start to work every single day of the emergency response. 
(Headmaster of PGRI Secondary School) 
There was a collaboration between two institutions in distributing water. Clean water was one of 
the most crucial aspects for victims, since they could not get clean water from their wells and water 
distribution from the water company was cut off. A donor company wanted to distribute water 
containers to the affected community, but it did not know about the needs, locations, and how to 
distribute the aid. The company contacted the Red Cross for distribution. The Red Cross 
distributed the water containers to communities without any coordination with the Task Force 
team. The Red Cross admitted that they had activities and they were happy because they could 
help donors and help victims alike.   
6.6. Accountability Deficit 
Failures of collaboration during the disaster response phase results in questions about accountability. 
Questions of accountability from the highest level in the hierarchy of local government to its 
citizens (The Regent), the chief of emergency response Task Force team, the chief executive of 
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BPBD, and all involved actors. The accountability is not only for financial management, but also 
performance. The data reveals that there are accountability deficits from forums who have the right 
to ask for accountability from the actors involved, especially the victims who are powerless. They 
accepted what they received from the government without arguing. Victims received donations 
from their government without asking for detail of the source and amount of donation from 
government. There was no transparency to victims. Although there was media which informed 
society about financial flow during the emergency, the media faced limited access to information.    
The Regent, as the head of local government, is obliged to protect and save citizens. He has a 
responsibility during a disaster response to provide better services to affected communities. 
Theoretically, he must be held accountable to the citizens. Failure in fulfilling this obligation may 
cost distrust from the citizens to the Regent. As a result, citizens might not vote for the incumbent 
in forthcoming elections. In contrast, repeated flooding to the city which affect certain 
communities had no negative consequences for the Regent. The current Regent could be re-elected 
for a second period (he has since been officially confirmed as the Regent for the second time for 
the period 2018-2023). This might be because of the relatively small number of victims who are 
affected by repeated flooding or other reasons which are not explored in this research. Some 
affected communities stated that they still believe that flooding is a natural cycle which is not the 
government’s fault. They believe that the government still help them by helping them with logistics 
during flooding.   
Hierarchically, the Regent is in the highest position. All reports of disaster responses end up on his 
desk. The Regent does not have any obligation or formal responsibility to report about tackling 
disaster response. The team is the only one that must report vertically, horizontally, internally, and 
externally. The team is a temporary organisation which is created only during the response. It has 
limited capacities and resources for complex reporting mechanisms because it focuses on victims.  
This is not an ideal situation since there were many donations to the local government of Garut 
from other local governments, province governments, national government, enterprises, 
foundations, and individuals.  
During disaster response, the Regent has full authority without any 
responsibility requirement to anybody. The fact is that all activities during the 
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response are under my control. Parties that are involved in disaster responses 
are controlled by the team that is created by me. (The Regent of Garut) 
Morally, responsibility for disaster responses is on the Regent.  Responsibility for failure will be 
pinned not only on BPBD or other local government agencies but also the Regent. This moral 
responsibility is difficult to measure which results in less direct consequences to local government 
agencies or the Regent. A significant consequence may be in the form of trust from the people to 
the local government. This can be seen from a fact that many donors prefer to distribute logistics 
or financial aid by themselves, or that some volunteers collect donations and distribute them 
without coordination.      
These situations repeat in every disaster response. One of the major issues is transparency among 
actors. Local government agencies lacked transparency for total financial distributions to other 
actors and citizens. They might make a final report of their activities to higher authorities 
hierarchically, but this does not happen horizontally to other involved actors and generally to 
citizens. The Task Force team is claimed as a collective group which consists of involved 
organisations.  The Task Force makes reports of its activities every day verbally in a meeting: 
There is no formal report of received donations. Sometimes, there is 
explanation from the person in charge person [Task Force team leader] if there 
is a question from the media. When donations arrived in the command post, 
there would be announcements about that daily. The responsible person is still 
the Regent. In the general system of governance, there will be external audit 
from BPK [supreme audit institution] but reports for disaster are only verbally 
daily during emergency responses. (Head of Local Planning and Development 
Garut) 
Furthermore, there were two bank accounts which were being used for collection from donors. 
The first account was specifically used for collecting donations from other government institutions 
(other local governments, provincial government, and national government) and foundations. The 
donor foundations were big organisations such as Qatar Foundation, Pikiran Rakyat, and Djarum 
Foundation.  The second account was used for the collection from enterprises, individuals, and 
other donors. These two accounts were handled by two different persons. Donations to government 
were managed by DPPKA/Dinas Pendapatan dan Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah (Local 
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Revenue, Finance and Asset Management). Another account was used by the Task Force 
emergency team to collect financial aid during the response.   
The team announced every evening during emergency response meeting to all involved actors 
about the receipt of donations. The secretary of the team, as the person in charge, reported financial 
and non-financial receipts and distribution locations to all actors, including the media. The 
secretary reported to the Regent on behalf of the chief of the team about all of the emergency 
response when the disaster status of emergency response ended. A carbon copy of report is sent to 
Local Board Disaster Management at the province level. This copy of the report continues to the 
National Board of Disaster Management, and then it will reach the President of Indonesia as the 
highest-level authority.  
The report is normally only an administrative procedure which must be followed by the team. 
There is a lack of follow-up action from the higher authorities about the report. There is no audit 
or inspection of the performance of the team. There are several reasons why the audit or inspection 
is not executed. Firstly, the team is a voluntary group from different types of institutions from 
government or civil society. They work based on a humanitarian sense. The audit process may 
offend the team, since they are voluntary. Secondly, some donors prefer to classify their donation 
as confidential. Their reason is a part of their belief that a donation must be kept confidential. 
Thirdly, logistics is not only collected in the Task Force team. Each organisation has its own 
financial and human resources. For instance, the social department has its own budget for 
emergency donations to disaster victims. It is usually communicated verbally during the meeting 
if they prefer to inform.  
Relationship of each actor in the team is more concerned with technical activities. The chief of 
team led a meeting daily during responses which discussed current status of situation, problems, 
challenges, and needs. The meeting would invite actors to be involved based on their availability, 
readiness, and capability in several locations. The meeting normally only reports each actor’s 
activities on that day and planning for the following day. Every actor wants to be heard and their 
ideas and opinions be accommodated. However, the military as a leader is not used to being 
democratic in a decision making situation. The meeting only became a session of reporting and 
delegating tasks for the next day.  
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There occurred turf battles among them since each of them brought its organisation’s missions and 
objectives, beside the collective task. For instance, they prefer to work in the most popular 
locations because there will be a lot of media and they will have an opportunity to be broadcast by 
television or their organisation logo may be captured by newspaper images. Most of them were 
organisations which have an interest to benefit from publicity, such as political parties, NGOs, and 
corporations. The turf battle did not affect directly how they worked. However, they did the 
assigned tasks in the meeting instructions and they worked in a good relationship and 
communication among them.  
The relevant concept of accountability among actors is professional accountability. They were 
expected to do duties delegated during the meeting to the best of their ability. Professional 
accountability requires certain standards to measure the performance of actors. This is not as 
simple since it was difficult to value better performance if there is no agreed standard. Furthermore, 
in the voluntary work, it is complicated to give “punishment” to actors from civil society. The only 
thing where accountability may be applied is to government institutions. There was a demand for 
better performance from non-government actors to government officers since they are paid 
professionally and their institutions have resources. However, non-government actors could not 
have any significant power to apply consequences to government officers formally.          
 
6.7. Summary 
Collaborative working during the response phase was executed incidentally. Actors came to 
locations without any instructions. Neighbouring communities, the military, police, local 
government, and volunteers came voluntarily. There was no command and instruction during the 
disaster, but they could work together and help each other. This situation happened since people 
in Garut have strong solidarity and respect for others. Social capital is an asset of majority society 
in Indonesia particularly in Garut. It helps government during disaster response. Without asking, 
they will voluntary help others in need.  
The following day, after the flash flood, a commander of KODIM (military district commando) 
was appointed a chief of the Task Force by the Regent. The situation was chaotic in almost every 
section such as evacuation, logistics, search and rescue, medic, and debris management. Military 
command system in disaster response had positive and negative impacts. Positively, the military 
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is good for agility. Troops are ready to work in any situation and condition. They were assigned to 
work with other organisations in many different locations. Their physical strength could help other 
involved actors in doing physically challenging work such as cleaning up debris around locations. 
Negatively, the troops only listened to their commander. They force other actors to follow their 
instructions. This was not a good relationship in voluntary work. Other actors came to help 
voluntarily. They felt underestimated and threatened by the military system of response. 
Furthermore, responding to natural disaster will face uncertainty. One disaster may have different 
characteristic to another location or even one location may be different to other locations at the 
same time and event of a disaster such as the flash flood.   
There was a lack of leadership from the chief executive of BPBD during disaster response which 
resulted in the appointment of the military as the chief of emergency response Task Force. This 
leads to a lack of accountability of BPBD as the institution in charge for disaster management. 
Some actors and donors preferred to distribute logistics by their own way or helping victims 
individually without joining the Task Force team. Some of them had personal motives such as 
promotion of their activities. This can be for campaign purposes for politicians, branding image 
for companies, or showing off by voluntary organisations to attract donors.     
Formally, the team made reports to the Regent for their activities. This was a form of responsibility 
from the team to the top of local government leader. The military is not under a direct structure of 
the local government’s hierarchy. The Regent had little power to give consequences if there was 
something wrong with their duties, since the military was only a partner that worked voluntarily. 
There is an accountability deficit within this context between account holders (The Regent) and 







Previous three analysis chapters discussed the dynamics of disaster management during the 
mitigation, preparedness and response phases. They tell how failures in coordination, 
communication and trust may lead to accountability issues. As a result, lack of accountability 
creates vulnerability for people facing flooding.  This chapter discusses collaboration during the 
aftermath of flooding, the recovery stage of disaster management. This analysis includes short-
term recovery and long-term recovery. Short-term recovery is a relief stage after the flooding. This 
includes temporary housing, food and drink distribution, clearance of debris, and trauma healing. 
This stage is part of the activities to prepare for long-term recovery stage. Short-term recovery 
usually begins while emergency responses are running. On the other hand, long-term recovery 
starts after the emergency response ends. The long-term phase includes rebuilding and 
rehabilitation. It takes a longer period for a major natural disaster. These two periods of recovery 
consist of many components such as planning, coordination, donations, funds, logistics, and 
personnel (Coppola, 2015e).  
This chapter focuses on recovery phase in a collaborative setting to analyse concepts of 
accountability which in turn may affect mitigation phase. There are two different groups of actors 
who contribute to the recovery phase. They are from government agencies and non-government 
actors (organisations or individuals). Several national and local government institutions are 
involved in this phase, such as BPBD, BNPB, BAPPEDA, social department, public work and 
housing department, state forest enterprise, nature conservation agency, and Balai Besar Wilayah 
Sungai/BBWS (River Basin Organisation). Non-government institutions involved in this phase are 
enterprises, NGOs, volunteers, and communities.  
Involvement of actors from government and non-government in these two types of recovery phase 
can consist of the same actors, or it can be different actors in the short-term and long-term recovery 
phases. Some of them work on specific events because of their availability, capability, and capacity 
in that event. However, government as a whole has responsibility to provide better recovery phase, 
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as mandated by the law that government must protect its people from any kind of vulnerability 
(The Republic of Indonesia, 1999).  
The first section of this chapter analyses collaboration in short-term recovery after the immediate 
disaster responses. The section depicts each actor’s roles and their way of working in the relief 
process, such as in the provision of temporary shelter and housing, the process of mud and debris 
clearance, and providing food and drink for affected citizens. It includes discussion of the 
dynamics of coordination and of communication processes between those involved. The second 
section discusses long-term recovery (housing, public infrastructure, river rehabilitation, 
afforestation programmes, and economic recovery). This analyses assessments of property lost and 
of affected citizens, and of resources required for rehabilitation. This section includes processes of 
physical infrastructure restoration, rebuilding and creating new housing to relocate citizens.  The 
programmes were dominated by local and national government institutions. The third section of 
the chapter discusses collaboration during the recovery phase. Collaboration occurs in both the 
short-term and in the long-term recovery phases. Short-term recovery collaboration occurs during 
evacuation of victims to temporary locations in a chaotic situation, and the assessment process of 
damage from flooding and the needs of victims.  Long-term recovery is mostly concerned with 
physical development (infrastructure). The fifth section is conclusion.  
7.2. Short-term recovery 
As explained in the previous chapter, the 2016 flash flood left many issues, physically and 
mentally. It swept hundreds of houses, bridges, farming areas, public facilities, and roads. Victims 
were left in shock caused by the traumatic event. Some people felt sorrow and distress because 
they lost their family members or relatives. The majority of the 2,525 affected people came from 
poor communities who lived near the Cimanuk River. They were struggling to get their life back 
to normal. There were several activities during the short-term recovery process which included 
shelter and housing provision, assessment, investigation of land conversion, creation of recovery 
plans which included the resources for recovery.   
7.2.1.  Provision of temporary shelter and housing 
Short-term recovery starts while the emergency response is ongoing (Coppola, 2015f). Most actors 
involved in the response phase continue their activities into this stage in helping affected 
communities. As discussed in the previous chapter, there was no appointed team leader during the 
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response to the flooding. The actors involved in evacuation faced confusion while relocating 
victims to temporary shelters. Neighbouring communities invited them to stay in their mosques, 
community halls and other public facilities. There was no clear instruction to locate victims in 
certain areas since, during the preparedness phase, those responsible had failed to make such plans 
(see Chapter 5): 
In the affected site it was chaotic and mess. Why did that happen? Yes, it was caused 
by no contingency plan which should be made by BPBD as a leading actor. 
(Secretary of District Military Command). 
Actors who helped with evacuation were informed by community leaders or neighbouring 
communities to direct victims to possible areas and some of their neighbours opened their doors 
as temporary places for victims. Decisions to locate victims were based on availability and distance 
to locations in Cimacan since it was an ongoing emergency and victims needed places to stay. The 
victims were scattered in many different places. For instance, the victims in Cimacan were 
evacuated to different places such as to the Local Education Centre, a sports hall in a neighbouring 
village, mosques, neighbouring communities and citizens’ houses.  This could only solve the 
problem temporarily since every temporary location had different capability and capacity to handle 
victims. Some locations had limited toilets, water, and food. Furthermore, these locations were not 
recorded and known by local government authorities and donors, which in turn created problems 
in the distribution of food, drink and other assistance.  
The Regent called a meeting of FORKOPIMDA/Forum Koordinasi Pemerintah Daerah (Local 
Government Coordination Forum) ofn which the Regent was the head, as mandated by Law No. 
23 of 2014 (Government of Indonesia, 2014a) in the following morning, the 21st September 2016. 
The meeting was attended by FORKOPIMDA members, such as a chairman of parliament, a judge, 
the Chief of the Military from KODIM, and head officers of related local government agencies. 
This meeting agreed to appoint the commander of KODIM as Head of the Task Force and the 
Chief Executive of BPBD as the Deputy of Task Force, as stated in Regent decree (see Chapter 6). 
The following day, after issuance of the Regent’s decree officially declaring the floods a disaster, 
some actors worked collaboratively under the appointed Task Force team, especially government 
agencies, but others preferred to work individually. There was no obligation for actors to join the 
175 
 
Task Force team from local government authority. The Regent did not act to direct, suggest, 
recommend, or invite them to join:  
…We let them do their activities [helping victims] by themselves. For 
example, there were political party organisations [and] enterprises. They 
went to citizens directly and there was no report to me. (Regent of Garut)   
This made for a lack of clarity in the immediate recovery phase. The Task Force team received 
minimum information about the areas or communities which were helped by individual actors 
since the affected areas covered from the upper stream to the lower stream of Cimanuk River. 
Local government seemed to be powerless. In particular,  the Regent, as the head of local 
government, could not use his authority and power in this particular situation.  
Actors from different groups of local and national organisations, such as NGOs, government 
agencies, community, and individual volunteers, arrived on these sites in the morning, having 
received information from the mass media and social media since the previous night. While the 
meeting of FORKOPIMDA was running, these actors were busy helping in the aftermath of the 
flooding. The situation was as chaotic as described in the response phase (see Chapter 6). They 
worked without any instruction and coordination. They managed to do whatever they could to help 
victims. Although there was no appointed leader or Task Force team yet, they could undertook 
various tasks, such as helping victims in mud and debris clearance, and in the collection and 
distribution of food and drink to affected communities. They were very quick to help affected area 
although there was no leader. However, they came to locations which had been reported through 
the media, since it was the only information they had and in the absence of official statements from 
local government about the affected locations.  
As a result, help was concentrated in the areas which were reported by media, such as the affected 
community in Cimacan and Lapang Paris (see Chapter 5). It created issues because help was 
concentrated in these two sites. Only 650 meters from Cimacan, there were two PGRI (Persatuan 
Guru Republik Indonesia/Republic of Indonesia Teacher Association) schools which were 
destroyed by the flash flood. Actors involved in Cimacan did not notice it, and no one direct them 
to help the schools. The schools were suffering without help for a couple of days:  
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There was no help from anybody for two days [after flooding]. On day three, 
there were many helpers coming from many different groups. They cleaned 
mud and debris because many buildings had collapsed. (Headmaster of PGRI 
High School).  
The headmaster and teachers had cleaned mud and debris by themselves for two days before help 
came. The help came to the location based on information spreading through national television 
broadcasts which reported live from the schools on day three. One national TV reporter 
interviewed the headmaster about the current situation at the schools: 
As soon as I was interviewed by TVONE [one of the biggest national 
television channels in Indonesia], there was a great deal of assistance 
arriving in the form of donations, manpower for cleaning, food and drink, 
and other materials. (Headmaster of PGRI High School)  
Although they could work without any central command and formal coordination during clearance 
of mud and debris and food collection and distribution in the affected areas, there were several 
issues regarding these activities.  Firstly, as has already been noted, there was no one in charge 





Figure 25: Organisations from civil society organisations and enterprises opened booths and 
command posts on the streets or in houses near the location of the flooding (Source: from local 
and national news media in Indonesia and NGOs documentations)   
 
Secondly, the collection of donations could be done by anyone. Many actors opened booths on the 
sidewalk of the main road or in houses near the sites (Cimacan and Lapang Paris). The actors were 
from community groups, political parties, enterprises, state-owned enterprises and individuals 
(Figure 25). They collected and distributed food, drink, clothes and other types of donation. Some 
booths were branches of certain organisations (political organisations, enterprises, NGOs) which 
were aimed to facilitate the distribution of donations from other parts of the country, while others 
were just local voluntary groups: 
178 
 
…at that time, beside from government [national and other local governments], there 
were great donations from people [individuals and organisations]. They set up booths 
from BUMN [Badan Usaha Milik Negara/state-owned enterprises], political parties, and 
so on. There were hundreds of booths everywhere near the flooding locations. They 
collected and distributed donations directly to victims without going through local 
government. (Regent of Garut)    
After the decision was made to appoint the military as head of the Task Force, there was no 
significant change in the management of logistics. They kept collecting and distributing food, 
drink, clothes and other materials directly to victims. Since there was no coordination among them, 
it made donation distribution uneven and it created another problem among victims:  
It happened in temporary shelters, although we tried to avoid that, such social 
envy among victims in temporary shelters triggered fighting for donations and 
so on. (Secretary of Task Force Team)   
Furthermore, there were several booths claiming as group of victims and collected donations near 
affected areas. There was no record of how many booths and posts. Majority of them used these 
booths for their personal purposes not for victims. The Task Force team did not manage these 
booths and posts’ activities in the collection and distribution of donations. This could create 
opportunities for them to take benefit from the situation: 
We did not know what they have collected and distributed to my community. 
I did not have authority to ask. You know, they were from different groups of 
people and mostly they were local groups. I know their members and some of 
them are not good people. (Head of Local Community 3).  
The Task Force team led the search and rescue process from within a team and directed the 
movement of evacuees from different places to specific locations considered as proper for 
temporary shelters. The evacuees were mostly citizens who lost their houses to the flash flood. The 
victims from Cimacan were moved to the Local Education Centre and to flats at Musaddadiyah. 
Victims from Lapang Paris were moved to the military barracks of KODIM, and victims from 
Sanding were moved to Inten Dewata Hall in the city centre. Not all of the victims were moved to 
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these appointed locations because some of them were already staying with their relatives or at 
neighbour communities. Some of them returned to their houses to clear debris and mud.  
The idea of moving victims to new centralisation places had positive and negative consequences. 
Firstly, it was good since it eased the distribution of food, drink, blankets and other donations. 
Individual donors could give their donations directly to these appointed locations since information 
about these locations were spread through media.  Secondly, local government officers from the 
social department could record the numbers of victims and their related information, such as their 
addresses, family, and properties. Thirdly, their family and relatives could find them easily by 
asking the Task Force commando base. However, they might feel depressed when they are 
gathered with other victims who were desperate and stressed because of loss of family members 
or property: 
During the days, there were many visitors who came and gave them donations. 
They were happy, but they were in sorrow talking about their loss at night. 
(Chief of Community Association in Cimacan) 
The victims who were moved to a flat in Musaddadiyah had issues adapting in the new 
environment. Most victims felt lonely since they are not used to living in high-rise housing. The 
flat housing system limited their time to gather together, such as for coffee time and for children 
to play. For example, they found difficulties visit their neighbours in the same block of flats 
because all doors look similar and there was no communal space in the flats for them to gather. 
They needed time to adapt to this environment.  
By the time they could cope to the new environment of flats in Musaddadiyah, they were obligated 
to move to another place since the flats are privately owned property and it was going to be used 
by its owner. They had lived there for several months and they got used to living there but they 
suddenly had to vacate the place: 
The victims of the disaster [flooding] who lived in Musaddadiyah suddenly had to vacate 
the flats because the flats would be used by Musaddadiyah Foundation. Moving them to 
another location was not as simple as turning our palm. We understood clearly that they 
had lived there for several months and they started to find comfort there. (Chief Executive 
of Local Board Disaster Management)  
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It was a different case for victims who stayed in the military barracks, city hall, and the local 
education centre. Privacy was a big problem because all of them stayed in the same space without 
any barrier among them. This might not have become a problem if it was temporary, for a week 
or two. But they still were living in these shelters a year after the flooding when I was visiting for 
data collection. They had to live in the shelters before they could be moved to their permanent 
houses which are provided by the government or by their own efforts. 
With all the dynamic situations of providing shelter for victims, there are several things that I could 
point out. Firstly, community support was great. They provided shelters in their houses or halls for 
victims and they helped to clean debris and mud for victims who wanted to return to their houses.  
It was executed without any instructions from local government officers (the Task Force team). 
Secondly, the evacuation procedures which were ordered by the chief of the Task Force team to 
centralise victims in specific location were not totally effective. Communities in particular area 
such as in Garut have very strong bonds with their neighbours. This can help during the recovery 
process, since victims would be looked after better by close neighbours or relatives rather than by 
the Task Force team in shelters. However, this mechanism has drawbacks by causing the 
distribution of food, drink, blanket and other materials to become complex since there was no 
record of and assessment system for victims who stayed with their neighbours. Work during the 
preparedness phase might have overcome the drawbacks by educating the community to face 
flooding by creating systems to identify and to record the mobilisation of the affected community. 
7.2.2. Assessment   
During the evacuation of victims to safer places, there was assessment of victims’ needs and of 
the effect of the flooding to sites. Short-term recovery was focused on victims’ needs and all 
activities urgently needed (Coppola, 2015b). The needs assessment was not executed properly 
during post flooding by the Task Force team: 
During the chaotic situation, donations came from everywhere. They were 
received by anybody [in command post]. They were stored and distributed 
by people who were not capable and lacking experience. There was 
confusion because there was no direction from the head of Task Force team. 
The stuffs were piled outside the command post and they [Task Force team 
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members] made an estimation of victims’ needs without prior assessment. 
(Chief of Local Red Cross of Garut) 
Some food, drink, blankets, clothes, money and other goods from donations came to the Task 
Force team, but a large amount of donations was received by non-government organisations to be 
distributed to victims. Some of these donations also were directly distributed by donors to victims. 
The Task Force team did not take any action on these issues. As a result, donations were distributed 
unevenly and some of these goods, such as clothes, were excessive for certain communities and 
they threw them away (see Chapter 6). 
Yes, we [the Task Force team] felt disappointed when volunteers from NGOs 
or enterprises or whoever they were directly distributed donations without 
coordination with the command post in the military base… There were a lot 
distributions [from them] on the field that became overlapping, such as 
clothes which were not needed by victims and they ignored them. [The 
clothes] became rubbish. (Chief of FPRB/Forum Pengurangan Resiko 
Bencana (Disaster Risk Reduction Forum))  
Assessment of victims’ needs was executed neither by the Task Force team nor individual donors. 
The total number of victims in all areas, the needs of victims, and which victims had received 
donations from uncoordinated organisations or enterprises were not known. However, the local 
Red Cross of Garut, as one of the Task Force members, initiated the conduct of assessments after 
a few days. It conducted its organisation’s standard operation procedures for post disaster. One 
procedure was assessment. There was a reason why the local Red Cross of Garut did not offer their 
assessment process to the Task Force team: 
We [local Red Cross of Garut members] were forced to comply [to Task Force 
team]. We followed their rules at the beginning but when we realised that we 
had strength [experience in tackling victims] compared to them, we did 
assessments for the areas where our members were…we communicated our 




The military style in the Task Force team was a reason why the Red Cross had to comply. But the 
Red Cross did assessments and distributed donations received by its base camp. Although The Red 
Cross joined the Task Force team, they continued to receive donations to their organisations and 
they could distribute them by themselves. They just needed to report their activities in daily 
meetings (see Chapter 6). The Red Cross explained its assessment activities before distributing 
food, drink, clothes, or any other goods. Historically, the local Red Cross of Garut has more 
experience in disaster management than any other local organisations. The Local Board Disaster 
Management existed in 2011 (see Chapter 4) and military has little understanding of disaster 
managements, while the Red Cross of Garut has served the community for decades. Consequently, 
the Task Force team listened and followed the Red Cross activities in assessment.     
The social department in Garut did not conduct assessment of victims’ needs but it did count the 
number of victims. It was based on Government Regulation No. 22 of 2008 and Social Ministry 
Regulation No. 04 of 2015. These regulations state that each victim has rights to receive an amount 
of money daily and the money is to be distributed per family. Theoretically, based on the 
regulations, all victims will receive allowances for up to three months. However, it was not what 
happened: 
The amount of the allowance for victims had been notified to us [community 
leaders]. I proposed to them [social department officers] as required. I 
proposed from RW 10 [chief of community association of region 10]. There 
were 632 victims in my area and I proposed that number, but I received only 
for 99 victims. I did not know what I should do…I initiated to call all 
neighbourhood groups in my area and discussed it. Based on our agreement, 
we received the money and divided equally to all families. (Chief of 
Community Association)  
The Chief of Community Association sought reasons from the sub-district of the formal 
government institution. According to an officer in this office, they were urged to report the number 
of victims on day three after the disaster by social department when not all victims had been 
recorded. The social department was pushed by its ministry of social services to provide data 
because the President of the Republic of Indonesia was going to visit Garut. 
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Victims were sacrificed by this process. The social department of Garut provided incomplete 
reports of victim numbers from the sub-district level of local government since the report had to 
be handed to the ministry of social services. Data of victims were not collected and recorded 
simultaneously in all areas. Some involved actors in certain areas had taken the  initiative to record 
the total number of victims, but other places did not. In turn, when social services department 
asked for data on victims, some community associations could easily provide it where others 
needed to process it. There was a problem in providing victims’ documents since these document 
were lost to flooding. There was an administrative requirement which required victims to provide 
documents such as citizenship ID, house certificate, and birth certificate, or evidence of family 
card. The victims had to undergo the process of making new documentation by going through to 
the department of population and civil registration. They had to follow bureaucratic processes 
which is from the lowest level of neighbourhood association, community association, village 
institution, sub-district institution, and the last is to department of population and civil registration 
to acquire new evidence of personal documentation. It consumes a lot of time and the victims could 
not prioritise the process since they were still shocked by flooding or they were focused on cleaning 
their houses.  
Social services department did not propose data that came after the first report. It was because the 
Regent had made the decree during first week of flooding: “I made a decree very quick. Before 7 
days the decree had been made which stated that the victims were 2525.” The decree that stated 
the number of victims made the social service department not able to process the proposal from 
community association. The Regent stated the number of victims was informed by the Task Force 
team where social department was part of the team.  
There was no integrated data and information for victims’ needs. Although they acted as a team in 
the Task Force, there was an organisational ego to show that they could do better. For instance, 
the Red Cross, which had more experiences in facing disaster, decided to conduct assessment by 
themselves since the team had a military style of disaster management. Requests for the total 
number of victims by ministry of social services, which had to be provided before the President of 
Indonesia came, made the local social service department submit limited data on victims since they 
needed to include victims’ identification, such as citizenship evidence. Victims received only a 
small amount of money because they did not have any other option. There was no action from 
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parliament members or other representative organisations about this issue since victims did not 
protest.  
7.3. Long-term recovery 
The recovery phase continues to the long-term recovery, which includes the development of 
permanent housing, the restoration of public infrastructure, afforestation programmes, and 
economic recovery. This phase requires a lot of effort and financial investment. In the case of 
Garut flooding, financially it was dominated by government programmes and there was a donation 
from the Qatar Foundation and from private enterprises. However, there was a large amount of 
individual donations which were directly distributed to victims and their environment. 
This long-term recovery process was preceded by an assessment of environmental damage. It 
included the effect of flooding on housing, farming, rivers, bridges, roads, and other public 
facilities. This assessment was not easy since there is no standard for the calculation of the 
environmental effect from disasters in exact numbers (Madjid, 2018). The Task Force team just 
recorded global damage, such as the number of houses, hectares of farming area and forest, or 
metres of road. The calculation did not depict the whole picture of destruction from flooding. 
Taking the housing calculation as an example, citizens who lived in different sub-districts had 
different types of houses. The citizens who lived on the upper stream built their houses mostly 
from wood, which cost less than people who lived in town areas, who mostly built their houses 
from concrete. Moreover, their houses have different size, furniture, and quality.   
The team assessed damage of public facilities which was going to be used for budgeting purposes. 
This assessment was conducted on public infrastructure and state owned or local government 
owned public facilities such as the general hospital, public schools and government office 
buildings. Private schools and factories were excluded from the assessment: 
I, as a headmaster, looked for donations for the rebuilding of our classes 
which were all collapsed by flooding. And, thank God, with all the donations 
we could rebuild a better building than before… There were four classrooms 
built by donations from the PGRI foundation of East Jakarta and the rest of 
the six classrooms, yard, toilets, and others were donated from the Bank 
Mega. (Headmaster of PGRI Junior High School) 
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The assessment of public infrastructure physical damage was focused on local government 
facilities. The reason might be for budgeting purposes. Local government could propose to 
province or central government for renovation or rebuilding these facilities. On the other hand, 
private schools and enterprises were struggling to rebuild their places because they did not have 
any insurance for their buildings.   
Assessment data from the Task Force team were submitted to the Regent as the head of local 
government through BAPPEDA which would then be used for planning and budgeting 
mechanisms in the short-term and long-term development plans of the local government (see 
Chapter 5). For long-term recovery, the Task Force team made a report of infrastructure and 
environmental damage which was made based on their members’ daily meeting.           
Recovery planning for long-term recovery consisted of what to do during the aftermath of flooding. 
Information came from the report of Task Force team’s finding during their evacuation, logistics 
distribution, search and rescues, and other immediate activities. The planning was made by local 
government of Garut which was led by the Regent. The recovery planning included the 
development of a housing programme for victims who were not allowed to return to their houses, 
renovation of affected public infrastructures, river rehabilitation, an afforestation programme, and 
economic recovery. This planning is an ongoing process and it continues on to the mitigation phase 
(see Chapter 4). Housing development was planned to build 1200 houses, of which 800 houses 
would be built by government and the other 400 houses were planned to be funded by private 
donations.  
7.3.1. Housing sector 
There was identified a number of victims who lost their houses and who lived in prohibited areas 
illegally. Although the total of victims stated in the Regent decree did not describe the real numbers 
of victims, the development of housing was based on this decree for local government programme. 
Some victims renovated their houses from individual and small private donors which gave material 
or financial donations directly to them. Most of these victims live in the Cimacan area which was 
prohibited for rebuilding by local government, but they did not have another choice since they 
were not listed as recipients of the local government programme. There was another view from the 
chief of local reporter in Garut which stated that local government seemed to ignore their activities 
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in renovating and rebuilding their houses in the prohibited area. The Regent warned them against 
rebuilding or renovating their houses but they ignored it:    
That is a dangerous area and nobody is allowed to settle there but they refuse. 
It is difficult in practice [to resettle]. Although the state aims to protect its 
citizens, they are vulnerable living there. I said ‘Ladies and gentlemen do not 
settle here again and the state will move you [to a safer place]’. But they 
replied ‘I am okay to live here and the new house [from government 
programme] is for my child.’ It is difficult to face citizens who do not 
understand. (Regent of Garut) 
The donors might not have information about the land status of victims since there was no 
information of land status during and after the flooding. Their intention to help victims facilitated 
them to rebuild their houses in the prohibited zone. There was no formal announcement from local 
government about land status. There was a statement from the community association leader in 
Cimacan that some of their people have deed of sale and had purchased their land.  
Another reason which made victims return to their houses, although they were prohibited, was that 
they had stayed too long in shelters and they felt inconvenienced. Local government kept them in 
temporary shelters because they did not have another option to move them to and they decided to 
return. The local government of Garut had limited capacity to provide housing for all of citizens 
in Cimacan if they had to be relocated. They faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they had to enforce 
the law about land status for green space, but on the other, they did not have an option to move 
them:  
We do not have any alternative [place] to relocate them because we do not 
have places [housing] for them. We could not force them by doing evictions 
since there is no alternative place to move them. We could do eviction, but we 
must have a prepared place [housing] for them. (Head of Communication and 
Information Department of Garut) 
The local government of Garut received different models of donations for the building of new 
housing. Some of them gave financial donation directly to local government for housing 
development but others decided to build by themselves. They needed 1,200 houses for 2,525 
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victims (interview with Regent Garut). The number of houses has gone through a verification 
process by local government: 
We verified [the information]. The verification process was conducted by 
asking the community leader, head of the neighbourhood association, or their 
neighbours. So, I am sure that our data is convincing. (Chief Executive of 
BPBD) 
Some enterprises, such as the Qatar Charity, Dompet Dhuafa, and Pikiran Rakyat, would provide 
physical development of housing and they asked local government to provide land such. The 
Regent was promised 140 billion Rupiah from central government for a housing development 
programme. The Local Government of Garut had started to search for locations to execute the 
programme. The victims could not be relocated to one location because there were different 
sources of donation with different mechanisms. For example, Dompet Dhuafa did crowdfunding 
and they collected 1.5 billion, of which 500 million was used during the response phase and the 
rest could build only 11 houses. Local government of Garut helped to provide land, but the process 
of development was managed by Dompet Dhuafa: 
Some of them through Regent [financial distribution], I think most of them 
through Regent. We needed to provide land and they would build the houses. 
(Head of Chief Executive of BPBD) 
Finding locations for development of 1200 houses could not be found in one area near the town 
since the City of Garut is small. Local government decided to find land in the suburbs. Besides 
having many options for locations, the land price is cheaper in the suburbs than in the town. It was 
concentrated in three locations: Kopi Lombong, Cigadog, and Lenggong Jaya. Providing land for 
development of housing needed many efforts for local government of Garut. There are many 
aspects which were considered: 
From the beginning, the consideration of housing location must be in a safe 
area which is far from future natural disasters. The second is land availability. 
The land availability should be in line with the local government budget. For 
instance, they [victims] want to move to a strategic location. There is no area 
near that place [flooding locations] but we give them stimulus [money] for 
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victims for alternative business. (Local Government Officer of Board of Local 
Development Planning of Garut) 
 Local government of Garut communicated to other departments in national government before 
starting development. For example, they contacted PVMB/Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi 
Bencana Geologi (Center for Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation) before deciding to 
use the land for development of housing. The reason was to assure that the location is safe.   
However, decision of location for housing development programme could not only consider safety 
reason, there are many aspects which should be considered. The victims had lived in the area from 
generation to generation. Their accessibility to go to work and other activities, for their children to 
go schools, and their other mobilities became problems. Local government did not consider this 
and there was no communication with the victims: 
Decisions on location is without the involvement [of the victims]. For 
example, children who live in Leuwidaun, Cimacan, and Lapang Paris, they 
went to school in town. But, when they were relocated to Copong there was 
no public transport for their access to schools. If they had to pay “ojeg” [ride-
hailing], they could not afford it because most of them were poor families. 
They used to have motorcycles which they bought by instalment but their 
motorcycles were swept away by the flood and they still had to pay instalment 








As I stated earlier, the development process of the housing programme was slow. There were 140 
families waiting for two years in shelters before they were relocated to flats in Margawati (Liputan 
6 News, 2018). They started to be relocated gradually after a minimum of a year in temporary 
shelters. This depended on finishing the process of development. The long timespan of the process 
was claimed to be affected by the process of acquiring land, which should be financed by local 
government:   
They [victims] do not understand mechanisms and procedures about 
budgeting [in government]. They complained that houses have not been 
finished yet. As matter of a fact, we have difficulties to provide land through 
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procurement. (Local Government Officer of Board of Local Development 
Planning of Garut) 
Local government had to follow mechanisms and procedures carefully otherwise it might become 
a problem during the audit process. They could not easily allocate budgets and use them to buy 
land. The budgeting process had to follow government schedules, starting from the budget 
proposal conducted in the beginning of year (February is final acceptance of proposal). The budget 
will be processed in parliament for approval or refusal. If the budget is approved, government 
could process the budget in the coming year. It takes a year before budget can be allocated. 
Following that, there is a procurement process which takes some time.  
Relocation was prioritised for victims who stayed in shelters since they had more complete 
documents, such as members of the family and previous address. This became a problem when 
people who lived with their relatives or spent their money to rent small houses close to their 
workplaces protested this policy. They asked for justice to local government about their rights to 
have houses or compensation money as promised by government. They demonstrated to the 
Regent’s office one and a half years after the flooding (Tribun Jabar, 2018). The local government 
of Garut made promises to victims about their housing issue:  
I heard that government promised to provide houses for them. A government 
officer told them that citizens whose houses were swept [by flooding] would 
get new houses but I have not heard anything after a while. (Chief of 
Community Association in Cimacan) 
Housing procurement is the responsibility of local PUPR/Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan 
Rakyat (Public Works and Public Housing Department). The department coordinates with its 
related institutions/organisations such as BPBD, Local Land Board, and Local Board of Planning 
and Development of Garut. The coordination was not optimal in this case. There were no clear 
guidelines for coordination. For instance, the location of housing was decided by the Regent based 
on input about availability of land and the price from their staff. The Regent’s decision was not 
based on consultation with community representatives, such as community leaders or parliament 
members, but only from their staff. Moreover, government project based housing was developed 
by a private company that won the bidding. The private company which got the project sometimes 
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had minimum control from government officers where they might be easily bribed by the 
company: 
If it is a government project based development, we usually have to give an 
amount of money to the survey team [government officers] in order to have 
minimum control and there will not be a lot of questions from them during the 
survey. We prepare money in an envelope and give it to them. This will 
guarantee that the project will not be questioned. (Housing Developer Owner) 
When some houses’ development had finished, the distribution was not easy. Theoretically, all 
victims would get the houses. However, the distribution mechanism was another issue. Most 
victims lost their house documents. Some of them did not have any documents, since they built 
houses in restricted areas. There was a mechanism for checking on victims by asking people who 
lived in the area, such as the chief of neighbour association, chief of community association, and 
village officers, to confirm the victims’ information about property possession. There were two 
types of victims, as tenants and house owners. The victims who lived there as tenants, they would 
get the same position in new houses. But, if they were the owners of houses, they would get new 
houses for free.     
The mechanism is like this, if [they are] the owners [of the houses], it means 
that asset is replaced by asset. If they are tenants, they will get rights to a 
building but some of them will be as tenants [who pay rent monthly]. That all 
depends on appraisal. (Local Government Officer of Board of Local 
Development Planning of Garut) 
However, whether or not they had ownership document for their house, such as land certificates 
and building permit certificate, all of them paid taxes. Victims who lived in restricted area paid 
house tax and the people who possessed land certificates paid both taxes, house and land. They 
had the same rights for protection from the state, which local government of Garut failed to do.  
7.3.2. Public infrastructure 
Reconstruction programmes of public infrastructure included the general hospital, public schools, 
and bridges. Financing for the programmes uses governmental budgeting mechanism (see Chapter 
5). They used local government and national government budget allocations. Each programme was 
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executed by different departments. Building construction, such as the hospital and public schools, 
was under the responsibility of the local Public Works and Public Housing Department of Garut 
and bridges were the responsibility of the provincial government.  
Local government focused on public infrastructure reconstruction, but ignored the buildings of 
private organisations which were aimed at social purposes, such as a private school. The Senior 
High School and Secondary School of PGRI had many classrooms, yard, toilets, and offices that 
were collapsed. There was not any budget allocated by government for the schools: 
That is a fact. I was furious because there was no concern at all from local government. 
They focused on Lapang Paris and Secondary School 3 of Garut. There was no attention 
to this place [PGRI Secondary School]. We cleaned up debris and mud ourselves and 
were helped by our alumni. They came to help and donated some amount of money. 
(Headmaster of PGRI Secondary School of Garut)  
The reconstruction of schools in PGRI was without attention and control from local government 
over the standard of classrooms and their facilities. The development was executed by a private 
developer and directly under the supervision of a donor. The school has become better in physical 
appearance, such as clean toilets, tidy classrooms and office, and a school yard covered by concrete 
floor.  
However, the rebuilding of the school did not consider safety factors for pupils. There was only 
one door in every room with no emergency exit. The school has experienced repeated flooding 
almost every year with different volume of water coming to the area. There was no solution 
provided by the developer for facing future flooding, while the school location is near Cimanuk 
River. For example, there was no wall built around the school which could block water from 
flooding into the area.   
There were many donations for the development of public facilities in the prohibited area 
(Cimacan) from private enterprises or NGOs. There were many victims who returned to the area 
although they were prohibited. They needed public facilities such as mosques, a community hall, 
and public toilets. There was no action from local government to prohibit these developments. 
This may happen because Cimacan area is registered as part of a local government administrative 
area. There exists community organisations (RT and RW) which have functions as informal 
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administrative tiers of local government. These community organisations are acknowledged by 
local government, since they are regulated in Ministry of Internal Affair Regulation No. 5 of 2007 















Sources: upper images from participant documentation and lower images from fieldwork 
documentation. 
The Cimacan and Lapang Paris sites were planned for urban green spaces. Local government 
decided to build areas for park and green open space. Citizens who used to live in Lapang Paris 
vacated the site, since most of their houses had collapsed from flooding. The location is still 
abandoned up to now. There is no latest information from local government about the progress. In 
contrast, citizens from Cimacan mostly returned to their houses. They rebuilt or renovated their 




houses. Some of them received houses from the local government programme of relocation but 
they gave the houses to their family members such as to their children who did not have a house.  
The abandoned location was criticised by community leaders. They had a concept for revitalising 
the area of riverside. Their knowledge came from generation to generation of maintaining the river. 
Modernisation and government systems had ignored their existence. In their beliefs there is no 
disaster. Flooding occurred because of human negligence towards nature. One community leader 
stated that Lapang Paris could be designed for green space with minimum financing. He had 
offered his concept to local government, but he could not agree with government regulations for 
the programme.    
I and my colleagues tried to offer traditional concept [river treatment]. The 
concept is gradually accepted and understood [by government officers] but 
the problem is that it collides with government regulations. Since our concept 
collides with government regulation, we finally made a statement that we 
could not follow them [government] and they cannot possibly be forced to 
[follow] our concept because they [government officers] had to make reports 
and all those stuffs. (Community Leader) 
7.3.3. River rehabilitation 
The President of Republic of Indonesia visited to survey the Cimanuk River and he proposed to 
revitalise the river. He asked Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing to provide financing 
for this. The project was executed by central government without the involvement of local 
government. Central government assigned BBWS/Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai Cimanuk and 
Cisanggarung (Cimanuk and Cisanggarung River Basin Organisation) as the institution that would 
handle the duty since Cimanuk River is under the authority and responsibility of BBWS (see 
Chapter 5). It was insisted by a staff of BBWS who supervised the project: 
That is our project [developing river embankment]. There is no business with 
local government.  We just informed local government of Garut that we are 
going to build the embankment. (Staff of BBWS) 
It was admitted by the Regent of Garut that BBWS was central government business and it had its 
own programmes and activities. There was a coordination with local public works and public 
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housing department, but it just needed assistance for technical issues such as accessibility of 
vehicles to locations or dealing with local people: 
Their office is in Bandung [Province of West Java] and Jakarta 
[headquarter]. They did not know how the situation in Talegong [a village] 
is.  And we facilitated them to coordinate with sub-district and head of village. 
(Chief Executive of BPBD Garut)   
Cimanuk River rehabilitation consisted of two main projects. They were the development of the 
river embankment in the town (Figure 28) and the forest rehabilitation of the upper-stream of 
Cimanuk River (the forest rehabilitation is discussed in the next section). Development of the 
riverside embankment across the city of Garut was executed in the year following the flash 
flooding of 20th September 2016. It was aimed to channel water away from housing by building 
embankments which were higher than the ground level of community housing. The project was 
planned at national level without the involvement of local entities such as local government 
institutions, local NGOs, and communities.  
 
Figure 28: Development of Riverside Embankment Across the City of Garut 




The project was regarded as problem solving for flooding disaster, but it might trigger other 
disasters. Firstly, it was admitted that citizens in town area might be made safer by the high 
embankment since the water could be blocked, but this could give worse flooding to the 
downstream of Cimanuk River: 
They [government institutions] use embankments, but it does not give solution. 
It just moves disaster around the town of Garut. The water may not reach 
community housing [in town] because the embankment is higher. But, do they 
consider downstream? Can you imagine that water flows without any 
resistance? There should be a process for water flowing, such as rocks in the 
rivers, to break the flow in order to slow down the current. It [the project] 
seems like we give a tunnel or pipe for the water to flow and the water will 
run fast. Citizens in the town might be safe but what about the ones 
downstream? I think that it is [merely] instant solution. (Community Leader 
2) 
Secondly, the development of embankment used local materials, mainly rocks and sand. The 
project was executed by a private company that won the procurement mechanism in central 
government. As a business, the company would seek minimum cost for the project. They could 
lower the cost for materials if they purchase it from the nearest area since transportation would be 
cheaper. Although excavation in Mount Guntur is illegal for majority of locations, they could get 
materials by bribing some officers in government or the police. 
To the top [government officer] was managed by money from the company [in 
excavation]. Such as in Cilopang, the excavation area belongs to Mr. XXX. 
He will manage it [bribing to government officer]. He is the boss in that area 
since he has large area of land there and he got licence to exploit sand and 
rocks there. (Owner of rocks and sand mining in Garut) 
Cimanuk embankment construction was as long as 3.2 kilometres and took place in four different 
areas alongside the river across the city of Garut (Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing, 
2017). The project needed a lot of rocks and sand. This has caused massive excavation of Mount 





Figure 29: The Damage of Mount Guntur, that is Close to the City of Garut, by excavation for 
Project of Riverside Embankment of Cimanuk 
Source: Fieldwork documentation 
 
The project of riverside embankment of Cimanuk was complained about by local community 
group PATANJALA who still hold their belief about relationship between their community and 
nature. In their beliefs, development of the riverside embankment is not the right solution for 
overcoming flooding. Nature engineering should adapt to the natural situation: 
If engineering does not adapt to nature, it will create disaster. Logically is 
like this, when you destroy forests it will create disaster. If you are against 
nature, the nature will go against you. For example, you are as a human 
similar to nature [a living creature]. When someone muzzles your mouth and 
your nose, you will fight against them. If you cannot fight, you will die. This 
is similar to nature, if the nature is degraded, the nature will defend itself. 
(Community Leader 1) 
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The group believes that river reengineering is not the best solution for overcoming flooding. 
Members of the group stated that humans have to follow nature’s characteristics, not the other way 
around. They showed examples of a group of indigenous people who live in the restricted area of 
Banten and manage their life without interference from government. They never have experienced 
any flooding to their area since they protect and preserve their nature. Nature will react to the 
change created by humans. The change will return to humans themself. Nature will give un-
negotiable consequences for any change created by human.    
7.3.4. Afforestation programmes 
Local government of Garut received a great number of donations for recovery programmes, as 
stated earlier, allocated for housing. There was also big money received by local government from 
central government for afforestation programmes.  
We actually received money about 80 billion for recovery programmes from 
Ministry of Forestry. The programme was aimed for afforestation. But, it has 
not been executed up to now [late 2017], even though there was a warning 
from national directorate general of the spatial plan to the Regent regarding 
help [financial] for the recovery phase. This money was aimed to treat 
[nature] in order to avoid coming disasters by reforestation by re-planting 
trees. (Chief of Local Communication and Information of Garut)     
The afforestation programmes are divided into several programmes. There are seedling and tree 
planting. These programmes were executed by the Department of Plantation and Forestry of local 
government of Garut. There was a seedling project by local government using aeroplanes. 
Thousand of seeds were spread over the mountain and forest of Cimanuk River’s upper-stream.  
The seedling project was criticised by local environmentalist groups who joined in FK3I/Forum 
Komunikasi Kader Konservasi Indonesia (Communication Forum of Conservation Cadre of 
Indonesia) of Garut branch and local communities. They have the belief that seedlings is wasting 
money, since it costs a lot to rent aeroplanes. Besides, they argued that planting trees is not as 
simple as seedlings. The trees need regular treatment to make them grow. This opinion was 
supported by local communities who live near upper-stream of river. Some people who live there 
know more about characteristic and types of plantations which would grow in the area and how to 
treat them.    
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The seedling project ignored the situation in the area of mountains and forests. Most forest 
degradation is caused by land conversion for farming and tourism  (see Chapter 4). More than 60 
percent of deforestation is caused by land conversion according to Chief of Board of 
Environmental Management (Badan Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup Daerah/BPLHD) for West 
Java region (Kompas, 2016). Land conversions are conducted by individual farmers and investors 
who funded local farmers to grow certain crop commodities such as potato, chilli, and tomato. 
They converted PERHUTANI (State Forest Company) area. They had the opportunity to convert 
the area since they joined Program Hutan Berbasis Masyarakat/PHBM (Programme of 
Community Based Forestry). The programme aims to help farmers near PERHUTANI area 
economically and protect the forest.  
However, the programme was out of control. PHBM programme obliges farmers to conduct 
agroforestry. Practically, farmers plant crops without any tree surrounding the farming area or only 
a small number of trees (Figure 30). PERHUTANI refused to be blamed as the cause of flooding 
from area of Cimanuk watershed since PERHUTANI covers only 10.16 percent of the upper-
stream watershed of Cimanuk and from that percentage only 3.5 percent is land in critical condition 
(Republika, 2016). According to its corporate secretary, PERHUTANI owns only 14,282 hectares 
from the total of 140,553 hectares of the upper-stream watershed of Cimanuk.  The officer of 
PERHUTANI blamed local people who conduct land conversion as the cause of sedimentation. 
The corporate secretary of PERHUTANI also responded to accusations from the local government 
of Garut who blamed PERHUTANI and BKSDA (Natural Resources Conservation Agency). The 
secretary insisted that other departments are responsible for the other 90 percent of the area in 
critical condition (TEMPO, 2016).  Local Forestry department, as another department blamed by 
NGOs, claimed that it had limited numbers of staff and the coverage area of its responsibility 




Figure 30: Deforestation in upper-stream watershed of Cimanuk 
Source: documentation of FK3I of Garut branch (Communication Forum of Conservation Cadre 
of Indonesia) 
7.3.5. Economic recovery 
Besides the infrastructure reconstruction and afforestation programmes, there were rehabilitation 
and economic recovery programmes. Rehabilitation was conducted voluntarily by a number of 
NGOs such as FPRB/Forum Pengurangan Resiko Bencana (Forum of Disaster Risk Reductions) 
and WAPALAM (Student Association of Outdoor Activities). They visited victims in temporary 
shelters and they conducted trauma healing. There was not any effort executed by local 
government agencies and central government for trauma healing. the government rather focused 
on economic recovery. 
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Local government of Garut received financing from central government for economic recovery by 
offering victims new economic activities, such as by providing sidewalk carts for victims. The 
programme was claimed to be a failure. Most victims worked in traditional markets as porters, 
rickshaw drivers, ojek (motorbike taxi) riders, street hawkers, and shopkeepers in markets. Local 
government trained them to be self-employed as sidewalk cart owners who sell food in the street 
market. They received capital from local government to start their business. It worked only for a 
few months. Most of them returned to their previous jobs and they sold the cart. They did not have 
skills in the business although they had been trained by local government: 
It wasted money and created more problem regarding traffic. People [victims] 
got money for capital and carts for selling the things such as food and phone 
accessories. They had no passion in business and they could not run it. The 
majority of them returned to their previous activities [jobs] and they got 
money from selling the carts. Some people from outside the city bought the 
carts and continued the business. You know, the traffic in city is worse than 
before now. (Community Leader 1) 
 
Figure 31: Sidewalk carts were complained about by citizens because it created traffic jams in the 
city. The cart narrowed the size of streets and some people parked their vehicles in random places.    
Source: fieldwork documentation 
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Local government tended to focus on economic recovery for victims. They did not have any clue 
in distributing money from donors. This was executed without any prior research to help victims 
for their daily needs. This effort failed to help victims but it created another problem because it 
narrowed width of street. 
7.4. Collaboration Practices during Recovery Phase  
Collaboration during the recovery phase can be divided into two stages, during the short-term 
recovery and the long-term recovery. Short-term recovery was dominated by a chaotic situation 
where collaboration was made with the same goal, to help victims. There was no prior agreement 
or communication among them. They shared their skills and resources. Although they had their 
own organisation missions, most of them were voluntarily involved in the Task Force team. There 
was an administrative mechanism to record organisations or volunteers in the command post of 
the Task Force team, but some of them preferred to conduct activities by themselves. They inform 
the Task Force team if the team asks them to report, but it was not obligatory for them.  
Government could not handle all donations with the Task Force team when many organisations or 
individuals and volunteers created their own command posts near the location. There were 300 
posts spread in different locations. Most of them were in Cimacan area, since the area was the most 
exposed by media because many victims died in the area. They received donations from many 
sources without any control from local government. Local government could not force them to 
join the Task Force team since they were volunteers and they wanted to distribute donations by 
themselves:  
During Saturday and Sunday it was very crowded and there were 50 post 
commands [independent] in Cimacan. They managed their own donation and 
we could not control them. Donations came from private companies and were 
managed by them, PERSIS [Muslim Association] office was full of donations, 
Muhammadiyah [Muslim Organisation] and other organisations could not be 
controlled for their activities. (Regent of Garut)  
They inform the team about their activities, such as distribution, only if the team asks them. The 
reason the team asked them was motivated by the unequal distribution of donations to victims. 
Although it was not easy to reach this ideal situation. Some victims who were lucky could get good 
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stuff and money, but others were in hunger.  This created social conflict in the community. They 
scrambled to get donations which sometimes ended in fighting. 
Many victims had been evacuated to temporary shelters but distribution of donations, such as food, 
clothes, drink, blanket and money was still going on. It was not clear whether the recipients were 
victims or just people who claimed to be victims to get donations. Some volunteers who opened 
command posts could not be verified for their motives. Communities around the area informed me 
that some volunteers were criminals who took advantage from the situation for personal benefit.  
In long-term recovery, collaboration occurred in several programmes. They were housing, 
afforestation, reconstruction of embankment, and rebuilding the bridge programmes. The 
programmes were conducted by government (local and national). Government did not execute 
those programmes with their agencies but transferred the duty to private companies. The 
government’s role was to control the programmes. The programmes were not organised in one 
stop recovery and rehabilitation system. Central government programmes were executed by 
companies that won project bidding without involving local government. It was the same for local 
government programmes who were without synchronisation with central government. The main 
issues were coordination.        
7.4.1. Coordination 
There is a tradition of pass the buck (blame to other institutions) in the local government of Garut 
if there is a problem with a policy and programme. Every institution tries to avoid their 
responsibility by pointing to other institutions. It happens among local government agencies or 
local government agencies with central government agencies. If there is a question from citizens 
about the failure of a programme, they will try to avoid responsibility by pointing to other 
institutions. It occurred in the recovery programme of river rehabilitation: 
Oh, no way, you know that river is the authority of central government 
through the Ministry of Public Works and under them is the BBWS (River 
Basin Organisation). Because it is the authority of central government, so it 
did not come to local government [the budget]. All [river rehabilitation 
programmes] were from central government. (Local Government Officer of 
Board of Local Development Planning of Garut) 
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Recovery and rehabilitation of Cimanuk River did not only involve treatment of the river stream 
by building up the embankment. It included the afforestation programme. The afforestation 
programme was under the authority of the forestry department. The department is from provincial 
government not local government as mandated by Law No. 32 of 2014 (Government of Indonesia, 
2014a). There is a sub-department of the forestry department, but it has the responsibility over the 
provincial level and if not responsible to local government at municipal level. The relationship 
between forestry department and local government is only one of coordination and communication 
during the programmes. However, their coordination and communication were not optimum: 
Because some areas belong to PERHUTANI (State Forest Company), local 
government has little authority for utilisation and control of its space because 
some of the areas are not under local government authority. Moreover, local 
government does not have authority for forest management [based on Law 32 
of 2014]. (Local Government Officer of Board of Local Development 
Planning of Garut) 
This was confirmed by the Chief Executive of BKSDA (Natural Resources Conservation Agency) 
that central government representative institutions had to follow tasks, instructions, and policies 
from central government: 
Yes, we are part of central government department from Ministry of Forestry. 
Our daily operations are from central government [instructions]. But, if there 
is a programme for rehabilitation of forest from local government and the 
programme is in our area, local government might ask our organisation for 
execution. (Chief Executive of Natural Resources Conservation Agency) 
Local government faced difficulties to control and manage spatial plans in areas where they were 
under central government authorities such as PERHUTANI, Forestry Department, and Natural 
Resources Conservation Agency. There were a lot of deforestation cases occurring in 
PERHUTANI area because PERHUTANI had a programme called PHBM/Pengelolaan Hutan 
Berbasis Masyarakat (Programme of Community Based Forestry). The programme was aimed to 
include communities’ participation in protecting forests and the community would get benefit from 
the activities by allowing them to farm in the area.  In practice, the programme had created more 
problems for the forest. Farmers were informed that they were not allowed to plant crops, but they 
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had to plant trees which fruits they could harvest annually or in several months, such as coffee, 
mango, jackfruit, and so on. The farmers ignored the instruction and they planted crops such as 
vegetables. There was no real action from PERHUTANI to solve the problem. Farmers did not 
receive any consequence for misconduct in PHBM programme.    
Coordination issues in the recovery phase occurred in relationship between government 
institutions and citizens (including non-government organisations and community associations). 
Government institutions such as BBWS, PERHUTANI, and Department of Public Works and 
Housing executed the programmes with minimum participation from communities. They worked 
based on allocated budget and it might be regarded as a success if all budgets were implemented. 
This was what they called accountability. One of the local NGOs (FPRB) admitted that they found 
difficulties in putting forward their ideas or opinions. The afforestation programme is an example 
of this.  The Forestry department did not listen to the advice of those familiar with the area, such 
as FPRB, that simply seeding the ground was not enough.  
7.5. Summary  
The recovery phase follows the activity of the response phase in disaster management. The 
aftermath of previous flooding created many programmes from central and local government. The 
programmes involved participation from communities, private companies and NGOs. However, 
most of the government programmes were organised and executed by government. Government 
invited private companies to run programmes through bidding mechanism. This mechanism was 
not clean from corruption, collusion, and nepotism in their implementation. Central government 
programmes are normally executed by big companies in Indonesia. Their motives are pure for 
business purposes for taking profit. As the result, the programmes gave minimum effect of 
prevention for overcoming flooding problem. In the worst case, this might create another natural 
disaster such as landslides caused by excavation in Mount Guntur.      
On the other hand, the local people have offered a different approach in the recovery phase. They 
believe that nature is not a subject which can be manipulated by humans. Cimanuk River 
embankment was claimed as the wrong solution according to them. They stated that flooding will 
still happen to the City of Garut if humans ignore the characteristics of the river itself. River 
embankment just moved flooding from certain places to other places. The local people believe that 
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nature is their responsibility to protect it. The failure in protection of nature will have consequences 
for them or for other people around the area. 
Two different concepts of recovery from both modern and local wisdom approaches have insisted 
on a different context of accountability. The state’s understanding of accountability is more to 
human relationships. The failure of execution of activities may result in a consequence from other 
actors such as a penalty or punishment. The consequence is a negotiable process which sometimes 
can be manipulated by rationalisation. Accountability is understood as formal mechanisms of 
reporting to higher position. 
The local people’s concept of accountability in facing flooding is more to their obligations  to the 
laws of nature. They believe that flooding will not happen if humankind follows these laws. The 
consequences faced by humans are the result of the failure to follow the characteristics of the 
natural environment.    
This condition explains that there are two types of accountability within this context. There is a 
relational accountability among humans (government agencies, volunteers, Donors NGOs).  This 
accountability type is negotiable. The accountability is created on demand from account holders. 
The second accountability is between human and nature.  This accountability is non-negotiable. 









In this chapter, I review findings of the thesis and I reflect on the theoretical framework. This 
chapter consists of six sections. The first section depicts and summarises the conclusions from 
each chapter of the thesis. The second section outlines the main conclusions and answers the 
research questions. The third section discusses the contribution of this research to our knowledge 
on collaborative working and accountability in response to repeated disasters. The fourth section 
reflects on the limitations of the research and possible areas for further research. The fifth section 
reflects on the theoretical framework and the final section offers a closing comment.    
8.2.1 Summary of Chapters 
This study has sought to understand accountability relationships in collaborative work in response 
to repeated disaster and, specifically, to repeated flooding in the city of Garut. There were three 
objectives for this study: the first, to examine the role of each actor that played roles in response 
to repeated flooding; the second, to examine working relationship between different actors; and 
the last, to understand the effect of accountability arrangements in each disaster management 
phase. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature relevant to this study. Much of this literature, in particular that 
on accountability, develops concepts that have been developed in a Western European and North 
American context. Even here, the meaning of accountability is contested (Rowe, 1999) because it 
can mean different things for different people (Blagescu, et al., 2005; Bovens, 2007; B. S. Romzek 
& Dubnick, 1987a; Schillemans & Busuioc, 2014). In thinking about accountability relationships 
in the context of collaborations, such as those we see in disaster responses, the literature  suggests 
that accountabilities become a challenge (Koliba, Mills, et al., 2011b) because many hands are 
involved in this setting. And in response to disasters, research has focused on a single disaster 
event, such as the Challenger tragedy (B. S. Romzek & Dubnick, 1987c) or hurricane Katrina  
(Baker, 2014; Koliba, Zia, et al., 2011; United States Government Accountabilty Office, 2006). 
The literature then indicates a significant absence of studies that consider collaboration and 
accountability relationships in the context of repeated disasters and in a developing society, a 
prismatic society (Riggs, 1960), such as Indonesia.  
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Chapter 3 explained the research methodology which is employed in this study. This research uses 
a case study as a strategy to answer the proposed research questions. A case study is the best suited 
to understanding social phenomena (Yin, 2014). A constructivist paradigm is used, reflecting the 
fact that accountability can mean different things to different people (Bovens, 2006; Bovens, et 
al., 2008; Barbara Romzek, 2014). The meaning is interpreted by human experiences which may 
differ from one to another. This chapter also outlined the data collection methods in this study. 
This study conducted semi-structured interviews with actors involved in the disaster management 
cycle in Garut. In addition, it has drawn upon documents, media and observations at the scene. 
Although this is a study of repeated flooding, it took participants who were involved in the 
response to the flooding that occurred in late of 2016. However, the other three phases (mitigation, 
preparedness and recovery) are explored through the same participants, most of whom have been 
involved in repeated flooding.  
Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7 presented the analysis of the case study. Chapter 4 analysed accountability 
for mitigation and Chapter 5 discussed accountability for the preparedness phase. These two 
phases were dominated by three government development plans (long-term, plan, medium-term 
plan, short-term plan). Local government involved people (citizens, NGOs, professionals, 
academicians, etc.) during the planning process. However, this participation was largely fictional. 
Local government failed to distribute information openly to people in general about its plans for 
prevention and preparedness in the case of flooding. Instead, plans were dominated by economic 
development objectives. They took no account of local wisdom with regard to the management of 
the natural resources of the Cimanuk river. The state regarded people as spectators. They could 
protest and criticise the state but they could not change the game and the result. Not only did the 
plans not mitigate against flooding, they aggravated the conditions that would ensure flooding 
recurred regularly. Preparations for those foreseeable floods were minimal and largely tokenistic. 
Chapter 6 focused on the response phase, taking the flooding of 20th-21st September 2016 as an 
example. The collaboration necessary for an effective response quickly became uncoordinated. 
BPBD, as the main actor in disaster management in the local context, failed in its function. There 
was a chaotic and uncoordinated response which cost 34 lives, 20 missing, dozens injured and 
thousands evacuated. Their duties were taken by the local military force, a decision that had 
positive and negative consequences. Military was admired for its agility during the response, but 
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they showed less understanding of how to work with other actors and with victims. Confusion, 
duplication in some areas, neglect in others and competing accountabilities arose during the 
response phase.  
These problems then continued to affect efforts to recover after the disaster, efforts discussed in 
Chapter 7. There were two major phases, the short-term and long-term recovery phases. Both were 
hampered by a rushed assessment of the scale of the disaster.  Furthermore, the longer-term 
recovery failed to learn from previous programmes and from local knowledge. Some programmes 
aggravated the problems that had caused the flooding. The building up of the river embankment 
and bridge redevelopment caused the illegal and uncontrolled sand and rock excavation on the top 
of mount Guntur, causing landslides in a community who live in the nearby area. Moreover, the 
raised river embankment did not solve the problem. Flooding has occurred again on 5 June 2017, 
22 February 2018, 19 January 2019 in the same locations, forcing people to flee to save their life.  
These four chapters present a detailed case. They identify failures in each phase of the disaster 
management cycle. It might be argued that it would be unreasonable to expect to find a faultless 
process, particularly in Indonesia. But this is in the context of repeated flooding. Table 1 detailed 
a number of recent incidents, yet, in the case analysed here, it was as if it had never happened 
before. More than that, failures at each phase aggravated the problems faced in the next. The 
absence of appropriate plans and the failure to enforce restrictions on land use ensure that flooding 
will recur. Lack of preparation ensures that the response phase will be chaotic. This in turn means 
that the recovery phase is hampered by confusion and a lack of resources. And the plans are ones 
that take no account of their longer-term impact. Reporting and accountability relationships broke 
down at every phase, not least because of the multiplicity of conflicting interests and relationships 
at play. At the heart of all these problems was the absence of any sense of responsibility as actors 
sought to take credit for their actions and pass any blame elsewhere. And because it affected only 
relatively small numbers of people, democratic mechanisms, which are weak and diffuse, will not 
function to correct this situation. 
The case study has also revealed a further accountability relationship which has not been 
considered fully to date. The state uses formal accountability mechanisms between its agencies 
and from local to provincial and national tiers. The focus is on formal accountabilities which was 
manifested in plans and reports. The community was formally part of these relationships, but in a 
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largely passive role. However, the communities in and around Garut might have offered a valuable 
input to these plans and reports. They live close to the river and, drawing upon long held animistic 
beliefs, regarded nature as part of their daily life. They believed that disasters occurred because of 
human negligence towards nature. They protected nature as they protected themselves. The failure 
to protect nature is believed to lead to disaster for them. The obligation to protect nature came 
from themselves. They have learnt how to treat nature from generation to generation, offering 
better solutions in facing flooding. The state and the people treated nature differently. They could 
not meet to solve repeated flooding problem since they had different perspectives in seeing nature. 
As a result, people regarded the state (local government) as an administrative office which did not 
help people with their problems. Local government had little power to command and instruct the 
people since people did not feel that local government helped them. There was no learning from 
local government since it did not threaten their position. They kept with their programmes of 
recovery which were budget based programmes and applying formal process of accountability.           
8.2. The Conclusion of This research 
8.2.1. Reflection on questions 
The objectives of this research is to answer following questions: 
1. What are the roles of the different actors in disaster management? 
2. What are the working relationships between the different actors? 
3. How do accountability arrangements affect actions in every disaster phase?  
To the first question, almost all actors make their most significant contribution during the response 
phase. They pay much less attention to the other three phases. There are significant roles from 
community leaders in all phases of disaster management. This is caused by their involvement with 
citizens and they have learnt from previous flooding disasters. Government contributes to disaster 
management with a project-based approach. Actors from government institutions will execute any 
disaster management phase if there is an allocated budget from national, regional or local 
government.  
To the second question, there are two main working relationships among actors. They are formal 
and informal. Government agencies have formal and informal mechanisms in collaboration with 
other agencies. Formal mechanisms are usually instructed by their higher authority. Informal 
mechanisms are normally voluntary work between agencies to help the Local Disaster 
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Management Board. Some NGOs have formal collaboration with government. This formal 
collaboration is normally in executing pre-disaster projects, such as afforestation.    
To the last question, there are two accountability concepts. The first is relational accountability 
among humans. This accountability is basically negotiable. The accountability within this concept 
can be negotiated among them. They can manage accountability based on demand from account 
holders. The second is accountability between human and nature.  This accountability is non-
negotiable. Nature gives consequences based on what humans do to nature. In the case of this 
research, government agencies may claim that they have fulfilled their duties based on their plans. 
The plans can be managed and rationalised by them, that their activities are crucial and important 
to prevent flooding. However, their claims could not prevent repeated flooding. Some communities 
who live in rural areas practised this type of accountability. But, these communities are small in 
number. They still have strong relationship with nature.   
Local government systems in Garut were designed by central government and implemented by 
local government with some additional modifications to accommodate the different type of 
community who live in the area. The views of disaster management based on the state lens, with 
its rationalities, and the people’s view of natural disaster gave a dynamic aspect to the process of 
disaster response. There were very complex characteristics of people who live in the city 
responding to repeated flooding. Some people believe that their life is as an integral part of nature 
and preserving nature is as a part of their accountability. The repeated flooding is believed as 
punishment from God for their negligence. It was used by government officers to claim that 
repeated flooding was not their failure, but uncontrollable nature. Local government officers may 
retain trust from this type of people who keep paying taxes. Moreover, local government officers 
convinced them of the value and importance of the state during the response phase by providing 
them with food, drink, blankets etc. Other people believe that government failed to understand 
natural characteristics and how to manage them. 
    
8.2.2 Contribution 
This research adopts the concept of the prismatic society to understand accountability in disaster 
management context. Disaster management involves different actors who contribute to its phases. 
These actors may face different types of accountability. Some scholars give a narrow concept of 
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accountability as a social interaction among humans. This research has sought to develop a more 
detailed understanding of these interactions by analysing accountability in collaborative settings 
in four phases of disaster management (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery). In 
addition to traditional ways of analysing and assessing accountability, I also include an ecological 
perspective as a way to study and measure accountability.  
The accountability concept which is adopted by the Indonesian government, and particularly in 
local government of Garut, is a western concept of accountability. This focuses on transactional 
accountability between government and its people, and also among people. This western concept 
is adopted in Indonesia’s public administration, but it is a concept that does not suit its 
environmental situation. As Riggs claimed, a developing country is different from a developed 
country. This impacts on not only the governmental system but also wider society. Local 
government of Garut values accountability with western perspectives of accountability. There is 
no specific consideration of an understanding accountability which includes nature. Flooding is 
not a pure natural disaster. There are some human factors which affect the natural enironment. 
This interference brings consequences for humanity. This is a new concept of accountability which 
includes nature as part of the accountability system.  
Theories of accountability are dominated by the interactions of humans. This can be seen in 
assessment of accountability by using the three perspectives of social interaction (democratic, 
constitutional, and learning perspectives). Nature plays no part in these models. This research 
found that there is another accountability concept that embraces nature in interaction among 
humans. This accountability is non-negotiable type of accountability. Nature will give 
consequences if people fail to protect and preserve it. This is also an older understanding of 
relationships, one drawing on older traditions and beliefs, including animism. It lingers on during 
the current prismatic phase of Indonesia’s development. We might consider whether it should play 
a more prominent role as Indonesia develops. Accountability should include nature as a part of the 
accountability system 
This understanding of accountability casts some of the findings of this case study in a fresh 
perspective. In the mitigation phase, understanding the accountabilities between citizens and the 
state has failed to engage with the non-negotiable relationship with nature. All plans, and in 
particular their enforcement, must take these into account if repeated disasters are to be avoided or 
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managed more effectively. In thinking then also about preparation, the same local knowledge, of 
the behavior of the river’s waters, represents a more effective warning system than any other. 
Working with the local knowledge of the land and the rivers in developing emergency plans, 
delivering preparatory education and conducting rehearsals, would represent a significant 
development on the current situation. Taking that same attitude into the response phase, 
recognizing the capacity and resources of the community, of families and neighbours would enable 
other resources to focus on those unable to help themselves. Working with local institutions, and 
drawing on the disaster response expertise of voluntary agencies and NGOs, would allow other 
agencies to manage and coordinate the influx of visitors, donations and volunteers. Finally, closing 
the loop, the recovery phase must take account of lessons from the past in managing the investment 
in infrastructure, in rebuilding and in prevention through afforestation and other initiatives. 
Western models of accountability are proven wanting in the context of repeated disasters in 
Indonesia. That these disasters repeat is testimony to that. Accountability models adopted from the 
west fail to prevent repeated flooding. The state sees accountability as a formal process to report 
its activities and it neglects the more essential purposes of accountability.  
Indonesia is a country with a relatively recent experience of both feudalism and of  colonisation. 
It struggles to practice western understandings of accountability that requires more transparency, 
democracy and engagement of citizens in its processes and in its public administration system. 
Indonesian citizens are passive in demanding accountability from their state. Local government 
dominates economic development, such as in the exploitation of natural resources, unlike those 
states from which the accountability concept is adopted. At the same time, the neoliberal economic 
model in developed countries does not suit Indonesia because of those same characteristics of 
society. The exploitation of natural resources could worsen existing potential for natural disasters 
because the community has a very limited involvement in economic development, allowing 
corporations could to dominate decision-making. Corruption, already a major problem in a 
prismatic society such as Indonesia, could then further exacerbate this. 
Local government uses accountability as a rhetorical device to justify its activities. Local 
government institutions may claim that they have fulfilled their duty of accountability to 
communities by accelerating economic development, such as tourism and dairy farming in this 
research case. But this has consequences in terms of the deterioration of the natural environment. 
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Local government development plans fail to prevent flooding which costs human life and wealth. 
This further exacerbated by failure of disaster management. Local government needs instead to 
create mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge and experiences from previous leaders of agency 
to the new one. By doing this, they can maintain plans and programmes of disaster management. 
Western concept of accountability which focuses on a social interaction has largely ignored the 
duty of accountability to nature because local government focuses on convincing communities that 
its development plans will accelerate the development of the area. In disaster responses, local 
government is concerned to allocate budgets to prevent and mitigate disaster. However, the 
economic motives have neglected local community wisdom and knowledge in preserving nature 
which might contribute to long term community prosperity and safety. 
Local government agencies can blame each other when disaster happens. Citizens may regard this 
catastrophe as beyond the capacity or responsibility of local government. But this is to obscure 
their responsibility deforestation, mining and land conversion that have aggravated, or arguably 
caused, flooding in the city.   
To sum up, there are three relational accountability models in this research. There is a model of 
accountability between community (citizens) and nature, the state and community, and between 
the state and nature. Communities have their sense of responsibility to preserve nature as part of 
their living environment. They depend on nature in undertaking their life. They have strong beliefs 
that their failure to protect and preserve nature will affect them, as is evident in disasters. Disasters 
are a consequence of a failure to conserve and protect nature in the course of their activities. They 
regard nature not as an object to be exploited but as part of their life which they must be responsible 
for. A legacy of animist beliefs, in which nature is regarded as God, is manifested in their respect 
to nature. They believe that nature will punish them with disasters if they fail to protect it. In 
contrast, they will have prosperity such as a good harvest and sufficient water during the dry season 
if they treat nature accordingly. Their accountability to nature is without any coercion. This is an 
integral part of their life   
A model of accountability between the state and community is a transactional interaction. There 
is no clear accountability mechanism from the state to its citizens. The state could negotiate its 
accountability to citizens by conducting rationalisation of its activities. Local government officers 
could claim that they are accountable if they have reported their activities to members of 
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parliament, as representatives of the citizens. There is no direct accountability mechanism from 
the state to communities. The communities have a weak power to request accountability from local 
government officers because they are unable to have a significant consequence if the state fails to 
fulfil its accountability.  
The last model of accountability is from the state to nature. Local government has failed to 
recognise its accountability to nature. This is manifested by repeated flooding in the city of Garut. 
While the state is formally responsible for the exploitation and conservation of natural resources, 
this is not a symbiotic relationship such as the one between the community and the natural 
environment. Instead, it is an economic relationship. On paper, plans seek to rationally balance 
different land use needs. But the extractive demands of commercial exploitation, aided by 
corruption, dominate the implementation of these plans at a local level. However, the state’s 
accountability to nature is not so easily avoided. Nature does not negotiate and disasters result, 
exposing the failures of the democratic relationship between the state and the communities 
affected, and specifically the failures of disaster management.   
8.3.Limitation 
Understanding the prismatic society in one local government district of Indonesia cannot simply 
be generalised to other local governments, to other regions, or to the central government of 
Indonesia, although the state characteristics are similar from one place to the next. Moreover, this 
research attempts to analyse the response of public administration to repeated disasters in one local 
government district of Indonesia. There are 416 local government units in Indonesia which might 
be different in the ways they manage disasters. There is a need to understand the governing systems 
and their relationship to their natural environment of the indigenous peoples, of which there are 
many hundred different peoples across the many islands of Indonesia, in order to enlighten our 
understanding of this prismatic society. Further research, with an historical perspective, might 
enrich the finding from this research. However, the majority of tribe cultures in Indonesia have a 
spoken culture. They distribute their knowledge and experience mouth to mouth from one 
generation to the next generations. The concept of accountability as a relationship between the 
state, the community and nature in this research is limited to repeat flooding in an area in which 
many local people still have a strong belief in the power of nature. The conclusions might be very 
different if this research were conducted in a metropolitan district, such as Jakarta, which faces 
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Appendix IV: Glossary of Terms 
 
Abbreviation Organisation/ Phrases English Translation 
BAPPEDA Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Daerah 
Local Government Officer of Board 
of Local Development Planning of 
Garut 
BBWS Balai Besar Wilayah Sungai 
Cimanuk-= Cisanggarung   
Cimanuk-Cisanggarung River Basin 
BKSDA Balai Konservasi Sumber Daya 
Alam 
Natural Resources Conservation 
Agency 
BPMPT Badan Penanaman Modal dan 
Pelayanan Terpadu 
Board of Investment and Integrated 
Services 
BPKAD Badan Pengelolaan Keuangan dan 
Aset Daerah 
Board of Financial Management 
and Local Asset 
BPBD Badan Penanggulangan Bencana 
Daerah 
Local Board Disaster Management 
BNPB Badan Nasional Penanggulangan 
Bencana 
National Board Disaster 
Management 
DLHKP Dinas Lingkungan Hidup 
Kebersihan dan Pertamanan 
Environment and Gardening Agency 
DPPKA Dinas Pendapatan, Pengelolaan 
Keuangan dan Aset Daerah 
Department of Local Revenue, 
Finance, and Asset Management 
FK3I Forum Komunikasi Kader 
Konservasi Indonesia 
Communication Forum of 
Indonesian Conservation Cadre 
FPRB Forum Pengurangan Resiko 
Bencana 
Disaster Risk Mitigation Forum 
FORKOPIMDA Forum Komunikasi Pimpinan 
Daerah 
Communication Forum of Local 
Government Leader 
Karang Taruna  youth organisation 
KODIM Komando Distrik Militer Military District Command 
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Corruption Eradication Commission 
LKD Lembaga Kemasyarakatan Desa village community institutions 
Musrenbang Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan Development Planning Multi-
Stakeholders Consultation Meeting 
Muhammadiyah  Muslim Organisation) 
PERSIS Persatuan Islam Muslim Association 
PGRI Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia Republic of Indonesia Teacher 
Association 
PERHUTANI Perusahaan Perhutanan Indonesia State Forest Company 
PHBM Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Hutan 
Bersama Masyarakat 
Community Based Forest 
Management 
PKK Pemberdayaan Kesejahteraan 
Keluarga 
Empowerment of Family Welfare 
Organisation 
Posyandu Pos Pelayanan Terpadu Integrated Service Post 
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PUPR Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan 
Rakyat 
Public Works and Public Housing 
PVMB Pusat Vulkanologi dan Mitigasi 
Bencana Geologi 
Center for Volcanology and 
Geological Hazard Mitigation 
RPJPD Rencana Pembangunan Jangka 
Panjang Daerah 
a long-term local development plan 
RPJMD Rencana Pembangunan Jangka 
Menengah Daerah 
a medium-term local development 
plan 
RKPD Rencana Kerja Pembangunan 
Daerah   
a working plan/short-term plan 
RT Rukun Tetangga neighbourhood group 
RW Rukun Warga   community association 
RTRW Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Spatial Plan 
Sekda Sekretaris Daerah Local Secretary 
TAGANA Taruna Siaga Bencana Cadets on Disaster Alert 
UUPR Undang-Undang Penataan Ruang Law of Spatial Plan 
WAPALAM Wahana Mahasiswa Pecinta Alam Student Association of Outdoor 
Activities 





Appendix V: Semi-Structured Interview Questions Guide 
 
Sub Topic: Collaborative working 
1. What do you know about working collaboratively? 
2. Would you rather to work alone or to work with other institution in every phase of 
disaster management you involve? 
3. Dou you trust to other institution where you work together? 
4. Is there any conflict when working with other organisations/ institutions? 
5. Why do you want/don’t want to work collaboratively in responses to disaster 
management? 
6. Do you find difficult to work with other institutions/organisations? What is the problem 
to work with other organisation? 
7. What would you do if you found other organisations did not work well? Would you give 
them any sanction?  
8. Is there any commitment among organisation involved in disaster management? 
9. What do you share with other organisation? Do you find easy to get information from 
other organisations? 
10.  Have you ever invited for a meeting by Local Board of Disaster Management? 
11. How often do you interact with other organisations? And how do you communicate? 
12. How to coordinate with other organisation? 
13. Who does evaluate your duty? 
 
Sub Topic: Accountability 
1. What is your role when flood hit the city? 
2. To whom do you responsible for your job? 
3. From where do you get financial support? 
4. How do you report your jobs? Internally or externally? 
5. What is your organisation objectives and goals? 
6. Is there any report do you prepare for community/ victims? 
7. Do you think media influence your organisation reputation? 
8. Who does control your job? 
9. Do you find that you have done the job as community expected? 
10. What do you know about accountability? 
11. Do you care about your accountability?  
12. Which one is your priority, saving people life or you follow the procedure and slow in 
responses? 
13. Do you report your activities to other organisations and media? 
14. Is there anyone blaming to you or to others for the problem in the field? 
15. If there is any complain to you, what have you done? 
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Sub topic: Natural disaster responses 
1. How often do you involve in responses to natural disasters? 
2. Why do you involve in this job? 
3. In what type of natural disasters do you involve? 
4. When natural disaster occurs, what is the first thing you do? 
5. Is there any technology do you use in response to natural disasters? 
6. What kind of preparation do you do to face natural disasters? Any short-term or long 
term planning? If so, do you find this useful? 
7. What kind of problems do you find in logistics distribution to the victims? 
8. How to get information about current situation in the site of natural disaster? 
9. How do you mobilise your logistics? 
 
 
